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INTRODUCTION

There are two reasonable conclusions about the delivery of
health care in America. First, managed care and managed competition predominately determine the amount and the quality of care
physicians give to patients, causing some observers to complain
about managed care's propensities to reduce the quality of health
care.' Second, health care is delivered in a manner that has a racially
disproportionate impact on African Americans and other minorities,
even when poverty and lack of financial resources are not causative
factors. 2
In the highly politicized debate over the quality of health care
and racism, litigants have asked the Supreme Court to decide two
"right-to-die" cases. In Washington v. Glucksberg,' physicians, and several terminally ill patients who died before the Supreme Court's decision, asserted that Washington's assisted suicide ban denied terminally ill patients a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest that
allegedly encompassed their decisions to undergo physician-assisted
suicide.4 Similarly, in Vacco v. Quill, physicians and terminally ill patients challenged New York's ban on assisted suicide on the grounds
that it denied equal protection of the law because these patients
could not receive physician-assisted suicide when other competent
patients could forgo life-sustaining medical treatment.6 In Glucksberg,
the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not grant individuals a fundamental liberty interest in "assistance in committing suicide."7 In Quill, the Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not preclude a state from outlawing physician-assisted suicide
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See LarryJ. Pittman, "Any WillingProvidef"Laws and ERISA's Saving Clause: A
New Solutionfor an Old Problem, 64 TENN. L. REv. 409, 412-27 (1997).
See text accompanying notes 176-196 infra
3 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
4 See id. at 2261-62.
117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
See id. at 2296.
7 See Gludksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275.
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while simultaneously allowing in appropriate cases the withdrawal of
life-sustaining medical treatment.8
The following discussion analyzes the impact of Glucksberg and
Quill on physician-assisted suicide in general and on African Americans and other disfavored minorities in particular. Part II discusses
the Court's cases on the "right-to-die," including Glucksberg's conclusion that the decision regarding the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide should be left to states as experimenting laboratories. Part
III analyzes some of the potential implications of states' regulation of
physician-assisted suicide, concentrating on probable racial discrimination in the practical application of physician-assisted suicide. The
conclusion is that physician-assisted suicide should be made available
for those terminally ill patients whose pain cannot be controlled by
pain medication. States, however, should enact and enforce stringent laws to prevent physicians from coercing patients into involuntary physician-assisted suicide and to adequately punish those who
do engage in such conduct.
Part IV examines physicians' involvement in discriminating
against African-American patients from slavery to the present time.
Part V examines the philosophical underpinning of the Thirteenth
Amendment and asserts that the amendment's supporters intended
to outlaw both the master-slave relationship and "badges and incidents" of slavery, including present-day racial discrimination in society and in the health care industry.
Part VI evaluates the Supreme Court's Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence and concludes that the Court should refocus its interpretation of the amendment by recognizing the "black inferiority"
theory as the foundational support of slavery. Therefore, the Court
should interpret the amendment as outlawing all forms of racial discrimination that perpetuate status based on alleged "black inferiority."
Part VII argues that the Court and lower-level federal courts
should acknowledge an individual's right to bring direct racial discrimination claims under the Thirteenth Amendment, including
claims based on the disproportionate impact of facially neutral policies and practices. This section also suggests strict scrutiny as the
appropriate standard of review for those claims. Part VIII discusses
some areas in which direct claims under the Thirteenth Amendment
might be used to eradicate racism in the health care industry, including the potential racial application of physician-assisted suicide.
a See Quill 117 S. Ct. at 2301-02.
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THE RIGHT-TO-DIEJURISPRUDENCE

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,9 the Court assumed, without deciding, that the Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest "would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition" even if the
refusal causes death. 10
The Court further held that, given the personal nature of the
decision and the state's interest in ensuring that incompetent patients' wishes are honored, Missouri could require surrogate decisionmakers to show by clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent patient would forgo life-sustaining nutrition and
9

497 U.S. 261 (1990).

10 Id. at 279. The Court did not accept the courts' opinions in In re Quinlan, 70

N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) and in Superintendent of Beichertown State School v.
Saiketwicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) that the right of privacy established in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 78 (1987) was
broad enough to encompass a patient's refusal of life-sustaining treatment. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. Therefore, that issue is still open.
Cruzan is somewhat confusing regarding the source of the liberty interest to
refuse hydration and nutrition. Although the Court cited many state court opinions
that based the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment on the common law informed-consent doctrine, the Court arguably did not rely on that doctrine. See id. at
277. The Court apparently relied on several of its opinions that limited a state's
ability to restrain its citizens' personal freedom without their consent. See id. at 27879 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 494 (1980);Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)). Admittedly, one could make an argument that the personal restraints at issue in those
cases are tantamount to the common law informed consent doctrine because both
involve nonconsensual invasion of one's bodily integrity. As the liberty interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment was implicated, however, and since the states in
those cases were attempting to restrain the complaining parties, a more appropriate
manner of classifying the protected liberty interest might be to call it an interest
against a state's "restraint [of] and intrusion" into one's body. See id. at 288
(O'Connor,J., concurring).
Even though the Court assumed that a competent person has the right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition, and presumably other types of treatments,
see id. at 279, that assumption might have been for the purpose of the Cruzan case
only:
Although we think the logic of the cases discussed above would embrace such a liberty interest, the dramatic consequences involved in
refusal of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether the
deprivation of that interest is constitutionally permissible. But for
purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
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hydration if she were competent." The Court, however, did not establish whether a person's liberty interest includes a right to demand
physician-assisted suicide. Presently, Glucksberg and Quill appear to
establish that it does not.'"
B. Washington v. Glucksberg-The Right to Refuse LifeSustaining Treatment Does Not Include the Right to Demand
Physician-AssistedSuicide
1.

A Partial Clarification of Cruzan's Scope

The Court in Glucksberg did not accept the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Cruzan. Whereas
the Ninth Circuit relied in part on Cruzan to conclude that a terminally ill person has a liberty interest in controlling the time and
manner of her death," the Court established that, at best, Cruzan is
limited to its assumption that a competent, terminally ill person can
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment despite the foreseeability of
death.'4 The difference in interpretation stemmed from the way that
the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit framed the question presented. 5
Comparing the common-law right to refuse medical treatment
and its case law precedent creating a liberty interest against
"unwanted medical treatment," the Court established that Cruzan
spoke only to a liberty interest in refusing forced treatment and not
to a primary liberty interest in hastening death. 6 The Court based its
1 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-85. Although Cruzan involved only nutrition and
hydration, the Court's assumption of a liberty interest should logically extend to
other life-sustaining treatment.
See infranotes 13-30 and 52-57 and accompanying text.
See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 814-16 (9th Cir. 1996).
14 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2269-70
(1997).
15 Instead of accepting the lower court's statement of the
issue-whether one
has a "constitutional right to aid in killing oneself"-the Ninth Circuit reframed the
issue as "whether there is a liberty interest in determining the time and manner of
one's death." Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 801. Relying on the approach that the

Court used in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1993) when analyzing a woman's right to
an abortion, the Ninth Circuit thought that the proper mode of analysis was to
identify the relevant constitutionally protected liberty interest before deciding
whether the state statutory prohibition against assisted suicide "unconstitutionally
restricted the exercise of that liberty interest." Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 801-

02. The Ninth Circuit then interpreted Cruzan to mean that one has a liberty interest in hastening his or her death because death was a foreseeable consequence of
Cruzan's refusing life-sustaining treatment. See id. at 814-16.
16

See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2269-70

Although it is clear that Cruzan is not

broad enough to encompass physician-assisted suicide, it is still not certain whether
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decision on the historical fact that states, through common law and
statutory provisions, have predominately recognized the right to refuse medical treatment while almost uniformly prohibiting assisted
suicide. 7
2.

Casey's Continued Indeterminacy

The Court in Glucksberg and the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in
Dying v. Washington'8 also disagreed on the scope of the Due Process
Clause liberty interest as defined in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey.'9 Although Casey involved abortion, "'procreation, contraception, family
relationship, child rearing, and education,"' 2 the Ninth Circuit
found the following passage persuasive:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "the decision how and when to
die is one of 'the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy.'"2 The court concluded that a terminally ill person's decision
"may have an even more profound impact on that person's life than
"23
forcing a woman to carry a pregnancy to term.
the Court, if presented with a similar case, will apply the assumed liberty interest to
refuse hydration and nutrition to a person who wants to refuse other types of lifesustaining treatment. Therefore, Glucksbergonly partially clarifies Cruzan's scope.
1 See id. at 2270. At a minimum, the informed consent doctrine and Cruzan's
liberty interest establish only that the state cannot force treatment on adults who do
not want treatment. Those doctrines protect one's right to be free from forced
treatment. The subsequent death or other bad consequences flowing from one's
decision to forego treatment is not the interest that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects. See id.
8
79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
20

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at851.

21 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813.
22

Id. at 813-14.

Id. The dissenting opinion by Judge Beezer relied on the same broad language from Casey to find that a terminally ill person has a liberty interest in obtaining physician-assisted suicide; thejudge asserted, however, that the right is not fundamental. See id. at 848 (BeezerJ., dissenting).
At least one leading commentator on "right-to-die" issues has criticized attempts to use Casey to support physician-assisted suicide. See Yale Kamisar, Against
23
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The Court in Glucksberg could have used Casey to create a liberty
interest right to physician-assisted suicide. At issue was a philosophical debate centered on whether the Court should use judicial lawmaking in lieu of states' legislative decisionmaking.2 4 In Compassion
in Dying, the Ninth Circuit adopted an "evolving liberty" approach
when it opined that the due process liberty interest cannot be reduced to a mathematical formula and that its scope must be formed
25
"in light of existing circumstances as well as our historic traditions."
Under that approach, an historical analysis of the asserted liberty interest and an evaluation of the contemporary state of affairs are warranted so that liberty can expand its protection to include "new
problems
arising out of the development and use of new technolo"6
gies.
Assisted Suicide-Even A Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 735, 765-68
(1995). First, Mr. Kamisar would limit Casey to decisions regarding "'the private
realm of family life' . .. '-personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception [and] family relationships.'" Id. at 765-66. As noted by Professor Kamisar, such phrases as "'defin[ing] one's own concept of existence' and 'of the mystery of human life,'" id. at 766 (alteration in original); and presumably the Ninth
Circuit's use of "the most, 'intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
life-time,' [and] a choice that is 'central to personal dignity and autonomy,'" Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 814, are taken out of context. See Kamisar, supra, at 76768. Kamisar concedes that Casey can broadly encompass a liberty interest for physician-assisted suicide. See id. at 766 (acknowledging that "I understand how one can
read the passage quoted above narrowly (limiting it to reproductive fights and related matters) or read it broadly (including death and dying)."). In broadly reading Casey, however, Professor Kamisar believes that one cannot reasonably limit physician-assisted suicide to the terminally ill. See id. His assertions that a broad
reading of Casey would mean that both the terminally ill and the completely healthy
would have a right to physician-assisted suicide appear to be a slippery slope argument that once the right to physician-assisted suicide is granted, the floodgates will
open and the right will eventually be available to all who want it. See id. at 766-67.
Thus, Casey is manipulable and indeterminate, and the Court in Glucksberg
held that its broad statements were not applicable to physician-assisted suicide, a
decision that was probably based on the value judgments and preferences of a majority of the Supreme Court Justices. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
2271, 2272 (1997).
24 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267-68. The Court stated:
"By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent,
place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action." Id. The
Court concluded: "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest
and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physicianassisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a
democratic society." Id. at 2275.
25 Compassion in Dying,
79 F.8d at 803.
26 Id. (explaining that "there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter") (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48
(1992)). The evolving liberty notion is consistent with the approach that a majority
of the Justices adopted in Casey when they recognized that the limits of "liberty"
cannot be defined simply by historically identifying those rights protected or denied
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On the other hand, in Glucksberg, a majority of the Justices
aligned themselves in the "traditionalist" camp, as evidenced by
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, in which Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and O'Connorjoined. Clearly, the decisive reason why those Justices did not extend the Due Process liberty interest
to include physician-assisted suicide was that the long-held traditions
of American society, as reflected in a majority of state laws, have historically outlawed assisted suicide.2 8 Emphasizing the historical disdain for assisted suicide and utilizing a two-step process for interpreting new substantive due process liberty claims under the Due Process
Clause," the majority held that the "'right' to assistance in commitprotection when Congress passed, and the states ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 848.
At the other extreme is the "traditionalist" approach that Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas espoused in the Casey dissent.
The dissenters would limit due process protection to the liberty interests mentioned
in the Constitution and those that "the longstanding traditions of American society"
have recognized. Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Their restrictive rule
of constitutional interpretation is static and backward-looking. Despite changes in
societal norms and technological developments, Justices in the traditionalist camp
mostly rely exclusively on a historical analysis to identify liberty interests. Therefore, according to these Justices, a woman does not have a protected liberty interest
in an abortion since the right to an abortion is neither mentioned in the Constitution nor protected by state law before Roe v. Wade. See id.
See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2260-61. Justice O'Connor apparently has
switched camps since she appeared to be in the "evolving liberty" camp that affirmed a woman's right to an abortion in Casey. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 843. Justice
O'Connor, however, arguably indicated that a protected liberty interest could be
found in physician-assisted suicide if a case is presented where pain medication
would not control the terminally ill patient's pain. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303
(O'Connor,J, concurring).
28 Granting liberty interest status to physician-assisted suicide would have required a break with tradition similar to the Court's decisions in Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), where the Court held state laws prohibiting interracial marriage unconstitutional, and in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973), where the
Court struck down laws prohibiting abortion.
See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268. The Court stated:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed." Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible decision
making," that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process
Clause.... [Tihe Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government
to infringe... 'fundamental' liberty interests at a1L no matter what
process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest."
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ting suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause." °
Therefore, the Court applied a rational relation analysis to determine whether Washington's law against assisted suicide was
"rationally related to legitimate governmental interests."3' The Court
identified five state interests: (1) an "unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life," (2) "an interest in preventing suicide,
and in studying, identifying, and treating its causes," (3) "an interest
in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession," (4)
"an interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor,
the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mistakes," and (5) an2 interest in preventing assisted suicide from leading to euthanasia.-

As to the first interest, the Court held that a state can assert an
"unqualified interest in the preservation of life" by refusing to "make
judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may
enjoy."" In other words, a state's interest in the preservation of life
does not diminish as one becomes more terminally ill. Therefore, a
state can assert the same amount of protection over a terminally ill
person's life as it can over a healthy person's life.M
Id. (citations omitted).
SO Id. at 2271. The author would extend Casey expansive language and
find
that one's liberty interest includes the right to physician-assisted suicide. This conclusion is strictly based on a value judgment because, under the current inconsistency of Supreme Court opinions, there is no rule of law that will provide definitive
support for or opposition to physician-assisted suicide. Limiting Casey to familiar
arrangements and procreation matters is not workable because in Casey the Court
recognized that "the Constitution places limits on a State's fight to interfere with a
person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood as well as bodily integrity."
Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (emphasis added). For the "bodily integrity" proposition, the
Court even cited Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), one of the opinions
that Cruzan relied on to find a presumed liberty interest to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 479 U.S. 261, 278
(1990). Thus, Casey's much-criticized, expansive language should apply to many
personal decisions (as Justice Scalia recognized in the Casey dissent, Casey, 505 U.S.
at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), including decisions regarding the nature of one's medical treatment.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
32 Id. at 2272-75.
33 Id. at 2272.
This means that a state does not have to balance its interest in the preservation of life against the terminally ill person's desires for physician-assisted suicide.
The Court stated: "As we have previously affirmed, the States 'may properly decline
to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy.'... This remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, even for those who are near
death." Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2272. YetJustices Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer
would hold that in some cases, where pain medication does not relieve pain, the
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Regarding the state interest in the prevention of suicide, the
Court acknowledged that depression and a lack of pain medication
are the roots of a majority of patients' requests for assisted suicide.
Because "depression is difficult to diagnose, [and] physicians and
medical professionals often fail to respond adequately to seriously ill
patients' needs," the Court concluded that "legal physician-assisted
suicide could make it more difficult for the State to protect depressed or mentally ill persons, or those who are suffering from untreated pain, from suicidal impulses." 6
Third, referring to the State's interest in protecting the ethics of
the medical profession, the Court cited the American Medical Association's (AMA) opinion that physician-assisted suicide is
"fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer." 7
Therefore, the Court reasoned that physician-assisted suicide might
"undermine the trust that is essential to the doctor-patient relationship by blurring the time-honored line between healing and harming." "

Fourth, discussing the State's interest in protecting certain vulnerable persons, the Court cited the New York Task Force:
[L]egalizing physician-assisted suicide would pose profound risks
to many individuals who are ill and vulnerable.... The risk of
harm is greatest for the many individuals in our society whose
autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty,
lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a stigmatized social group.-9
Consistently, the Court believed that some patients would request
physician-assisted suicide "to spare their families the substantial financial burdens of end-of-life health care costs."'
Lastly, the Court noted that the State has an interest in preventing a "slippery slope" slide from physician-assisted suicide to euthanasia.41 Citing evidence of physicians in the Netherlands having
forced involuntary euthanasia on some patients, the Court stated:
This study suggests that, despite the existence of various reporting procedures, euthanasia in the Netherlands has not been limpatient's interest would outweigh the state's supposedly unqualified interest in life.
See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
35 See Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. at 2272-73.
36

Id. at 2273.

37

Id.

3,Id.
s9 Id.
40
41

Id.
See Glucksberg 117 S. Ct. at 2274-75.
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ited to competent, terminally ill adults who are enduring physical
suffering, and that regulation of the practice may not have prevented abuses in cases involving vulnerable persons, including severely disabled neonates and elderly persons suffering from dementia.
Despite having identified the five State interests, the Court decided not to balance those interests against the respondents' rights:
"We need not weigh exactingly the relative strengths of these various
interests. They are unquestionably important and legitimate, and
Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to
Consequently, the Court held
their promotion and protection.
that Washington's ban on assisted suicide was neither facially violative of the Fourteenth Amendment nor violative as applied to the
terminally ill patients who wanted to speed up their death."
The use of a rational relation test instead of a balancing test is a
departure from the balancing approach that the Court adopted in
Cruzan45 and in cases involving unwanted intrusion into one's bodily
integrity.46 The departure might in part be due to the Court's desire
to leave the legality of physician-assisted suicide to states' political
processes. By deferring to State action, the Court escaped the difficulty of weighing the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant State
and private interests.
The majority concluded that Washington's statute against assisted suicide was neither unconstitutional on its face nor as applied
to the respondents before the Court.47 Despite this conclusion, some
of the Justices would limit Glucksberg to a decision on the facial challenge to the statute and might find the ban unconstitutional as applied to terminally ill patients whose pain and suffering cannot be
relieved through the use of pain medication.4 Justices O'Connor's
42

Id. at 2274.

Id. at 2275.
See id.
45 Unlike Cruzan, however, the Court in Glucksberg held that the aggrieved person's interest in physician-assisted suicide was not a protected liberty interest. See
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
46 A majority of state courts have used the balancing test. Washington, however,
in its statute dealing with the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, decided not to
use the balancing test, choosing instead to unqualifiedly protect life at all stages. See
id. at 2272. Now that Glucksberghas left states in a position to decide whether or not
to legalize physician-assisted suicide, states will have to perform the same type of
balancing analysis that the Ninth Circuit used. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816-37 (9th Cir. 1996).
47 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275.
48 See id. at 2303 (O'Connor,J., concurring); id. at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring
43

44
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and Breyer's concurring opinions emphasized that, in their view, the
decisive fact supporting the majority opinion is evidence that pain
medication alleviates terminally ill patients' pain in all or substantially all cases. If presented with a specific case where pain medication did not sufficiently relieve pain and suffering, Justices
O'Connor and Breyer implied that they would find that the patient
has a due process liberty interest in obtaining physician-assisted suicide."o
Justice Stevens similarly limited Glucksberg and indicated that, in
the appropriate particularized case, a patient's interest in "[a]voiding
intolerable pain and the indignity of living [her] final days incapacitated and in agony" might outweigh the State's interests, including
the interest in protecting patients from abuses." Justice Stevens apparently would also allow physician-assisted suicide in some cases
where pain medication is not effective.
3.

Vacco v. Quill-Muddying the Equal Protection Waters

Whereas Glucksberg's concurring opinions leave room for debate
over whether physician-assisted suicide is constitutionally required
for patients with uncontrollable pain, Quill more conclusively establishes that a state's denial of physician-assisted suicide while allowing
the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause. 2 The Court's decision was based on a
perceived distinction between a patient's dying from an underlying
condition when life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn and an intentional dying from medication when physician-assisted suicide occurs.5" The Court reasoned that physicians who assist in withdrawing
or refusing to begin life-sustaining medical treatment might intend
only to honor the patient's medical treatment desires when confronted with hopeless medical conditions.- Similarly, that some physicians administer pain medication that they know has a double effect of relieving pain and of eventually causing death did not

in the judgment); id. at 2312 (BreyerJ., concurring in the judgment).
49 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
2312
(BreyerJ., concurring in the judgment).
so See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2312
(BreyerJ., concurring in the judgment).
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2307 (StevensJ, concurring in the judgment).
52 SeeVacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302
(1997).
53 See id. at 2298.
5

See id.
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dissuade the Court from its belief that the primary intent of such
medication was the relief of pain and not the killing of patients.'"
Believing that there was a rational distinction between a primary
intent to cause death, as with physician-assisted suicide, and a possible foreseeability of death, as with the withdrawal of life-sustaining
medical treatment, the Court held that the banning of the former8
while allowing the latter was not a violation of equal protection.
The Court reached that conclusion despite recognizing that in some
cases the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment might be for the
purpose of causing death. The Court did not find such a possible
occurrence to be dispositive, believing that states do not have to be
certain that no abuse will occur during the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment and that "[i]n the absence of omniscience ...the State is entitled to act on the reasonableness of the
distinction. " " Together, Glucksberg and Quill allow states to act as
laboratories in deciding whether to legalize physician-assisted suicide
and in establishing the types of precautions to employ for protection
of vulnerable patients from the abuses of physicians and others.
III. STATES AS LABORATORIES FOR TESTING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE

Ostensibly, states will balance their interests against private persons' interests in seeking physician-assisted suicide. The outcome of
that balancing should persuade states to conclude that generally
their interests in the preservation of life, in the prevention of suicide,
in the protection of family members and loved ones, and in the protection of the integrity of the medical profession do not warrant a total ban on physician-assisted suicide.
Despite Glucksberg's cursory references to the Ninth Circuit's
weighing of states' and patients' interests, 8 the Ninth Circuit's bal55 See

id.at 2298-99.
See id. at 2302.
57 Id. From a fairness standpoint, Quill is problematic. First, although
there are
statutes on the books, states do not normally monitor the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment. There is no clear indication of how much abuse physicians
and others commit when giving that type of treatment. Given the states' lack of
monitoring of the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments, it seems unfair to totally
ban physician-assisted suicide out of a fear of similar abuses without banning at least
those withdrawals of life-sustaining treatment that are performed with the intent to
kill. Instead of the issue being omniscience regarding abuses involving the cessation of life-sustaining treatment, the issue is a lack of state effort to obtain any
knowledge about such abuses at all while simultaneously banning physician-assisted
suicide to prevent similar abuses.
See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816-37 (9th Cir. 1996).
56
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ancing conclusions should be instructive to states that consider the
merits of physician-assisted suicide. First, the Ninth Circuit prudently held that two state interests-a general interest in the preservation of life and a specific interest in preventing suicide-did not
outweigh a terminally ill patient's liberty interest in having physicianassisted suicide. 9 In other words, in the physician-assisted suicide
arena, states should adopt the same "sliding scale approach" that
they have adopted when evaluating whether one has a right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. There is no reason why this approach
should not be used in weighing the state's interest in the preservation of life and in the prevention of suicide against a terminally ill
person's desires for physician-assisted suicide. Using the same balancing standard would mean that similarly situated persons are
treated similarly because one who dies from the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment is just as dead as one who dies from physicianassisted suicide.60
The Ninth Circuit identified the following interests:
1) the state's general interest in preserving life; 2) the state's more
specific interest in preventing suicide; 3) the state's interest in avoiding the involvement of third parties and in precluding the use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; 4) the state's interest in protecting
family members and loved ones; 5) the state's interest in protecting
the integrity of the medical profession; and 6) the state's interest in
avoiding adverse consequences that might ensue if the statutory provision at issue is declared unconstitutional.
Id.
59 See id. at 819-25. The court used the same "sliding scale approach" that state
courts have used to balance a state's interests against a terminally ill patient's fight
to refuse life-sustaining treatment-as the patient's condition worsens from a
healthy state to a terminal state, the state's interests in preserving life and in preventing suicide decrease to a point where they are outweighed by the terminally ill
patient's liberty interest. See id. at 817-20. Therefore, the state's interest in the
preservation of life is on a continuum. When the patient is healthy, the state's interest in the preservation of life is at its strongest point; when the patient is terminally ill or in a permanent coma, the state's interest diminishes and is at its weakest
point. See id. This continuum approach to evaluating a state's interest in the preservation of life is the predominate approach that has been used by state courts in
their evaluation of "right-to-die" cases involving the refusal or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment.
60 Although the Supreme Court might split hairs to find a distinction between a
primary intent to cause death and death as a secondary, foreseeable consequence of
the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, a state should not make such
meaningless distinctions when balancing its interest in the preservation of life and
in the prevention of suicide against the patient's desires for physician-assisted suicide. Nor should states find importance in the fact that the right to refuse lifesustaining treatment stems from the common law protection against battery. In the
end, a person who dies from the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is just as
dead as one who dies from physician-assisted suicide. Therefore, as far as balancing
the state's interest against the patient's interest, the same "sliding scale approach"
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The Ninth Circuit also correctly held, from a policy standpoint,
that the state's interest in protecting minors and other family members should not outweigh a terminally ill patient's right to physicianassisted suicide.6 ' Forcing a terminally ill patient to continue her life
until a protracted and painful death occurs does not aid minor children or other family members.62 The weakness of the state's interest
in protecting minor children and other family members is amplified
if physician-assisted suicide is limited to terminally ill patients who
have six months or less to live. With such a short period of remaining life, in most cases physician-assisted suicide would probably not
leave minor children and other family members in a worse financial
condition or emotional state than they would be left if death oc-

should be used when evaluating the legality of both the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment and physician-assisted suicide.
61 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 827.
In cases involving the right to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment, courts have considered the impact of the
terminally ill patient's death on innocent third parties. Primarily, this consideration has been limited to the terminally ill patient's minor children who might be
financially disadvantaged by the patient's death. In most instances, this state interest is not at issue because the terminally ill patient does not have any minor children. In those cases where there have been minor children, courts have concluded
that financial harm to the children would not be sufficient to warrant denying a
terminally ill person's right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1977) (allowing a parent to withdraw treatment because the children would have been provided for after the patient's death); In re
Brooks Estate, 205 N.E.2d 435, 440 (Ill. 1965) (implying that minor children would
have affected the court's decision, but there being none, the patient was allowed to
withdraw from treatment); In re FarrelI 108 N.J. 335, 352-53, 529 A.2d 404, 413 (NJ.
1987) (allowing withdrawal of respirator and implying that because patient was in a
weakened condition, her decision to withdraw from the respirator was different
from a stronger patient who wanted to forego blood transfusion, and indicating that
the patient's husband could adequately care for her two minor children). There is
no reported case where the state's interest in protecting minor children has outweighed the patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, such as respirators,
when the patient is terminally ill, in a coma, or otherwise in a weakened condition
with no probability of obtaining a substantially improved medical condition. The
blood transfusion cases, where courts ordered transfusions because transfusions
would have returned the parent to a healthy condition, appear to be the only type
of cases where courts will force unwanted treatment on patients. See Farrl, 108 N.J.
at 352, 529 A.2d at 412 (distinguishing blood transfusion cases from cases where the
patient is on a respirator). It seems that a strong case can be made that patients
with terminal conditions should be allowed to have physician-assisted suicide because, unlike stronger patients who want to refuse blood transfusions, terminally ill
patients will die even if they are not allowed physician-assisted suicide. Therefore, it
does not appear that in most cases minor children and other family members will
be in a substantially worse condition if parents are allowed to have physician-assisted
suicide, especially if that treatment is limited to those who have six months or less
to live.
62 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at
826.
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curred naturally."3 Admittedly, there is some validity to Justice Stevens's statement in Glucksberg that states have an interest in the preservation of life to enhance the community well being through its
citizens' "exchange of ideas, expressions of affection, shared memories and humorous incidents."64 Yet preventing a person from committing physician-assisted suicide does not mean that she will convey
any emotional benefits to family members. The patient might be in
so much pain that she does not communicate with family members,
or she might be so distraught that she totally withdraws from others.
It is doubtful that the state legally could go into the patient's home
and force such communications.
Furthermore, although Justice Stevens recognized the community value of life, the Justice would apply a sliding-scale approach,
balancing the state's interest against the competent, terminally ill patients' interests in "'defin[ing their] own concept of existence, of
[the] meaning of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.'"65
Thus, even though the state might have an interest in promoting the
financial and emotional benefits that society could derive from patients' continuing to live to the natural end of terminal illnesses, the
patients' interests in both "[a]voiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living [their] final days incapacitated and in agony,"6 6 and
in "mak[ing] judgments 'about the 'quality' of life that [they] may
enjoy,'" often outweighs the state's interest in the preservation of life
and the protection of minors and other third parties. 67
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rationally held that constitutionalizing physician-assisted suicide would not destroy the integrity of the
medical profession." In one sense, this seems to be a correct con63

Even if forcing a terminally ill patient to live until a natural death would offer

some financial and emotional benefits to minor children and other family members, states should also consider that other financial expenses (such as medical
bills) and emotional injury to family members might be incurred if terminally ill
patients are forced to continue life in severe, uncontrollable pain until a natural
death. Therefore, it is possible that, on average, any financial or emotional benefits
to families might be offset by the financial and emotional expenses incurred until
natural death. Along those lines, it appears reasonable that in most cases, the liberty interests of terminally ill patients should outweigh states' interests in protecting
minors and other family members.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2305 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). These emotional benefits are in addition to the monetary benefits that terminally ill patients might still offer to society. See id.
65 Id. at 2307 (citation omitted).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 2308.
U See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 827-30 (9th Cir. 1996).
The court was persuaded by the fact that criminalizing physician-assisted suicide
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clusion because physicians who disapprove of physician-assisted suicide can refer patients to physicians who do not disapprove of the
practice.69 Yet being transferred to a physician who wants to assist in
suicide resolves only one aspect of the alleged erosion in the medical
profession's public image. Another aspect involves Glucksberg's conclusion that some patients, knowing that their physicians have the
authority to assist in their suicide, might lose trust and faith in those
physicians and in the medical profession in general.° As the AMA
fears, instead of being perceived as healers, physicians will be considered killers.71 Standing alone, however, the possible erosion in
the integrity of the medical profession is not sufficient justification
to deny competent, terminally ill persons the right to physicianassisted suicide.72
Given the present prominence of Managed Care Organizations'
(MCO) involvement in physicians' treatment decisions, many people
have already lost trust in the medical profession.75 Similarly, African
Americans have historically distrusted and presently distrust physicians because of their discriminatory medical treatment. Instead of
complaining about potential losses in integrity, the AMA should
lobby state medical boards and other regulatory authorities to draft
disciplinary rules to sanction errant physicians who engage in overreaching, duress, coercion, and other shady practices in violation of
rules adopted to govern the orderly rendition of physician-assisted
suicide and other medical treatments. Such actions might mitigate
the perceived dangers to the medical profession's status. Additionally, the AMA, state medical boards, and other relevant regulators
would do more harm by making criminals of those who secretly assisted their patients; that physicians presently give lethal pain-killing medication to patients under
the "double effect" exception without violating ethical norms; and that, just as the
American Medical Association's (AMA) unrealized fears that abortion would destroy
the profession, physician-assisted suicide would not destroy the integrity of the profession. See id. Judge Beezer concluded that physician-assisted suicide would harm
the integrity of the medical profession because it was unethical to give medication
for a non-therapeutic purpose under Washington's law and because the AMA's
Code of Ethics prohibits a physician from engaging in physician-assisted suicide. See
id. at 855 (Beezer,J., dissenting). The Court in Glucksberg found the AMA's position
persuasive, and also believed that legalizing physician-assisted suicide would cause
some patients to distrust their physicians. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274.
69 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.$d at 830.
70 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
at 2273.
71 See
id.
72 Instead of lamenting a possible erosion of the integrity of the
medical profession, the American Medical Association and others might do a better job in screening, training, and monitoring physicians to ensure that they do not impermissibly
coerce their patients into physician-assisted suicide.
73 See generally Pittman, supra note 1, at 416-23.
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might engage in sufficient publicity to inform the public of their vigilance in monitoring physicians to ensure physicians' proper conduct
and, when necessary, to punish bad behavior relating to physicianassisted suicide.
Therefore, the only state interest that arguably might outweigh
a terminally ill person's desire for self-induced death is the interest
in protecting a patient from the adverse consequences of legalized
physician-assisted suicide. This interest assumes added importance
where the protection of disfavored African Americans and other minorities are concerned because they are generally more vulnerable to
In furtherance of their patientphysicians' abuses and coercion.
protection interests, states might be concerned about the undue influence and coercion that physicians, family members, and other
persons might assert to force or improperly persuade terminally ill
persons to relinquish their remaining lives in order to reduce health
care expenditures, speed up the conferment of inheritances, and
conserve health care resources for healthier patients. 76
In Compassion in Dying, the Ninth Circuit held that the State's interest in preventing those abuses did not outweigh a terminally ill
patient's interest in having physician-assisted suicide. That conclu
74

2273.
'5

In Glucksberg, the Court recognized this interest. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at
For example, it is foreseeable that disfavored groups such as African Ameri-

cans and other racial minorities, who generally distrust physicians because of past
and present discrimination in the health care industry, will probably be even more
skeptical of physicians who have the legal authority to assist in their suicides. They
might feel that, through advocacy of physician-assisted suicide as a treatment option, physicians will employ the same type of subterfuge and trickery that they and
others used to entice African-American syphilis patients to participate in the Tuskegee Experiment. See text accompanying notes 168-174 infra,
The elderly might be especially susceptible to coercion because of their increased vulnerability. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 826
(9th Cir. 1996).
77 See id. at 825-26. Even if one were to assume the correctness of that decision,
the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is not based on a pure balancing of the relative
weight of the state's interest against the patient's liberty interest. Rather, the conclusion is based on an equal protection comparison of the potential abuses existing
in the traditional "right-to-die" arena when one refuses life-sustaining treatment and
the possible abuses existing when one seeks physician-assisted suicide. The Ninth
Circuit believed that the same possible abuses exist whether one requests withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment or physician-assisted suicide. The court concluded that physician-assisted suicide would not unduly increase the risk of coercion
to which the elderly and other terminally ill patients are already exposed when refusing life-sustaining treatment. See id. at 826. Along those lines, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the availability of physician-assisted suicide might lessen the temptation towards coercion that family members and others might have since the terminally ill would shortly die anyway. See id. This conclusion appears to be reasonable
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sion was based primarily on an assumption that physician-assisted
suicide does not expose patients to the above-stated risk any more
than the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments. This analysis
sounds more like an equal protection argument than a balancing of
the state's interests in avoiding abuses against the terminally ill patient's interests in physician-assisted suicide. Even if one were to accept the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the terminally ill patient's
short life expectancy and the presence of an "impartial physician"
mitigate against family abuses, there is still the possibility of physicians' and hospitals' unmitigated potential for abuses in advocating
physician-assisted suicide to conserve health care costs and to perpetuate their own racial prejudices.
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the terminally ill patient's
right to physician-assisted suicide outweighed the State's interest in
protecting patients from abuses might be reasonable in an ideal
world. However, the world is not ideal. It is filled with racism and its
deadly effects. It is also a world filled with managed care's ever present utilization reviewers and financial incentives to control physicians' treatment decisions. Therefore, a state probably could justify
continued proscription of physician-assisted suicide. Some observers
might argue that this is the best decision for African Americans and
other disfavored minorities who have been historically subjected to
physicians' abuses.
A.

A SubstantialState Interest in PreventingRacism by Outlawing
Physician-AssistedSuicide

Judge Beezer's dissenting opinion in Compassion in Dying concluded that the State's interest in protecting African Americans and
other minorities from abuses constituted sufficient support for a total ban on physician-assisted suicide. Correctly, the judge acknowledged two realities. First, physicians "'are not exempt from the
prejudices manifest in other areas of our collective life.'" 7 Second,
in most cases. Although it is reasonable to believe that imminent death might reduce the desires of those who want to speed up the death of a terminally ill person,
the Ninth Circuit's additional conclusion that the involvement of "impartial" physicians would be another mitigating factor is less sound. See id. For various reasons,
including the conservation of medical resources and racism, physicians might not
be impartial as they might engage in abuses to encourage involuntary physicianassisted suicide.
78 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 851-54.
7: Id. at 852 (BeezerJ., dissenting). Judge Beezer stated:
[I]t must be recognized that assisted suicide and euthanasia will be
practiced through the prism of social inequality and prejudice that
characterizes the delivery of services in all segments of society, includ-
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because of physicians' racism and prejudice, minorities "are at risk of
being unwanted and subjected to pressure to choose physicianassisted suicide rather than continued treatment."0
The Ninth Circuit majority in Compassion in Dying naively rejected this argument.8 ' Surprisingly, the majority feared that, instead
of being coerced, poor people and minorities "who have historically
received the least adequate health care, will not be afforded a fair
opportunity to obtain the medical assistance to which they are entitled-the assistance that would allow them to end their lives with a
measure of dignity."' The court stated:

ing health care. Those who will be most vulnerable to abuse, error, or
indifference are the poor, minorities, and those who are least educated and least empowered. This risk does not reflect ajudgment that
physicians are more prejudiced or influenced by race and class than
the rest of society-only that they are not exempt from the prejudices
manifest in other areas of our collective life.
Id. (citing Kamisar, supranote 23, at 738) (quoting THE NEw YoRK STATE TASK FORCE
ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN
THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 143 (1994) [hereinafter New York Task Force]).
80 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 852 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (citing Kamisar,
supra note 23, at 738). In addition to being concerned about racism, Judge Beezer
feared discrimination against the elderly and the poor. See id.
Judge Beezer stated that a recent study showed that minority cancer patients
who were treated at cancer centers where minority patients were predominately
treated "'were three times more likely to receive inadequate therapy to relieve
pain.'" Id. Judge Beezer further established the connection between inadequate
pain medication (for African Americans and other minorities) and physicianassisted suicide:
People request physician-assisted suicide because they are in pain or
are otherwise suffering. If their suffering is alleviated, they will likely
withdraw their requests for physician-assisted suicide. We the courts
are asked, in a nation of inadequate and unequal access to medical
care for the alleviation of pain and suffering, to create a constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide. Surely this is a case of misplaced
priorities.
Id. Judge Beezer then quoted Professor Kamisar:
"Although pain is notoriously under treated in this country,
'according to experts in the field of pain control, almost all terminally
ill patients can experience adequate relief with currently available
treatments.'
Thus, ... suicidal ideation and suicide requests
.commonly... dissolve with adequate control of pain and other symptoms.'"
Id. (quoting Kamisar, supra note 23, at 738) (quoting JUDITH AHRONHEIM & DORON
WEBER, FINAL PASSAGES: POSrrIvE CHOICES FOR THE DYING AND THEIR LOVED ONES 102
(1992); Kathleen Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to Patient
RequestsforPhysician-AssistedSuicideJ. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 289, 290 (1991)).
See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 825.
82 Id.
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The argument that disadvantaged persons will receive more
medical services than the remainder of the population in one,
and only one, area-assisted suicide-is ludicrous on its face. So,
too, is the argument that the poor and the minorities will rush to
volunteer for physician-assisted suicide because of their inability
to secure adequate medical treatment.83
The majority's conclusions stem from its comparison of racebased arguments against abortion with similar arguments against
physician-assisted suicide.8 4 At first blush, the majority's discounting
of those arguments seems well-grounded because African-American
women have not undergone the number of abortions that some observers feared. 85 Instead of being a tribute to the powerlessness of
racial discrimination, however, the lack of coercive abortions might
be due to an absence of financial resources.8" Even racist physicians
will not give free abortions.'
On the other hand, racist physicians who lack financial resources to treat African Americans and other minorities properly and
fully will have an opposite incentive when it comes to physicianassisted suicide. In a health care environment dominated by managed care, it will be cheaper for physicians to proscribe a lethal dose
of medication than it will be to keep a terminally ill African American or other disfavored minority patient hospitalized for a day, a
week, or a month, especially if continued treatment is not profitable
for the hospital or other medical provider. Some commentators are
already looking at physician-assisted suicide as a means of rationing
health care resources.8
8s Id.
84

See id.

85

See generally Carole A. Corns, Note, The Impact of Public Abortion Funding Deci-

sions on Indigent Women: A Proposal to Reform State Statutory Constitutional Abortion
FundingProvisions,24 U. McH.J.L. REFORM 371 (1991).
86 See id. at 384-88.
87 Because no one expects that physicians will give free abortions, it is not surprising that fears regarding racial coercion of minority women have not materialized. With the controversy over Norplant implants being forced on AfricanAmerican women and other minority women, one might reasonably believe that
coercion of minority women into having abortions might occur if the price of abortion were cheaper. See generally Darci Elaine Burrell, Note, The Norplant Solution:
Norplant and the Control of African-American Motherhood, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 401
(1995).
as See generally Leonard M. Fleck, Just Caring: Assisted Suicide and Health Care Rationing, 72 U. DET. MERcy L. REv. 873 (1995). The Ninth Circuit's failure to properly acknowledge the racially motivated dangers emanating from physician-assisted
suicide is consistent with a societal norm that minimizes the concerns of minority
groups and the dangers that the health care industry poses to African Americans
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It is somewhat encouraging, however, that the Ninth Circuit in
Compassion in Dying recognized that minorities and poor people
"have historically received the least adequate health care."" Nevertheless, unlike its exhaustive historical analysis of suicide, the court
did not spend a great deal of time discussing the perceived racism
that exists in the health care industry." A better historical analysis of
racism in the health care industry should have influenced the court's
balancing of a terminally ill patient's interest against the state's interest in protecting African Americans and other minorities from
physician-assisted suicide. The historical persistency of racial discrimination in the health care industry warrants extreme caution
when evaluating whether physicians should be given more power
over the life and death of terminally ill patients.
Consequently, the Court's decision in Glucksberg, which rejected
the respondents' challenge to Washington's ban on assisted suicide,
raises several concerns. First, those who oppose physician-assisted
suicide are probably pleased with the Court's decision, including
those who oppose it because of its potential racial implications.
Upon further reflection, however, African Americans and other disfavored minorities should await the outcome of states' experimentations with physician-assisted suicide before they engage in premature
celebration. In leaving states in a position either to outlaw or allow
physician-assisted suicide, Glucksberg delegated the resolution of a
controversial, racially-infected issue to the same state political processes that have historically been inimical to minority groups interests. 9' Blindly,Justice O'Connor stated:
There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike
the proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end their suffering
and the State's interests in protectin those who might seek to
end life mistakenly or under pressure.
and other minorities.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 825 (9th Cir. 1996).
90 See
id.
91 For example, federal troops were needed to enforce school desegregation in
some states, and many federal lawsuits have been brought to enforce voting rights
laws. The most recent example of states' hostility toward minorities is California's
initiative against affirmative action. SeeJohn 0. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior,81 MINN. L. Rv. 1441, 1465 n.83 (1997) (noting that "[i]n the recent
anti-affirmative action California initiative, Jews voted in opposition nearly to the
same extent as Asians. Whites generally voted in favor 63 to 37%, while in opposition were Jews 58 to 42%, Asians 61 to 39%, African Americans 74 to 26%, and Latinos 76 to 24%.").
92 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2303
(1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Given the past and present abuses that African Americans and other
disfavored minorities have suffered at the hands of the medical establishment, obviously there is a substantial reason to believe that
states and their democratic processes will not properly strike a balance where African Americans' and other minorities' interests are
concerned. Disfavored groups may reasonably fear that they will be
the ones who will suffer the most harmful abuses of physicianassisted suicide.
Therefore, as Judge Beezer argued in his Compassion in Dying
dissent, the probable harm that legalized physician-assisted suicide
will cause to stigmatized minorities, including African Americans, is
sufficient to outlaw physician-assisted suicide." No reasonable observer, however, should believe that states will ban physician-assisted
suicide simply because minorities stand a greater chance of being
discriminatorily put to death. The present discriminatory use of the
death penalty is instructive. If other persuasive reasons are not offered, African Americans and other minorities can only hope that
laws legalizing physician-assisted suicide will have maximum protections built into their rules and procedures.
It should be noted that, because of historical racial discrimina94
tion, many African Americans distrust physicians and hospitals.
This distrust has caused a lower percentage of African Americans to
execute living wills specifying the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment," and to be predominantly against the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide. 6 Clearly, some of this apprehension is
them into suffering physicaused by a fear that physicians will coerce
97
will.
their
against
suicide
cian-assisted
Despite the legitimacy of those fears, physician-assisted suicide
should be available as a treatment option for those terminally ill patients whose pain cannot be controlled with pain medication. In
other words, as long as there is evidence that pain medication will re-

See text accompanying notes 126-196 infra.
See generally Vemellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and Racism: Trusting the
Health Care System Ain't Always Easy! An African American Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 191 (1996).
93
94

95 See id. at 281.
96 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123,
1148 n.121 (1997)
(noting that "while a slight majority of whites favor physician-assisted suicide, African-Americans oppose it by more than two to one.") (citing HERBERT HENDIN,
SEDUCED BYDEATH 180 (1997)).
97 See Lori Montgomery, Right-to-Die Choices Arouse Suspicion, Citing a Long
History
of Mistrust, Many Blacks ExpressFears of Victimization, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1997, at
5.
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lieve substantially all of the pain that terminally ill persons suffer, a
total ban on physician-assisted suicide is desirable in light of the
dangers that it poses to African Americans, other minorities, and the
elderly. If it becomes well-established through medical evidence that
the pain of a substantial number of patients is not controlled
through medication, then legalized physician-assisted suicide should
be available. The focus should then be on the creation of laws to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that terminally ill patients are
not involuntarily coerced into physician-assisted suicide. Presently,
the degree to which medication will relieve terminally ill patients'
pain and the availability of medication to minorities and other
groups are in dispute."s At a minimum, states should do the necessary investigation to resolve the question and provide the means for
all patients to receive available pain medication. If investigations
show that pain medication is ineffective for many patients who can
afford the medication, physician-assisted suicide should be legalized.
Presently, Oregon is the only state with a statute legalizing physician-assisted suicide." Other states might look to that statute as a
model; they might also look to the Model State Act to Authorize and
Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide (Model Act), drafted by nine
authors who specialize in various fields including medicine and
law.'00 From an African-American perspective, however, some observers might find that several provisions contained in Oregon's
statute and in the Model Act do not minimize African Americans'
fears concerning physician-assisted suicide.
For example, one scholar has emphasized that traditional bioethical doctrines, such as "autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence,
and justice"'1 do not take into consideration that some African
Americans have a different perspective. Instead of wanting individual autonomy to the exclusion of all other values, African Americans
may place a premium on "community belonging" and, implicitly,
family involvement in decisions affecting one's life. 10 2 This scholar

98 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2308 (9th Cir. 1997).

99

See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800 (1996); see generally Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp.
1429 (D. Or. 1995) (holding that Oregon's statute violated equal protection), rev'd,
107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997) (vacating the district court's judgment on the
grounds that the plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the statute).
1oo See generally Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Ph osician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1996).
1 Randall, supra note 94, at 193.
102 See id. at 194.
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suggests that bioethical norms and principles be reformulated to
take into consideration those values.
Regardless of whether one believes that many African Americans have different values that affect health care decisions, it seems
reasonable that many African Americans have less trust in the medical profession than those groups with no history of systemic health
care discrimination.0 That distrust, current inequities in the delivery of health care, and present evidence of persistent racism are factors that states should consider when adopting rules to govern legalized physician-assisted suicide. This perspective leads to criticism of
the Oregon physician-assisted suicide statute, the Model Act, and
recommendations regarding additional safeguards.

10s See id. at 234-35. Professor Randall stated:
European Americans have a history that is racist and "conspicuously
indifferent to community, religion, virtue, and personal experience."
African Americans face the health care system with anxiety, fear, and
disaffection. Such anxiety, fear, and distrust will not be alleviated until bioethics constructs a practical, ethical approach to the anxiety and
fear which would lead to community empowerment. Such a practical
approach would require behaviors such as: reinstatement of community hospitals; assuring urban perinatal health care; encouraging traditional lay-midwifery; and reestablishing the extended family. However, such practical approach must be based not only on the
traditional Eurocentric principles but also on:
o recognizing the needs of the community and not just the individual
self;
o formulating bioethical and legal solutions involving both the family
and the community;
o aggressively training health care providers and institutions about the
African American perspective, thus making the barrier of distrust easier to overcome;
" eliminating the disparities in health status;
" aggressively reducing the existing disparities in health care delivery
in the African American community.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
104 See id. at 191. Professor Randall
wrote:
Many people are surprised at the level of distrust of the health care
system held by African Americans. However, fear and distrust of the
health care system is a natural and logical response to the history of
experimentation and abuse. The fear and distrust shape our lives
and, consequently, our perspectives. That perspective keeps African
Americans from getting health care treatment, from participating in
medical research, from signing living wills, and from donating organs.
That perspective affects the health care that African Americans receive. This fear and distrust is rarely acknowledged in traditional bioethical discourse.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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First, because this author is not fundamentally opposed to physician-assisted suicide, but is primarily motivated by a belief that it
should be employed in a nondiscriminatory and noncoercive manner, that the Oregon statute and the Model Act differ over the scope
of legalized physician-assisted suicide is not significant, so long as
both allow the treatment in those cases where medication will not relieve pain.0 5 Second, both Oregon's statute and the Model Act invite
criticism over their informed consent provisions. Although Oregon's statute requires treating physicians to disclose a patient's diagnosis, prognosis, and the risks involved in taking the prescribed
death-causing medication, 6 the statute requires only that the informed consent disclosure be documented in writing on the medical
records.' 7 Despite requiring at least two witnesses (one of whom is
not the treating physician, a family member, or other party with a financial interest in the patient's death),' there is no requirement
that the physician's informed consent disclosure be either audiotaped or videotaped. Similarly, there is no such requirement in the
Model Act.'0 9
If the drafters of the Oregon statute and the Model Act had
considered many African Americans' racism-induced distrust of the
medical profession, they might have imposed a mandatory requirement that physicians' informed consent disclosures be videotaped.
Videotaping has the potential to minimize the possibility that physicians will manipulate their informed consent disclosures to coerce
patients into suffering physician-assisted suicide against their will."0
Importantly, the manner and tone of physicians' risk disclosures influence patients' decisions."' Furthermore, due to racism or an in105 The Oregon statute limits physician-assisted suicide to those terminally
ill
persons who have "an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically
confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six
(6) months." OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800(12) (1996). The Model Act extends the
right to those suffering from "terminal illness or an intractable and unbearable illness." Baron et al., supra note 100, at 26-27.
106 See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800(7)
(1996).
Seid.
e7 § 127.855(1)-(7).
1oSeeid. § 127.810(1)-(4).
109 SeeBaron et al., supra note 100, at 28-29.
1o See generally Mary L. Malone, Note, Informed Consent and HospitalConsent Forms:
Pater Chasingin a Video World, 61 U. DET.J. URB. L. 105 (1983).

See RuTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A
CONSENT 319 (1986). The authors state:

HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED

It has been widely appreciated that people's choices between risky
alternatives can be predictably influenced by the way the risk information is presented or framed. Whether the proverbial glass is
described as half empty or half full establishes a frame of reference
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ability to communicate with African-American patients and other
minorities, many physicians either do not provide required risk disclosures or provide incomplete disclosures."' Obviously, physicians
should be more thorough, less coercive, and less manipulative in
their informed consent disclosures if they know that there will be
videotape evidence of the process.'"
Third, had the drafters of the Oregon statute and the Model Act
been aware of, or considered, the legal scholarship regarding many
African Americans' different bioethical perspectives, including family and community involvement, the drafters might have done more
than simply impose an obligation on treating physicians to inform
patients that they can contact their families about decisions to request physician-assisted suicide. 114 The Glucksberg Court held that
states can totally ban physician-assisted suicide, at least while medication substantially controls pain." Thus, proponents of physicianassisted suicide should not complain when a state, instead of banning the practice, places a mandatory requirement on physicians to
contact known family members about their patients' requests for
physician-assisted suicide and to allow family members to participate
in the informed consent disclosures. In addition to recognizing the
importance of families in some patients' medical decisionmaking, a
family notification requirement provides another means to protect
patients from physicians' undue influences. A family member who
believes that a physician has improperly coerced a terminally ill patient or that the patient might not be competent to make medical
decisions can protest a decision in favor of physician-assisted suicide
even to the extent of seeking judicial review of the decision.
Although this Article does not advocate that families have veto
power over patients' decisions, some observers might argue against
family involvement unless initiated by patients themselves. Such
thinking only reinforces bioethical norms that place individual
autonomy over familial concerns. Informing family members and
allowing their involvement in the informed consent process is a
against which risky outcomes and contingencies are viewed as either losses or gains.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
11
See 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS:

THE

ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTIONER
RELATIONSHIP 96-99 (1982).
:3
See generally Malone, supra note 110.
14
11

See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.835 (1996); see also Baron et al., supra note 100, at 28.
See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
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proper accommodation of both individual autonomy-because the
patient's decision is honored-and the family's interests-because
the family will play a role in a terminally ill patients' life-ending decisions.
Fourth, given that physicians, and implicitly other medical personnel, have been known to share a conspiracy of silence when it
comes to testifying against each other," 6 statutes legalizing physicianassisted suicide should mandate that individuals who act as witnesses
to patients' informed consent disclosures must not be affiliated with
either the health care institution where the terminally ill person is a
patient or with the physician who writes the prescription for the lethal medication. This requirement might minimize conspiracies between physicians, health care institutions, and witnesses when issues
arise regarding the voluntariness of patients' decisions.
Fifth, requiring physician-assisted suicide patients to undergo a
mental competency evaluation and counseling from a physician specializing in psychiatry, psychology, or similar fields could increase
117
Although some might frown on this reconsumer protection.
quirement as undercutting patients' autonomy, the minor inconvenience of the requirement certainly outweighs the harm that would
occur when mentally compromised patients undergo physicianassisted suicides.
Sixth, patients' requests for physician-assisted suicide should be
required to be both written and oral." There should be a sufficient
period of time between the written and oral requests to allow patients an opportunity to change their minds about the treatment.' 9
Seventh, there should be a requirement that certain vital statistics, including patients' "age, sex, race, and marital status" be re116

Both the Model Act and the Oregon statute allow at least one of the witnesses

to be affiliated with the health care facility and the treating physician. See OR. Rzv.
STAT. § 127.810 (2)(a)-(c) (1996); see also Baron et al., supra note 100, at 28. The
fear of having even one witness who is affiliated with the health care provider is that
the affiliated witness mightjoin with the medical provider in withholding evidence
of the patient's incapacity or evidence of any coercion or undue influence that
might have impacted the patient's decision to have a physician-assisted suicide.
Some believe that depression is a substantial factor in causing suicides. Unlike the Oregon statue, the Model Act provides for mandatory counseling. See
Baron et al., supra note 100, at 29.
1 The Oregon statute requires both a written request and an
oral request. See
OR. Rv. STAT. § 127.840 (1996). The Model Act mandate does not specify the exact mode of the patient's request, but apparently would leave this decision to the
agency charged with enforcing a statute complying with the Model Act See Baron et
al., supranote 100, at 31-32.
19See OR. REV. STAT. §127.840 (1996).
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ported to a designated regulating agency.' There should be a similar reporting requirement regarding a patient's insurance status and
ability to pay for more aggressive nonlethal treatments. These reporting requirements will provide statistics that show whether the
practical application of physician-assisted suicide has a disproportionate impact on certain discrete groups, including minorities and
those who do not have the financial means to pay for other treatments. The reporting of these statistics to the public in a format that
will not disclose the identities of patients will facilitate efforts to challenge any disproportionate impacts that rules and procedures regulating physician-assisted suicide may have on minority groups, the
elderly, and poor people.
Eighth, there should be a requirement that physicians and
other medical personnel are immune from criminal and civil liability
2
because of the mere act of prescribing lethal medication.1 1 Immunity provisions, however, should not prevent lawsuits for injuries
caused by physicians' malpractice in prescribing ineffective deathcausing medication and in otherwise negligently or intentionally
mistreating patients, including improper coercion and undue influence over patients' decisions.1"
Ninth, there should be a requirement that patients, regardless
of their competency or incompetency, can withdraw requests for
physician-assisted suicides at any time. This requirement is important because it provides
a default rule against involuntary physician23
assisted suicide.1
Tenth, a requirement is necessary that imposes felony liability
on those who intentionally coerce or unduly influence a patient's
decision to die against her will. 24 Yet the mere inclusion of a crimiBaron et al., supranote 100, at 31.
The Oregon statute's immunity provision, which immunizes physicians from
both civil and criminal liability if they act in "good faith compliance" with the statute, does not state clearly whether a physician is also exempted from liability if she
or he negligently prescribes a medication that does not cause death, but only worsens the patient's living condition. See OR. Ray. STAT. § 127.885(1)-(4) (1996). The
Model Act, however, would provide protection only against civil and criminal prosecution because of the mere participation in a physician-assisted suicide, but would
not exonerate the physician from either negligence in prescribing the medication
or from other improper intentional or negligent acts. Thus, improper intentional
coercion of the patient's decision to undergo physician-assisted suicide would not
begrotected. See Baron et al., supra note 100, at 33-34.
See Baron et al., supranote 100, at 33-34.
10
2

See OR. REV. STAT.
124

See OR.

§ 127.845 (1996).

REV. STAT. § 127.890 (1996); see also Baron et al., supra note 100, at 33-
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nal liability clause in a physician-assisted suicide statute does not ensure either physicians' observations of its prohibition or prosecutors'
enforcements of the requirement. One can only wonder whether
the prospect of criminal liability will persuade some physicians to
avoid coercion and racism when discussing or advocating physicianassisted suicide. That physician-assisted suicide appears illegal in all
states except Oregon has not prevented some physicians from unlawfully assisting in their patients' deaths. 25 Therefore, states that legalize physician-assisted suicide should commit the necessary financial
resources, including monitoring by appropriate governmental agencies, to ensure strict punishment of physicians and others who are
involved in illegal or coercive physician-assisted suicide. The penalty
for a criminal violation should be mandatory life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. The stiffness of the penalty should
deter others from similar improper acts.
Eleventh, statutes legalizing physician-assisted suicide should
have expedited procedures for judicial review of any dispute regarding a patient's requests for the treatment. Such disputes may involve
a patient's competency, coercion and undue influences, and physicians' and others' compliance with all statutory requirements.
Although the rules as outlined in Oregon's statue and in the
Model Act, with the modifications that are recommended above,
cannot reasonably be thought of as guaranteeing that no patients
will be coerced into physician-assisted suicide against their will, they
should substantially minimize the possibility of these abuses. Therefore, instead of calling for a total ban on physician-assisted suicide,
the better approach is to establish the best possible rules and procedures to promote noncoerced patients' decisionmaking, including
procedures that give states the authority to locate and punish overbearing, manipulative, and racist physicians. It seems fundamentally
unfair for anyone, including African Americans and other disfavored
minorities, to be denied beneficial treatment out of legitimate fears
that physicians will racially coerce patients into physician-assisted suicide if the treatment is legalized. Instead, society's attention should
be focused on eradicating racism in America, including racism in the
health care industry.
Therefore, the remaining portions of this Article emphasize the
use of the Thirteenth Amendment for the eradication of some of the
15
SeePeter G. Daniels, An Illinois Physician-Assisted Suicide Act: A Merciful End to
a
Terminay Ill Criminal Tradition,28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 763, 795-96 (1997) (noting that
"in a survey of physicians illegally providing physician-assisted suicide, thirty-nine
percent of patients prescribed a lethal substance did not use it.").
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intentional and disproportionate impacts of discrimination that still
plague the health care industry. The following discussion highlights
the vital link that physicians have played from slavery to the present
time in the application of harmful racist medical policies to many African Americans.
IV. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SLAVERY AND CURRENT RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN MEDICAL TREATMENT

A.

Physicians'Advocacy of Physical and Mental Differences Between
African-American Slaves and White Americans As Foundational
Supportfor Slavery

Physicians often assisted in the creation of "black inferiority"
theories that accentuated alleged physical and mental differences
between African-American slaves and white Americans. Slave masters
and other white Americans used those theories to argue that slavery
was just.2 6 The debate over slaves' susceptibility to malaria is one example of physicians' complicity in the chain of slavery. Some physicians took a slavery-supporting, extreme position that all slaves were
immune to malaria, despite evidence that some slaves died from the
disease.'2 Obviously, those physicians cited alleged differences in
126 See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: PublicHealth and the
Role

of the State in the FramingEra, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 302 n.266 (1993).
The effect of slave ideology on southern public health should not be
underestimated. In the early part of the 19th century, for example,
southern physicians, eager to defend the powerful slave-owning class,
developed epidemiological theories tojustify slavery and the distinctiveness of southern medicine.... Such theories undoubtedly not
only reflected the racism and increasing separatism of the region, but
also served, either intentionally or unintentionally, to discredit northern critics of the slave system.
Id. (citing John Duffy, A Note on Ante-Bellum Southern Nationalism and Medical Practice, 34J.S. HiST. 266, 269-71, 273 (1968)).
127 See TODD L. SAvrrr, MEDICINE AND SLAVERY 22 (1978);
see also KENNETH M.
STAMPP, THE PECUuiAR INSTITION 296-307 (1956) (listing many diseases that affected slaves, and noting that different diseases were prevalent in different slave
states and regions). For a discussion of how genetic defects such as deficiencies in
red blood cell antigens, sickle cell disease, sickle cell trait, and in glucose-6phosphate made some slaves less susceptible to certain forms of malaria, see SAvrrTr,
supra, at 17-29.
Those physicians who argued that all slaves were not susceptible to malaria
paid no attention to other physicians' opinions that, in many cases, immunity to
malaria developed overtime through repeated contact with the disease. See id. For
a discussion of the many other diseases that slaves were susceptible to and that
caused many deaths, see WILLIAM DOSrr= POSTLL, THE HEALTH OF SLAVES ON
SoUTERm
PLANTATIONS 74-89 (1951).
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susceptibility to support opinions that African-American slaves were
more 8 suitable for manual labor in fields where malaria was prevalent.

12

Some physicians were more extreme in their advocacy of physical differences between slaves and white people. Dr. Samuel A.
Cartwright, a well-known southern physician, alleged that physiological differences made slaves immune to yellow fever.'" More bizarrely, he alleged that other physical conditions"" produced a disease

that made slaves run away from their masters."' In a nutshell, physicians' exaggeration of insignificant physical differences gave slave
masters medical opinions that they used in order to justify slavery as
the only means of African Americans' survival.
Unfortunately, the
128

See SAvrr-r, supra note 127, at 8. In explaining how southern physicians used

medical differences to support slavery, one scholar states:
The apologists for the peculiar institution [also known as slavery] ... argued that blacks possessed immunity to certain diseases
which devastated whites. Slave owners, they said, did not sacrifice
blacks every time they send [sic] them into the rice fields or canebrakes. Nor could physicians adequately treat blacks without knowledge of their anatomical and physiological peculiarities and disease
proclivities. Blacks were medically and mentally inferior to whites,
they asserted, and the Negro race was actually a distinct species with a
separate origin from the Caucasian.
Id.; see also STAmpP, supra note 127, at 296 (explaining that "[iln these lowlands
[Deep South] under the hot southern sun, it was argued, white laborers would have
perished 'by the thousands,' whereas the Negroes flourished."). For a discussion of
the idea that mental and physical peculiarities of slaves required a separate body of
medicine, see id. at 308-11.
Whereas some physicians took a hard-line view that all slaves were immune to
malaria, others emphasized that there were regional variations to the slaves' susceptibility to malaria. See SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 21-24. Yet even this latter group
still asserted that as a group African Americans were less susceptible than whites.
See id. For more discussion regarding malaria and slaves' susceptibility to malaria,
see STA PP, supra note 127, at 300-01. Stampp stated that "[tihe belief that Negroes
were particularly immune to malaria was altogether incorrect, as ante-bellum doctors and slaveholders knew all too well." Id. at 300. Other scholars, however, noted
that because of certain genetic deficits, slaves were less susceptible to some, but not
all, strains of malaria. See SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 17-29.
9 See Alan Raphael, Health and Medical Care of
Black People in the United
States During Reconstruction 11 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Chicago) (citing Samuel A. Cartwright, Report on the Diseases and PhysicalPeculialitiesothe Negro Race, NEw ORL.iS MFD. & SURGICALJ., May 1851, at 691-715).
See id.
"'

See id.

132

See WYNDHAM B. BLANTON, MEDICINE IN VIRGINIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

154-59 (1931) (giving examples of the impact that slaves' tuberculosis, syphilis,
colic, dysentery, worms, sores, diseases of the spine and hip, disorders of nerves and
glandular, lockjaw, colds, cholera, measles, smallpox, typhoid fever, and pulmonary
infection had on their masters).

1998]

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

807

same black inferiority theory supports much of the present day racism in this country.1 3
B. Medical Treatment Given to Slaves
Moving from slavery-supporting medical theories to the actual
treatment of slaves, one finds additional historical evidence of racial
medical treatment. First, it should be noted that the general quality
of medical treatment was not good for either slaves or slave masters. - 4 Masters, however, normally limited slaves' medical care to
those treatments necessary for protection of their property interest
in the slaves.3 The preferred medical treatment was home health
The writings and opinions of those physicians regarding racial and medical
differences between African Americans slaves and whites were a part of the foundation supporting slavery. See SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 17. For example, one commentator states:
Observers were correct in noting that blacks showed differing susceptibility and immunity to a few specific diseases and conditions. They
capitalized on these conditions to illustrate the inferiority of blacks to
whites, to rationalize the use of this "less fit" racial group as slaves, to
justify subjecting Negro slaves to harsh working conditions in extreme
dampness and heat in the malarious regions of the South, and to
prove to their critics that they recognized the special medical weaknesses of blacks and took these failings into account when providing
for their human chattel. But in terms of an overall theory of medical
care predicated on racial inferiority, the issue was a false one....
Remarks on the subject were always couched in terms which placed
whites in a position of medical and physical superiority over Negroes,
perfect for polemics and useless to the practitioner.
Id.
1
See Olati Johnson, Book Note, Integratingthe "Underclass": Confronting America's
EnduringApartheid, 47 STAN. L. REv. 787, 794 (1995). The author states:
Others have argued that race is the more salient factor in the experience of African Americans, as evidenced by the independent ideology
of black inferiority in this society, the racism which has historically
prevented the formation of alliances between white and black working
class people, and the racism that continues today against even middleclass blacks.
Id.
134
See Pos'ELL, supra note 127, at 1-14 (discussing the absence of medical knowledge regarding the causes of many diseases, the inadequate supply of physicians,
crude medical treatments, poorly trained physicians, and medical treatment by trial
and error).
135
See Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming An Unjust Health Care
System to Meet the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRix 127, 146-47 (1993)
(citing WOODROW JONES, JR. & MITCHELL F. RICE, HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN BLACK
AMEIcA 6 (1987) (noting that "[diuring Slavery, they were given better primary
care because of their property value.")), Some owners and overseers were successful
in their home treatments of slaves; others were unsuccessful and only delayed the
eventual obtaining of trained physicians for treatment of slaves. For a general discussion of the types of home treatments that owners gave slaves, and the success of
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care that masters, their wives, and overseers personally administered,' 6 with formal physician's care for slaves being sought only
when home health care was unsuccessful 7 Arguably, white physicians' medical treatment of slaves was of lesser quality than that given
to their white patients. 's Consistent with "black inferiority" theories
regarding slaves' lower susceptibility to certain diseases, the
" [c]ontemporary medical opinion held that the Negro required different treatment from the whites."'"
Some physicians, however,
bragged about the quality of care they gave to slave patients.' 4° They
even used their alleged good treatment of slaves to support arguments against abolitionists' efforts to free slaves. 4 ' Despite physicians' claims about quality care, given the perceived racial inferiority
that treatment, see SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 150-65 (discussing the use of such
drugs as quinine, calomel, castor oil, laudanum, opium, and the use of such medical procedures as blood-letting and dosing).
See BLA NON, supra note 132, at 167-69 (discussing home treatment of slaves
by their masters, their wives, and their overseers, and also noting that some overseers were derelict in carrying out their primary function of managing the health
treatment of slaves).
Frequently, home health care was the only alternative for slave owners who
lived in rural areas of some southern states, where trained physicians were in short
supply. See PosnLL,supra note 127, at 4, 54.
Although there is evidence that the medical profession objected to owners'
medical treatment of their slaves, apparently because such treatment was of a lower
quality, see SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 165-66, many physicians encouraged such
treatment, even to the point of publishing books instructing slave owners on the
diagnosis and treatment of slaves. See PosLL, supranote 127, at 54-55.
Even then some owners used nontraditional medical practitioners such as
those ascribing to the Thomsonian methods. See SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 168-71;
see also PosTLL, supra note 127, at 58-59 (discussing the use and success of nontraditional medical practices).
138 One writer contends that "[c]rude as medical practice
was at the time, the
planter provided the same care for his slaves as he did for his family." PoSaELL, supra note 127, at 57. Yetjust because the same care was provided, as reflected in physicians' account books and ledgers, does not mean that the same quality of care was
provided. See id. at 58 (referring to an owner moving sick slaves into his home,
where they were treated alongside whites).
159 Id. at 5.
140 See STAMPP, supra note 127, at 812.
141 SeeBLANTON, supranote 132, at 161. One writer's book contains
the following
statement:
A Savannah physician wrote after an epidemic of cholera in 1849: "I
wish an abolitionist could see the care & attention bestowed upon our
Negroes, first to avoid the pestilence & next to cure the sick. A manufacturing Cotton Lord can easily fill the place of his dead operative &
he loses nothing by his death. A planter loses so much capital by the
death of every one of his operatives, & hence to save his capital is to
save his negroes."
Id. (footnote omitted).

1998]

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

809

of slaves and opinions about the differences required in their medical treatment, one can reasonably believe that some slaves received
inferior care.'42 Low quality of care, in part, led to some slaves' dis1
One commentator has concluded that 'iu]nquestionably, slaves were attended by trained physicians and received good medical care less often than
whites." STAMPP, supra note 127, at 315. Other writers, who slanted their conclusions toward supporting slavery, assert that slaves were given excellent care. See
BLANTON, supra note 132, at 155-179. Dr. Blanton's book only emphasized that
slaves received good medical treatment from physicians. His opinions, however,
might be influenced because he was a physician. Furthermore, he goes out of his
way to demean the physical and mental abilities of slaves, and to phrase the benevolence and strengths of the white owners. He states:
Many individuals were fine specimens of physical development, but
the race also had its weaklings. In the rape of Africa which went on
for four centuries many different tribes were carried into slavery, some
of them notorious for their feeble constitutions. Of the Gaboons one
observer declared that 'the debility of their constitutions is astonishing." In fact the "prime field hand" was difficult to find and brought a
fancy price in the market. It is well known that the average white man
under similar conditions possessed greater stamina and could outwork the negro in the fields. When the abolitionist charged slave
owners with over-working their slaves, the owners replied that they
worked side by side with the negroes in the field and asked no more
of them than they themselves could do-a fair rejoinder to the abolitionist but no proof that the negro was physically able to stand the
work.
Id. at 154-55.
Other examples of Dr. Blanton's warm feelings toward slavery are:
A colored man working on a boat said in answer to the question
whether he was better off now than before he was freed, "Wall, when I
tumbled overboard before, the captain he stopped the ship and put
back and picked me up; and they gave me a glass of hot whiskey and
water; and then they gave me twenty lashes for falling overboard. But
now if I tumble overboard, the captain he'd say, What's dat? 0! only
dat damned nigger-go ahead!"
Id. at 161 (footnote omitted).
In reference to some slaves' malingering to avoid work, Dr. Blanton states:
The average negro slave was a child, anxious to shirk work and making much of his illnesses. Great care and judgment were required to
tell whether his sickness was real or pretended. In the effort to detect
the malingerer hardship was doubtless sometimes worked on really
sick slaves.
Id. at 171. For other less derogatory accounts of slaves malingering, see SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 164-65 and PosTnLL, supra note 127, at 60. Given the fact that slaves
were forced to work against their will, many of whom had been captured and brutally taken from their native land, beaten and whipped at will, they should not be
faulted for malingering. In any event, we know that the slaves' alleged deficiencies,
including malingering, were not so great that they caused slave states to outlaw slavery, which would have to some extent avoided the Civil War. For an argument that
Virginia outlawed slavery, in part, because of the alleged burden of slavery on the
masters, see BLANTON, supra note 182, at 162. In any event, most slave states continued slavery until a civil war loss brought an end to slavery.
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One commentator has relied on the lower life expectancy of slaves to correctly argue, in opposition to the arguments that slave owners made to support slavery, that slaves were not treated so well that many of them lived to reach old age.
Slaves' mortality rates were higher and their life expectancy was lower than whites.
See STAmPP, supra note 127, at 318-21.
Scholars who contend that slaves received good medical care have offered
several justifications for their conclusions. Their beliefs stem from the argument
that masters gave good medical care to protect their financial investments in the
slaves. See BLANTON, supra note 132, at 161. For an opposing argument that the
masters' economic investment did not always mean that slaves would be given quality medical care, see generally FANNY KEMBLE, JOURNAL OF A RESIDENCE ON A GEORGIA
PLANTATION IN 1838-1839 (John A. Scott ed., 1961). Others contend that slaves were
a financial burden on the masters, see BLANTON, supra note 132, at 161-62 (arguing
that 'It] hey [Virginia slave owners] complain that the maintenance of their negroes
is very expensive; that their labour is neither so productive nor so cheap, as that of
day labourers, or white servants; and lastly, that epidemical disorders, which are very
common, render both their property and their revenue extremely precarious."),
while the slaves themselves were "care free." Id. at 159. Some commentators also
infer that physicians gave quality care because they received a substantial portion of
their income from the treatment of slaves. See id. at 166 (asserting that wealthy slave
owners and smaller slave owners generally sought trained physicians to give the best
medical care to slaves). The mere fact that physicians received a substantial portion
of their income from their treatment of slaves, however, does not mean that they
gave slaves treatment equal to what they gave to their white patients.
Overall, there is evidence to suggest that some slave owners might have provided adequate care for their slaves. Some masters sent their slaves to the best physicians. This might have meant that they received better care; however, it is not
known whether the care was equal to that given to whites. See STAMPP, supra note
127, at 281. Such good treatment was used to justify slavery by arguing that slaves
had better provisions than free African Americans who lived in the North. See id.
(criticizing such arguments). The average slave did not receive such good treatment, see id. at 281-82, and despite hardships, the average free African American
had a better economic subsistence because he could, to some degree, bargain for
higher wages. See id. at 282.
As could be expected, some masters, even to a point above what was required
to protect their property interest in slaves, might have provided good physician care
and hospital care to their slaves. See id. at 312-14. Some have argued, however, that
such good treatment was the exception to the rule, because masters did not adequately provide medical care for slaves:
Often they possessed neither a sense of duty nor a practical concern
for the protection of their property. They misused their lands, tools,
and livestock as well as their human chattels with a singular disregard
for the dictates of self-interesL Indeed, economic self-interest did not
always impel a calloused master to give medical aid to an ailing slave.
Id. at 315.
One commentator stated:
Some of the larger plantations maintained medical doctors for the
care of the slaves, but folk medical practices were usually resorted to.
Even when doctors were available, the practice of medicine among
the slaves was something short of scientific. The doctors frequently
complained that they were unable to administer treatment because
the slaves were not amenable to the same medical treatment as white
patients. Frances Kemble summarized the conditions in a slave infir-
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trust of the medical profession. This distrust contributed to slaves
concealing
illnesses for the purpose of using their own "home reme4
dies." Additional inferences about the quality of slaves' medical care
can be garnered from the methods that slave masters used to pay
physicians. ' 4 Many physicians and masters entered into "practice-bythe-year" contractual agreements under which masters paid physicians certain sums of money for necessary medical treatments as frequently as slaves needed them during the contractual period.'
Those contractual arrangements were slavery's version of managed

care's capitation contracts.'o One can reasonably believe that some
mary on one plantation: "In all, filth, disorder, and misery abounded;
the floor was the only bed, and scanty begrimed rags of blankets the
only covering."
ALPHONSO PINKNEY, BLACK AMERICANS 5-6 (3d ed. 1987) (citing FRANCES ANNE
KEMBLE, JouRNAL OF A RESIDENCE ON A GEORGIA PLANTATION IN 1838-1839 71 (John A.

Scott ed., 1961)).
The available scholarship on the quality of medical care slaves received is usually slanted to support the author's views toward slavery. For a list of authors asserting their beliefs that adequate care was given to slaves and for other authors asserting that insufficient care was given, see SAvrrT, supranote 127, at 310-12.
It might be impossible to conclusively evaluate the overall quality of the
medical treatment that slaves received from trained physicians. Most of the written
documentation of slaves' medical treatment come from either slave masters' records
or from the treating physicians' ledgers or medical journals. See Raphael, supra note
129, at 6 (concluding that most records from physicians regarding medical treatment of slaves provide little useful information about the quality of medical treatment that physicians gave to slaves).
143 See SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 171-84. There is
also some evidence that some
slaves would not take medicines that had been prescribed by the owners and physicians. See PosTELL, supra note 127, at 60-61.
144 SeeSAvrrr, supra note 127, at
195-98.
145 See id.
at 198.
146 SeeJohn Petrila, Ethics, Money, and the Problem
of Coercion in Managed Behavioral
Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. LJ. 359, 366-67 (1996). One commentator has stated
the following regarding capitation:
Capitation, in particular, has potentially far-reaching implications for
the relationship between provider and patient. In a capitated reimbursement system, a fixed amount of money is made available to a
provider to furnish specified health care benefits to a defined population. If the provider can furnish the agreed upon services for less
money than that made available in the contract, the provider typically
will be able to keep some or all of the savings. However, if the provider spends more than the contracted-for amount, the provider will
become financially responsible for some or all of that amount. This
assumption of "risk" is a key component of capitation. In contrast to
fee for service reimbursement, capitation may create incentives to under-serve individuals, raising significant ethical issues for the treater.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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slaves did not receive quality care, 7 especially because critics complained that treatment contracts led to substandard care.'"
Other evidence of physicians' racially-discriminatory treatment
of slaves is visible from the use of slaves as medical specimens.
Scholars have shown that slaves were disproportionately used as
specimens in two ways. First, slaves were live specimens on whom
hospitals trained physicians and experimented with new medical
procedures.'4 Second, discrimination was even more pronounced
when it came to performing autopsies and using cadavers for training medical students.' ° Medical institutions hired "grave robbers" to
steal bodies from cemeteries that primarily held African Ameri151
cans.

147

See SAvrTr, supra note 127, at 198-99.

One scholar stated: "Though complaints from slaveholders were few, the servants' best interest could not have always
been well served through such a system." Id.
The "pay-by-the-year" contract came under attack when physicians developed
large medical societies that eventually opposed the method of payment as being not
in "accord with fair competition, nor comport with the dignity of the medical profession." Id. In addition to fee-for-service and capitated contracts, slave owners and
physicians also entered into agreements that set the medical fees that physicians
would charge for specified medical conditions. See id. at 200.
148 See Raphael, supra note 129, at 19. The
same type of quality of care fears are
voiced against managed care contracts today. See Susan J. Stayn, Note, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Organizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grieuance
and Appeal Procedures, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1674, 1676 (1994) (emphasizing lack of
proof that managed care prevents inadequate treatment during efforts to cut costs);
see also Randall, supra note 94, at 218 (emphasizing that managed care financial arrangements might be harmful to African Americans).
See SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 282-90. Some argue that poor whites might have
been used as specimens more frequently than slaves because of the owners' property interest in the slaves. See id. at 289 n.23. "Poor whites may have suffered more
from such abuse than slaves, inasmuch as bondsmen were property and were, when
possible, watched closely by their owners. Whites had no such advantage." Id. It is
clear that in some cases slaves were used more frequently. See id. at 290. "Of seventeen cases known to have been discussed at Richmond medical society gatherings
between January 1853 andJune 1854, ten involved black patients. The only organs
displayed during this period had been removed from five Negroes. Though white
cases were mentioned, no specimens were produced to illustrate these diseases." Id.
,50 See id. at 291. Although the bodies of poor whites were also stolen, it is clear
that African Americans' bodies were disproportionately used. See id. Stolen bodies
were used by medical students despite the fact that dissection of bodies for medical
purposes was outlawed in Virginia. See id. One scholar states: "There is little doubt
that most of Virginia's dissection subjects were procured from midnight graveyard
expeditions, and that most of these cadavers were black. Medical schools and students in Virginia thus made great use of black patients, both living and dead." Id. at
293. "[Bllacks served most of the needs of Virginia's medical community for
autopsy and dissection cadavers." Id. at 290.
51 See SAvrr, supra note 127, at 291.
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Physicians also conducted nonconsensual experiments on living
African Americans.' 2 Dr. J. Marion Sims, a specialist in gynecology,
perfected vesico-vaginal fistula surgery by performing numerous
painful, nonanesthetized experimental surgeries on slave women.15
Other physicians used slaves as guinea pigs to perfect operations for
bladder stones'- and to develop a vaccine for smallpox.'
Besides discriminatory medical treatment of slaves, stealing
their dead bodies for autopsies, and experimenting on their live
bodies, some physicians were more actively involved in the slave
trade. Some physicians speculated in the buying of sick slaves from
152

Although physicians conducted experiments on some poor whites, physicians

disproportionally used African-American slaves. See SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 293301. The use of white Americans does not mean that African-American slaves were
not discriminated against, because the mere fact that one race was disproportionally
sub*ected to unwanted experimentation establishes discrimination.
Barbara L. Bernier, Class, Race, and Poverty: Medical Technologies and Sociopolitical Choices, 11 HARV. BLACKLETrRJ. 115, 118-19 (1994) (citing Diana E. Axelsen, Women as Victims of Medical Experimentation: J Marion Sims' Surgeries on Slave
Women, 1845-1859, 2 SAGE 10 (1985)); see also SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 293
(discussing Sims's surgeries and experiments by Dr. Thomas Hamilton who conducted tests on a slave "in a makeshift open-pit oven in rural Georgia to discover the
best remedies for sunstroke"). Dr. John Peter Mettauer was another physician who
used slave women as subjects for his experimental vesico-vaginal fistula surgeries.
See id. at 297.
15
See Bernier, supra note 153, at 119 (referring to the pouring of near-boiling
water on the spinal column of a twenty-five-year-old slave allegedly to treat typhoid
pneumonia); see also SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 299 (describing pouring of nearboiling water). Dr. P.C. Spencer also disproportionally used slaves during experimental surgery to correct urinary tract stones. See id. at 301 (noting that "[t] hree of
his first four operations were performed on blacks, one of whom died."). "Poor
people in general, and slaves in particular, constituted a captive population in Virginia. They had little choice but to submit to the physician's treatment and trust
that he would not harm them. Rarely did they realize when an experiment was being conducted upon them." Id.
See SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 301. Those harmful experimentations were perpetuated by both private medical institutions and public institutions. See Bernier,
supra note 153, at 118-21. History has not recognized slaves for the role that they
played in the perfection of the smallpox vaccine. See SAvrrr, supra note 127, at 29697. "Few white people then realized that the vaccine matter which entered their
bloodstreams and saved their lives often came from the arms of such blacks as Jefferson's slaves. And few people today recognize the significant role that blacks
played in the introduction and acceptance of vaccination in America" Id.
Other acts of discrimination are shown by physicians subjecting African
Americans to public exhibitions. For example, physicians placed deformed slaves
on display for public viewing by other physicians and the public. See id. at 305.
These practices probably added to a public perception that slaves and African
Americans in general were genetically inferior. See id. (noting that "[t]he attitude
of physicians seems to have been that blacks, being property, or free but inferior,
could be used for medical display and publicity, whereas whites with similar anomalies required privacy and anonymity.").
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slave ships for the purpose of treating them so that they could be
sold to the highest bidder.'6 Many physicians in the South, some of
whom were poorly trained, practiced medicine as a means of obtaining enough capital to become slave owners. 57 Even when they did
not own slaves, many physicians benefited from slavery because they
had built lucrative medical practices on the backs of their slave patients.'
Obviously, after emancipation and the Civil War, many southern
physicians exhibited racial hostility toward free African Americans. 6
Physicians often treated African Americans as if they were still
slaves.' 60 Some physicians even hoped that tuberculosis would be a

genocidal means of removing African Americans from America."'
Despite their racism toward African-American patients, many white
physicians opposed African-American physicians who tried to establish medical practices in the South. 62
Even the Freedmen Bureau's northern physicians who worked
in the South were guilty of racial discrimination against AfricanAmerican patients." As a result of the various types of racially dis1See BLANTON, supra note 132,
at 155.
157
15

See POSTELL, supra note 127, at 66.

See id. at 66-68.

Therefore, even in the midst of the intense poverty that African Americans
experienced at the time, many southern white physicians would not treat African
Americans unless they paid high fees in advance of treatment, with no possibility of
credit from either the physicians or from drug stores. See Raphael, supra note 129,
at 155-59. Some physicians and local governments did, however, attempt to provide
medical care to poverty stricken African Americans. See id. at 158.
159

160
161
162

See id. at 157.
See id. at 180.
See id. at 183-86.

See id. at 47-60. Although the Freedmen Bureau was not perfect in its provision of care to freed African Americans, it was successful in ending some discriminatory practices that existed in the South after the Civil War, and it provided a substantial amount of free medical care that African Americans would not have
otherwise received. See generally Raphael, supra note 129. For example, under
President Andrew Jackson's Presidential Reconstruction, freed African Americans'
health care issues were neglected because Jackson did not recognize a national obligation to give priority to such issues. See PINKNEY, supra note 142, at 23. Southern
states passed Black Codes that virtually reestablished slavery in everything but name.
See id. The Codes regulated almost every aspect of African Americans' lives. See id.
Through the Codes, southern states sought to relegate African Americans to a segregated and subordinate position premised on the alleged racial inferiority of African Americans. See id. at 23-24. After its creation in 1865 during Radical Reconstruction, the Freedmen Bureau abolished the Black Codes and provided a great
deal of free medical care to African Americans. See id. at 24. Generally, African
Americans as a group obtained some degree of equality including the holding of
governmental positions on the local and national level. See id. at 24-26. Progress
163

1998]

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

criminatory medical treatments, the stigmatized former slaves developed a lingering distrust of white physicians."' Some African Ameri6
cans, in fear for their lives, went entirely without medical care. "
After Reconstruction, southern states enacted and enforced Jim
Crow laws that excluded African Americans from hospitals and other
health care facilities serving white Americans.'" Overt discrimination
in white-owned health care 6facilities continued until the passage of
1
civil rights laws in the 1960s.

toward equality, however, ended with the Compromise of 1877, which returned local governance to southern states and withdrew remaining federal troops. See id. at
26.
64 See Raphael, supra note
129, at 159-60.
65 See id. at 160. African Americans' general distrust of white
physicians even exists today.
166 See Randall, supra note 135, at 147 (citing WOODROWJONES, JR. & MITC.HELL F.
RICE, BLACK HEALTH CARE: AN OVERVIEW, in HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN BLACK AMERICA:

PoLclES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 6 (Woodrow Jones, Jr. & Mitchell F. Rice eds.,
1987)).
Scholars have linked African Americans' present day lack of access to health
care in some locations to historical patterns of segregation in the provision of hospital services. See RoMAJ. Stewart, Health Care and Civil Rights, in CrviL RIGHTS ISSUES IN
HEAI.LTH CARE DELIVERY 318, 322 (United States Commission on Civil Rights ed.,

1980) (asserting that present day "disparities are the vestiges of historical patterns
of racial segregation"). Segregation in hospital facilities existed during slavery and
reconstruction, and it continued in the 1960s even in those facilities that received
federal monies for the construction of hospitals under the Hill-Burton Act. See id.
16 See Randall, supra note 135, at 147-48; see also id. at 149-50 (citation omitted).
Many white-owned health care facilities either closed or relocated from areas where
African Americans predominately resided. See Randall, supra note 135, at 148. The
loss of health care facilities in African-American communities means that they will
either not have access to health care facilities or that they will have to travel great
distances to other areas to obtain treatment, situations that might result in African
Americans forgoing medical treatment until their illness becomes more serious and
more costly to treat. See id. at 150; see also Stewart, supra note 166, at 323-24. In addition to racism, there might be economic factors that contribute to the closing of inner-city hospitals as many of those facilities might have been older and more costly
to operate. See id.
Some scholars believe that present-day systemic racial discrimination in African Americans' access to health care facilities is a covert continuation of the same
racially discriminatory health care policies that have existed since slavery. For a discussion of institutional policies that hospitals employ to exclude or restrict African
Americans' access to hospitals, see Randall, supra note 135, at 149 (discussing admission practices that allow only physicians with staff privileges to admit patients;
health care facilities without physicians on staff to accept medicaid patients; and
health care facilities that lay off African-American physicians--all of which have a
disparate impact on African-American patients by causing them to receive less
treatment); see also Stewart, supra note 166, at 324 (listing similar and other hospital
policies and procedures that result in a disproportionate exclusion of African
Americans from hospital treatment).

816

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:774

Unfortunately, the practice of denying medical treatment to African Americans and using them as experimental guinea pigs is not
limited to slavery. One of the most horrendous, experimental frauds
to be perpetrated on African Americans was the Tuskegee Experiment. 8 In this experiment, 399 African Americans afflicted with
syphilis, and 201 who were not, were evaluated for forty years under
the auspices of the United States Public Health Service.'69 The secret
experimenters did not provide their subjects with penicillin despite
its effectiveness in treating syphilis. 17 0 Public Health Service employees, with the aid of Miss Eunice Rivers's solicitation, used trickery to
obtain the subjects' uninformed consent by telling them that they
had "bad blood""' and by promising free medical treatment and free
burials. 172 Many of the victims died without receiving adequate
treatment for their conditions. 17 Public exposure of the Tuskegee
Experiment caused African Americans to harbor even more distrust
of government and health care institutions. 174 Distrust is also understandable in light of the United States Public Health Service's and
the American Cancer Society's experimental injection of cancer cells
into African-American women during the 1960s. 75 Similarly, in 1972
twenty African-American women were improperly given abortions
with a discarded Super Coil surgical procedure; some of these7
women suffered medical complications that led to hysterectomies."
Consistently, African Americans have also been victimized by the disparity in the quantity and quality of medical care that white physicians give them even when they can afford to pay for better treatments.

168 See generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD:

THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT

(1981).

169 See id. at
1.

170 See Bernier, supra note 153, at 122-25.
171 The victims were never informed that they had syphilis. SeeJONES, supra note

168, at 5.
172 See id. at
13.
173

See id. at 2.

174 See Deborah Weimer, Beyond ParensPatries: Assuring Timely, Informed
CompassionateDecisionmakingfor HIV-Positive Children in Foster Care, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 379,

385-86 (1991) (discussing the fear of some African Americans and Hispanics of
medical experiments after the Tuskegee Experiment).
175 See Randall, supra note 94, at 198.

Other experiments include the testing of

African Americans for sickle-cell disease, see id. at 200-01, and the coerced sterilization of many African-American women. See id. at 202-04. For an exhaustive historical analysis of racism in the health care industry, see generally Randall, supra note
94.

176 See Randall, supra note 94, at 202-04.
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C. Studies Showing Evidence of Racial Discriminationin Medical
Treatment
A multiplicity of studies have shown that there is a disparity between the provision of medical services to white Americans and African Americans.' 77 This is true even when African Americans have the
same income levels as their white counterparts.' 78 One leading
scholar has noted that white Americans are "one-third more likely to
undergo coronary angiography, 7 , two to three times more likely to
undergo bypass surgery,"'" and more likely to receive both hemodialysis treatment for kidney disease and kidney transplants than are
African Americans.'8 ' Also, white Americans receive more intensivecare treatment for pneumonia,'" and pregnant African-American
women are more likely to be classified as "clinic patients," resulting
in their receiving fewer necessary caesarean sections than pregnant
white women.,8
A recent study of the impact of race on medical treatment was
released in September 1996. The United States Department of
Health and Human Services financed the study through the Health
Care Financing Administration.'" The study involved a review of the
1993 Medicare treatment files of 24.2 million white and 2.1 million
African-American Medicare beneficiaries. Some of the results sug-

17 See H. Jack Geiger, Letter to Editor, Race and Health Care: An American
Dilemma? 1996 NEwENG.J. MED. 815-16. The author states that a

recent search of the literature on racial and ethnic disparities in
health care, prepared for the American Medical Association's board of
trustees, covering only the 10-year period 1984 to 1994 and restricted
to articles, commentaries, and letters in the New England Journal of
Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association, filled 66
single-spaced pages.
Id.
178

See Randall, supra note 135, at 160-61.

119 Id. at 160 (citing Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Black-White Disparities

in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344, 2344-46 (1990); Mark B. Wenneker & Arnold M. Epstein, Racial Inequalitiesin the Use of Proceduresfor Patientswith Ischemic HeartDisease in
Massachusetts,261JAMA 253, 253-57 (1989)).
180 Randall, supra note 135, at 160.
181 See id. at 160-61.
,8 See id. (citing Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 179, at 2345;
John Yergan et al., Relationship Between Patient Race and the Intensity of Hospital Services, 25 MED.CARE 592, 600, 603 (1987)).
183 See Randall, supra note 135, at 161 (citing R.H. de Regt et al., Relation of Private or Clinic Care to the CesareanBirth Rate, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 619, 619-24 (1986);
Yergan et al., supranote 182, at 592, 600, 603).
See Marian E. Gornick et al., Effects of Race and Income on Mortality and Use of
Services Among Medicare Beneficiaries,1996 NEw ENG.J. MED. 791.
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gest present racial discrimination in the health care industry. First,
white Americans had more hospital discharges for ischemic heart
disease treatment than African Americans, indicating that the former
received more treatment for that disease than the latter. 8" Second, a
similar disparity existed in the performance of coronary-artery bypass
surgery and percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty.'

Third, white women received more mammography examinations
that African-American women at all income levels.'8
Fourth, the rates of amputation of all or some of the lower limbs
were three times as great for African Americans than for white
Americans.... Fifth, and of much historical significance, the rate of
bilateral orchiectomy (castration by removal of the testicles) for African-American men was two and one half times that of white men."'
This disparity in levels of amputations and castrations can be labeled
the "kunte kinte syndrome."'
Sixth, white Americans received
slightly over one and one half times as many influenza immunizations as African Americans. 9'
This study reveals that, despite a supposed equal access to Medicare benefits, African Americans received less medical treatment
than white Americans. The researchers theorized that the study results are too inconclusive to prove racism and that certain cultural or
185

See id. The rate was 33.8 discharges for whites to 25.0 for African Americans.

See id. at 793.
18
See id. The rate for those procedures for whites was 4.8 to 5.4 per 1000
respectively, while the rate was 1.9 to 2.5 per 1000 respectively for African Americans.
See id.
187
See id. at 794. The rate per 100 for white women is 26.0 compared to 17.1 for
African-American women. See id. White women also receive more than twice as
many procedures to reduce hip fractures than do African-American women. See id.
This disparity might be explainable because more white woman suffer from osteoporosis that African-American women. See id.
in See id. The rate was 6.7 per 1000 for African Americans to 1.9 for white
Americans. See id. The researches theorized that the rate of amputation might be
explainable on the grounds that African American and lower income people were
"less likely than white beneficiaries to have leg-sparing surgery and more likely to
undergo amputation." Id. at 798.
1 See id. at 794. The rate was 2.0 per 1000 African-American men to 0.8 for
white men. See id. The income difference among African-American men has an
impact on the rate of amputation within the group, but did not have an impact on
the rate or number of orchiectomy. See id.
190 The disparity in amputation and castration is reminiscent
of the scene from
Alex Haley's Roots where Kunte Kinte, as punishment for his multiple attempts to
run away to freedom, was offered a choice of castration or amputation of a foot. He
chose the foot.
191 See Gornick et al., supra note 184, at 797. The rate was 515 per 1000 compared to 313. See id.
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treatment patterns might have caused the disparity. 19 Some commentators, however, are critical of those explanations."" They more
The researchers conclude: "The differences in these patterns according to
race and income may reflect a multitude of factors, including educational, cultural,
and behavioral variables; individual preferences; differences in the treatment of
disease, such as the use of hormonal therapy for prostate cancer; differences in
supplementary insurance; and the availability of services." Id. at 798.
In summarizing the racial and income discrepancies in Medicare beneficiaries' treatment, the researchers state:
Black beneficiaries and low-income beneficiaries (white and black)
have fewer visits to physicians for ambulatory care, fewer mammograms, and fewer immunizations against influenza but are hospitalized more often and have higher mortality rates (as is consistent with
the relation between income and mortality in the U.S. population 25
to 64 years of age). This pattern suggests that these two groups of
beneficiaries may be receiving less primary and preventive care than
either white or more affluent beneficiaries.
Id. at 797-98 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Attributing these discrepancies to less primary and preventive care, however,
does not mean that racism is exempted as a causative factor, as African Americans
might receive less primary and preventive care because of racial barriers to such
care. See Randall, supra note 135, at 148-54 (discussing barriers to health care).
In a recent study conducted at Duke University of 12,402 patients, 10.3% of
which were African Americans, the researchers controlled the date to avoid any disparity in treatment based on income and severity of sickness. The outcome of the
study showed that, although African Americans were slightly less likely than whites
to undergo angioplasty, they were significantly less likely to have bypass surgery
(31% of African Americans compared to 45% of white Americans), and that the
disparity was greatest among those who stood to benefit the most from bypass surgery (42% of African Americans to 61% of white Americans). See Eric D. Peterson
et al., Racial Variation in the Use of Coronary-RevascularizationProcedures-Are the Differences Real? Do They Matter?, 1997 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 480. Again, the researchers
speculate and imply, without any evidence, that other "nonclinical factors," instead
of racism, might have caused the disparity, including whether those African Americans who were not given bypass surgery were "angiographically suitable" for the surgery, the particular informed consent discussions between African-American patients and their physicians, and the trust that African-American patients have in
their physicians' recommendations. See id.
Another group of researchers investigated some of those "nonclinical factors"
and imply that the way that physicians give informed consent to African Americans
and Hispanics determine whether they choose bypass surgery:
Racial differences may exist before coronary revascularization-that is,
in the actual recommendations made by physicians after coronary angiography has been performed. We analyzed data for the multiethnic,
multiracial population of 827 patients undergoing initial angiography
for the evaluation of ischemic heart disease between 1990 and 1993 at
our institution and found racial and ethnic differences in recommendations for coronary revascularization after angiography in the group
of patients with severe disease, such as left main coronary artery disease or three-vessel disease. African-Americans were twice as likely
and Hispanics almost three times as likely as whites with the same
level of disease to have medical therapy recommended rather that re192
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willingly point to racism as the cause-or at least as a contributing
factor-of these results.194 Indeed, some legal scholars readily conclude that racism, and not poverty or lack of income, causes much of
the disparity in medical treatment between African Americans and
white Americans.9
In light of the historical evidence of racist medicine and current
evidence suggestive of persistent racial discrimination in the health
care industry, it seems clear that federal statutes and other legal pro-

vascularization (coronary bypass surgery or angioplasty).
J. Marie Bamhart & Sylvia Wassertheil-Smoller, Letter to Editor, Racial Variation in
the Use of Coronaty-RevascularizationProcedures,1997 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 131.
This study strongly shows that physicians' racism determines the treatment
recommendations that they make to minority patients; this consequently determines that they will die at a disproportionate rate when compared to white Americans.
193 See generally Geiger, supranote 177.
194 If racism is in fact the cause, or a cause, then the disparity in treatment might
stem from either the conscious intent of medical providers to discriminate, their
unconscious behavior, or a combination of conscious and unconscious behavior.
See id. (emphasizing that, throughout many studies, race "was the overriding determinant of disparities in care."). Unconscious discrimination might be just as devastating as intentional discrimination because deep-seeded individual and social
changes might be necessary for its eradication.
195 See RAND E. ROSENBLATr ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
108-09 (1997). Professors Rosenblatt, Law, and Rosenbaum state:
Despite their greater health care needs, minorities receive
fewer hospital and physician services; this remains true even if we control data for poverty, cultural preference, source of payment and clinical condition. The few studies that are available conclude that this
differential treatment in access to health care is the result of race discrimination, not poverty or cultural preference. Even when studies
control for source of payment and clinical condition, minorities receive fewer medical services. Nationally, African-Americans receive
one half (and in the South one-third) the coronary artery bypass operations of white patients--even when their symptoms and source of
payment are the same. Blacks are also less likely than whites to receive long-term hemodialysis, kidney transplants, and potentially
sight-saving treatment for glaucoma. African-Americans hospitalized
for pneumonia are less likely than whites to receive medical services,
particularly intensive care. Black women receive less appropriate hospital care than white women for breast cancer and are less likely to receive Cesarian sections. Blacks are less frequently accepted for psychotherapy, more often assigned to inexperienced therapists, and
seen with less intensity. Low use of dental services and nursing home
care among blacks is particularly striking. Low income whites are
more likely to receive care from private physicians than Am' nonwhites, regardless of income.
Id. (citations omitted).
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nouncements have not been successful in eradicating racial discrimination.'9 6
V. THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT

The Thirteenth Amendment can augment anti-discrimination
laws to prohibit racial discrimination. Shortly after the Civil War,
Congress enacted the Thirteenth Amendment to end slavery and to
prevent former slave masters from continuing their subjugation and
de facto reenslavement of African Americans.17 Section 1 of the
amendment states:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 98
Section 2 provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation."'" Much debate has focused
on the scope of the first section of the amendment. Initially, the Supreme Court contended that Section 1 outlaws only the masterservant relationship and involuntary servitude."
Other commentators assert that the amendment eradicates both the physical bonds of
slavery and the "badges and incidents" of slavery.'2
The Amendment's legislative history supports the latter view. 2
Scholarly commentary has pinpointed the essence of the debate between opponents and proponents of the amendment. The consis1
Some scholars have argued that Title VI and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) have been ineffective because their standards and enforcement efforts are inadequate. See Randall, supra note 94, at 211
(discussing the ineffectiveness of EMTALA); Sidney D. Watson, Health Care in the
Inner City: Asking the Right Questions, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1647, 1668-71 (1993)
(discussing the ineffectiveness of Title VI).
197 The amendment was deemed ratified on December 18, 1865.
See Jacobus
tenBroek, ThirteenthAmendment to the Constitutionof the United States: Consummation to
Abolition and Key to the FourteenthAmendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 183 (1951).
198 U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
199 Id. § 2.
200 See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1906).
201 See tenBroek, supra note 197, at 200; G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Free-

dom: A Legal Histoy of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REv. 1, 21-22. (1974).
"Stated more positively, the thirteenth amendment would free the slave from legal
bondage, secure equal protection under the law for all blacks in the exercise of
their natural and constitutional rights, and, more pervasively, secure the same equal protection under the law for all United States citizens of whatever race." Id. at 12 (emphasis
added).
202 See tenBroek, supra note 197, at 174-83.
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tent arguments of both groups emphasized that the amendment
would do more than simply set African Americans free from involuntary servitude and physical confinement on the plantation. 2° 3 The
opponents, fearful of a disruption in the balance of power between
the federal and state governments, 204 argued that the amendment
would "'make [African Americans] our equals before the law."205
They believed that the amendment would grant former slaves
"equality before the law, protection in life and person, opportunity
to live, work and move about." 2
Similarly, proponents of the amendment believed that it would
give African Americans more than mere freedom from the masterslave relationship. 27 A Lochean natural rights philosophy animated
the proponents' arguments. 208 They believed that the amendment
would confer those "civil or natural rights" that predated the United
States Constitution.2 9 Those rights were the same quintessential
20

See id.

More specifically, opponents of the amendment argued that the amendment
would expansively alter a preexisting federalism tradition by giving Congress the
authority to control state domestic matters such as the status of African Americans
and other persons. See tenBroek, supra note 197, at 175 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864) (statement of Rep. Anton Herrick)). Professor tenBroek states that there would be no need for the opponents' federalism concerns if
the only purpose of the amendment was to destroy the physical bonds of slavery. See
id. at 176.
205 Id. at 175 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 179-80 (1865)).
Other
portions of the legislative history include the following statements by Rep. William
S. Holman for Indiana regarding the impact of the amendment:
[The amendment] "confers on Congress the power to invade any state
to enforce the freedom of the African in war or peace. What is the
meaning of all that? Is freedom the simple exemption from personal
servitude? No, Sir, mere exemption from servitude is a miserable idea
of freedom. A pariah in the state, a subject but not a citizen, holding
any right at the will of the governing power. What is this but slavery?"
Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2692 (1864) (statements of Rep. William S. Holman)). In accord is the statement of Elijah Ward: "We are now called
upon to sanction a Joint Resolution to amend the Constitution so that all persons
shall be equal under the law, without regard to color, and so that no person shall
hereafter be held in bondage." Id. at 176 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
177 (1865) (statements of Rep. Elijah Ward)).
206 Id. at 176.
207 See id. at 176-83.
208 See id. at 176.
The drafters believed that the amendment granted former
204

slaves their natural rights to "equality before the law, protection in life and person,
opportunity to live, work and move about." Id.
o9 See id. at 177. Those natural rights were limited only to the extent of providing general protection to all citizens. See id. Professor tenBroek states:
Throughout the debates, these were the points the abolitionists
hammered home with ardor and relentlessness. As had been true of
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natural rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" that white
men had by birth, as reflected in the Declaration of Independence.1
their constitutional attack from the time of its original formulation,
two major ideas were combined and recombined into a single argument and purpose: First, the Lockean presuppositions about natural
rights and the protective function of government; second, slavery's
denial of these rights and this protection not only to the blacks, bond
and free, but to the whites as well.
Id. at 176. For support of the natural rights philosophy underpinning the adoption
of the Thirteenth Amendment, Professor tenBroek relies on statements from Senator Henry Wilson and Senator E.C. Ingersoll of Illinois. See id. at 177-78 (citing
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1319, 1321, 1324 (1864) (statements of Sen.
Henry Wilson); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2987, 2989, 2990 (1864)
(statements of Sen. E. C. Ingersoll)). Godlove S. Orth of Indiana summed up the
essence of the natural rights underpinning of the amendment by stating that the
amendment's purpose is the enforcement of the "self-evident truth, 'that all men
are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.'" Id. at 178
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142-43 (1865) (statements of Sen.
Godlove S. Orth)).
210 The Thirteenth Amendment would "'bring the Constitution
into avowed
harmony with the Declaration of Independence.'" tenBroek, supra note 197, at 179.
One commentator states:
Many advocates of the Thirteenth Amendment held a broad view
of its scope. In particular, abolitionist senators such as William Sumner of Massachusetts and Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, among others,
viewed slavery as destroying natural rights that the Constitution had
been intended to protect. They believed that abolition of slavery
would restore a status quo ante in which all persons' natural rights
would be protected regardless of race. Under this theory, former
slaves were protected not only from the status of legal bondage, but
more broadly in their rights to participate in civil society through protecting their rights to make and enforce contracts, to sue and be sued,
to testify, and so forth. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in the Civil Rights
Cases, shared this view and argued that the amendment reached not
only the institution of slavery, but also its "badges and incidents."
Consequently, Harlan stated that the congressional enforcement
power encompassed the power to "enact laws to protect ...people
against the deprivation, because of their race, of any civil rights granted
to other freemen in the same State...."
John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the
Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3
ASIAN L.J. 55, 74 (1996) (footnotes omitted); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating
the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8-15 (1995) (relying on legislative history from both the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to emphasize the natural rights foundation of the
amendment).
Other commentators recognize the natural rights foundation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality-and the Irrational Underinclusiveness of the Civil Rights Laws, 45 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 67 n.214 (1988)
(arguing that " [h ]ere, the pro-amendment faction was basing its arguments on the
Lockean presupposition of natural rights and the protective function of government. Congress, then, saw an expansive and vibrant thirteenth amendment.");
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Douglas L. Colbert, Challengingthe Challenge: The Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 n.153
(1990) (acknowledging that "Professor tenBroek, the seminal commentator on the
amendment, concluded that the amendment's prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude included 'a direct ban against many of the evils radiating out
from the system of slavery,' and protected against 'the denial ... of their natural
rights... [and] the denial to the whites of their natural and constitutional
rights.' ... [and that the amendment] guaranteed blacks their natural and constitutional rights by eliminating the badges and incidents of slavery, and extended these
protections to whites.") (citation omitted); Russell H. Hittinger, DistinguishingBetween ConstitutionalArt and Morals, 4 S. CAL. INTERDisc. L.J. 567, 579 (1995) (noting
that "I will concede that the Thirteenth (and perhaps the Eighth) Amendment is an
exception to the rule, for this Amendment is not merely congruent with, but a direct requirement of natural justice."); RobertJ. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 890, 893,
895 (1986) (recognizing the Declaration of Independence as the source from which
the natural rights philosophy stemmed; describing "the principal statement of the
Republicans' intentions regarding Reconstruction": "Schuyler Colfax of Indiana,
opened the Thirty-ninth Congress in December 1865 by announcing that the protection of the natural rights of all American citizens was to be one of the major objectives of the forthcoming Congress"; and asserting that the adoption of the first
section of the Thirteenth Amendment was to "secure[] to every man within the United
States liberty in its broadest terms." (emphasis in original)); Andrew Koppelman,
Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480, 534
(1990) (noting that: "[s]tated affirmatively, and in the alternative phrases and concepts used repeatedly throughout the debates, the Thirteenth Amendment would:
first, guarantee the equal protection of the laws to men in their natural rights and
to citizens in their constitutional rights; and/or second, safeguard citizens of the
United States equally in their constitutional privileges and immunities; and/or,
running a bad but nevertheless articulated third, enforce the constitutional guarantee to all persons against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law."); Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State Action, Federalism, and Congress, 59 Mo. L. Rrv. 499, 528, 532 (1994) (asserting that
"[wlhatever the source of their belief, however, all [proponents of the Thirteenth
Amendment] agreed that the institution of slavery was a violation of natural law and
a violation of the essential obligations of the southern states to protect the natural
rights of all persons," and that "[miany Republicans believed that the Thirteenth
Amendment alone was sufficient to permit them fully to protect the natural rights
denied to Blacks under slavery."); Barry Sullivan, HistoricalReconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 564 (1989)
(congressional Republicans understood Thirteenth Amendment to guarantee status
and natural rights of citizens); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 440 (1989) (explaining that "[iun addition to
purely labor-based concerns, the thirteenth amendment debates reflected themes
such as racial equality, the importance of access to education, the integrity of families, and the natural rights of mankind.") (footnotes omitted); Lisa Tudisco Evren,
Note, When is a Race Not a Race?: ContemporaryIssues Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
61 N.Y.U. L Rev. 976, 985 (1986) (describing "the purposes of the congressional
Republicans as twofold: to establish unequivocally the authority of the national
government, and to consolidate that government's power to enforce the natural
rights of all Americans," and referencing the Declaration of Independence as their
basis for promoting a natural rights philosophy and the federal government as the
sources for protection of those rights.); William E. Mahoney, Jr., Comment, Section
1981 and Discriminatory Discharge: A Contextual Analysis, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 173, 203
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Necessarily, the natural rights philosophy evidences Congress's intent that the amendment would remove both the physical restraints
of slavery and the "badges and incidents" of slavery.'
The same natural rights philosophy that informed the debate
surrounding the Thirteenth Amendment also motivated drafters of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Act).2 1 2 Interestingly, opponents of the
(1991) (explaining that "[glenerally invoked as the rights to life, liberty, and property, these rights of citizenship were tantamount to securing for Black Americans
the proper and intended effect of the thirteenth amendment-that is, practical, as
opposed to formal, freedom.") (footnote omitted).
The same natural rights philosophy governed the debate over the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Kaczorowski, supra, at 892-93 (citing legislative history describing
the Fourteenth Amendment as "incorporating the concept of liberty as it was defined in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights," and that section
one of the Fourteenth Amendment was "so clearly within the spirit of the Declaration of Independence of the 4th of July, 1776, that no member of this House can
seriously object to it."); Madry, supra, at 528 (explaining that "[wihatever the source
of their belief, however, all agreed that the institution of slavery was a violation of
natural law and a violation of the essential obligations of the southern states to protect the natural rights of all persons.").
211
Congress enacted the amendment with three purposes in mind: to (1) free
African Americans from the physical bondage of slavery by outlawing the masters'
ability to force African Americans into physical, involuntary servitude; (2) to elevate
the status of both those African Americans who were free during slavery and those
who were enslaved to a level of equality with whites; and (3) to remove the "badges
and incidents" of slavery that prevent African Americans and poor whites from enjoying most of the rights that the masters and other wealthy whites enjoyed. See
tenBroek, supra note 197, at 180-81. Professor tenBroek states:
Thus, in the eyes of all abolitionists, the Thirteenth Amendment either gave or confirmed congressional power to enforce a constitutional prohibition against slavery everywhere in the United States; and
the liberty which Congress now had constitutional mandate to enforce
was not just the liberty of the blacks but the liberty of the whites as
well and included notjustfreedom from personal bondage but protection in a
wide range of naturaland constitutionalrights."
Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
212 See tenBroek, supra note 197, at 183-200.
Instructive are Senator Trumbull's
statements regarding the Lockean philosophical underpinning of the Thirteenth
Amendment:
"But every man who enters society gives up a part of this natural liberty, which is the liberty of the savage, the liberty which the wild beast
has, for the advantages he obtains in the protection which civil government gives him. Civil liberty, or the liberty which a person enjoys
in society, is thus defined by Blackstone:
'Civil liberty is not other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws and no further, as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public.'"
Id. at 191 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull)).
The Thirteenth Amendment's purpose was to give African Americans liberty in
the broadest sense of the Lockean tradition, restrained only to the extent necessary
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amendment who had complained that its expansive scope would
make African Americans equal to white Americans duplicitously
changed their strategy by subsequently arguing that the Thirteenth
Amendment only freed African Americans from the physical bonds
of slavery by dissolving the master-slave relationship.2 3 Their narrow
interpretation of the amendment was an unsuccessful attempt to
support an argument that the amendment did not give Congress the
authority to codify the Act's conferment of certain natural rights on
African Americans. 4 Yet supporters of the Act again noted that the
Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the authority to pass the Act
because, in addition to destroying the bondage relationship between
masters and slaves, the amendment also conferred the rights specified in the Declaration of Independence, at least to the extent those
rights were specifically enumerated in the text of the Act.2' The obfor the protection of the general welfare of all citizens. No effort was made to list all
of the natural rights that the Thirteenth Amendment conferred on African Ameicans and other minorities. See id. at 194 (explaining that "[t]he Radicals differed as
to the length of the list of natural rights but they agreed that it was at least as long as
that presented in Section One of the Civil Rights and Section Seven of the Freedmen's Bureau bills.").
213 See id. at 189 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Edgar Cowan)).
214 In Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court did not accept
opponents of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866's contentions that Congress's powers under Section 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment were limited only to outlawing conditions establishing
a master-slave relationship. See id. at 439-44. Therefore, Congress had the authority
to enact section 1982, formerly section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which outlawed racial discrimination in the sale and rental of real property. See id.
215 See tenBroek, supra note 197, at 190-91. Instructive are Senator
Trumbull's
statements:
That is the liberty to which every citizen is entitled; that is the liberty
which was intended to be secured by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States, originally and more
especially by the amendment which has recently been adopted: and in
a note to Blackstone's Commentaries it is stated that"In this definition of civil liberty it ought to be understood, or rather expressed, that the restraints introduced by the law should be equal to all, or as much so
as the nature of things will admit."
Then, sir, I take it that any statute which is not equal to all and which deprived any citizen of civil rights which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a badge of sernitude which,
ly the Constitution, is prohibited.
Id. at 191 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1866) (statement of
Sen. Trumbull) (emphasis added)). For addition legislative history that a natural
rights philosophy supported both the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, see id. at 192 n.46. At least one commentator has asserted that,
through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (the Act), the supporters of the
Act did not intend to make African Americans the equal of white Americans in at
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least three areas: the right to attend the same schools as white Americans; the right
to marry white Americans; and the right to vote. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11-29 (1955).
The exclusion of rights in those three areas probably was due to the Act's
supporters' desire to avoided alienating those Republican members of Congress
who were racist, since the supporters had to obtain a sufficient number of votes to
obtain passage of the Act. See Kaczorowski, supra note 210, at 882 (explaining that
"[t]he exclusion of suffrage thus helped to reduce political opposition to the measures by neutralizing racist opposition within the Republican party. Consequently,
even erstwhile racists rallied to the cause of civil rights enforcement.").
Arguably, except for those three areas, the supporters of the Thirteenth
Amendment intended that the amendment would confer the equal access to the
rights of "life, liberty, and happiness" as stated in the Declaration of Independence.
See id. at 895-96 (quoting Sen. John Sherman of Ohio that the first clause of the
Thirteenth Amendment "secures to every man within the United States liberty in its
broadest terms" and citing Senator Trumbull, who observed that the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was intended to enforce the Thirteenth Amendments conferment of
the liberty that was secured by the Declaration of Independence). One commentator's statements emphasize the equal protection of the law concept advanced by the
Act:
Accordingly, § 1 of the civil rights bill and § 14 of the Freedmen's Bureau bill contained an identical list of civil rights to be guaranteed by
the national government. The list of rights is short but sweeping.
The first and third embraced the rights to make and enforce contracts
and to purchase, sell, and convey real and personal property. These
two rights, essential to the conduct of daily affairs in a free society,
were plainly concerned with establishing equality of economic opportunity for all United States Citizens. The second listed right to sue
and give evidence gave to the citizen in all governmental proceedings,
at both the state and national levels, the legal capacity to protect and
enforce the other rights listed in the bills. The fourth listed right to
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property reinforced the major premise of the bills that each
United States citizen should possess the listed rights to the same degree and extent as white citizens. In the areas covered by the bills, the
rights possessed by white citizens thus became the yardstick for measuring the
rights possessed by all citizens. The bills also used the "white citizen" yardstick
to prohibit unequal punishment under the law for the same criminal offense.
Clearly, therefore, equal protection under the law and equality of economic opportunity emerge as the dominant themes of the civil rights and Freedmen's Bureau bills. The sponsors of these bills regarded those two rights as the sine qua
non of liberty.
Buchanan, supra note 201, at 15-16 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Regardless of the debate over whether the Act's supporters' intended it to only protect the rights listed in the Act, and that the supporters' intent was that the Act did
not outlaw school segregation and interracial marriages, the Supreme Court has
conclusively established that section 1 of the Act, presently codified as 42 U.S.C. §
1981, does outlaw segregation in private schools by preventing such schools from
refusing to enter into admission contracts with African-American students. See Runyon v. McCray, 427 U.S. 160, 170-71 (1976). The Court held:
Just as in Jones a Negro's § 1 right to purchase property on equal terms
with whites was violated when a private person refused to sell to the
prospective purchaser solely because he was a Negro, so also a Negro's
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vious purpose of the Act was to give meaning and effect to the
amendment's mandate that African Americans should have the same
free exercise of natural rights as white Americans.216
Implicit in the conferment of natural rights to former slaves, the
supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Act proclaimed
that the amendment also mandated that African Americans have
equal protection in the full exercise of their natural rights. 21 7 The
§ 1 right to 'make and enforce contracts' is violated if a private offeror
refuses to extend to a Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the same
opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees.
Id. By implication, Runyon means that section 1 of the Act should prevent a state
from refusing to sell a marriage license to an African American who wants the license to marry a white person. Therefore, despite some Thirteenth Amendment
scholars' uncertainty about the application of the Act to segregation and interracial
marriage, the Supreme Court has resolved the issues by holding that the Act prohibits all racial discrimination in refusing to enter into contracts with and refusing
to sell real property to African Americans, and by consistent implication, discrimination in the exercise of the other rights enumerated in sections 1 and 2 of the Act,
now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.
Given that the Thirteenth Amendment is the basis for Congress's authority for
enacting the Act, the Court, when interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, should
apply the same broad equal protection notions, regardless of any assertions that the
amendment did not intend to make African Americans the equal of white Americans. The legislative history, as referenced above, shows the contrary just as clearly
as the Court's conclusion in Runyon that the Act prevents racial segregation in private schools.
216 See tenBroek, supra note 197, at 194. If white Americans had the free exercise
of certain natural rights, then African Americans could not be denied the free exercise of those natural rights. Professor tenBroek has summarized Senator Trumbull's statements regarding the relationship between natural rights and equal protection as follows:
He took the next step of articulating the relationship of this natural
rights philosophy to the concept of the equal protection of the laws.
"Then, Sir," he said in summing up, "I take it that any statute which is not
equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to
other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a
badge of servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohibited." Civil rights
which are "secured to other citizens"- "secured" how? By the only
method by which rights can be secured, namely, by supplying protection, by imposing restraints on those who would invade the rights.
Hence, "deprivation" or "denial" of laws "not equal to all" will occur
just as much by failure to supply the protection or impose the restraints as by black codes imposing special burdens on a selected class.
Id. (quoting CONG. CLORE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull)) (emphasis added).
Therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment has an equal protection component
that proscribes the unequal treatment of African Americans, and other minorities,
in the exercise of their natural rights, and that mandates that both the state and
federal government take affirmative actions to ensure the free exercise of those
natural rights. See id. at 194-95.
217 See id. at 195-200.
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equal protection notion meant that both the federal government
and state governments might enact and enforce laws to ensure that
former slaves were given their natural rights.21 8 One commentator
has labeled the Thirteenth Amendment's
equal protection rights as
219
theory."
law'
the
under
"'equal
the
218

See id. at 196. "Ihave thought the weaker they were the more the government

was bound to foster and protect them. If government be designed for the protection of the weak, certainly the weaker men are[,] the more they need its protection." Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 438 (1864) (statement of Rep.
Timothy H. Howe)).
Commentators have differed over whether the Framers of the Thirteenth
Amendment intended state governments or the federal government to have the
primary responsible of enforcing the newly freed African Americans' natural rights.
Compare tenBroek, supra note 197, at 199 (arguing that "[the primary duty of protection is still with the states. It is only when acting they act discriminatorily or
when not acting they fail to supply protection against private inroads the federal
power springs into life.") with Arthur Kinoy, The ConstitutionalRight of Negro Freedom,
21 RUTGERS L. REv. 387, 397-414 (1967) (criticizing Justice Bradley's majority opinion in the Ciil Rights Cases, and asserting that the Thirteenth Amendment gave the
federal government the primary role of protecting freed African Americans' natural
rights). For a general discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment's Framers' intent
that the "Thirteenth Amendment alone was sufficient to permit them fully to protect the natural rights denied to Blacks under slavery," but because of southern
states' schemes to reinstate slavery through black codes, violence, and other oppressive means, Congress was forced to enact other legislation and constitutional
amendments to specifically delineate protected natural rights and to provide for
their protection, see Madry, supra note 210, at 532-33.
219 Buchanan, supra note 201, at 8. Professor Buchanan states:
Thus, the main resistance to passage of the thirteenth amendment was based almost entirely on opposition to the expansion and
centralization of national power. Most, if not all, elements of congressional opposition asserted that the amendment would guarantee to
the emancipated black a basic minimum of rights-equality under the
law; protection of life, liberty, and property; opportunity to live, work,
and move freely-and that Congress would be empowered to protect
these rights. The amendment's opponents clearly recognized its
sweeping potential and resisted its adoption, not as the first step in a
series of undesirable steps, but as the final step itself.
Id. at9.
Under that theory, the definition of "slavery" that animated the congressional
debates on the Thirteenth Amendment included three components. First, in the
narrowest sense, the amendment would outlaw slavery in the form of "legally enforceable personal servitude." Id. at 10. Second, it would prohibit discrimination
against free African Americans who, through general degradation and restrictions
on their rights, "bore all the badges and incidents of slavery save the technical one."
Id. at 11. Professor Buchanan states: "Thus, the status of the freed slave of the
North was regarded as a condition of substantive slavery within the amendment's
reach; for the freed slave as well as the bondsman, the abolitionists desired a condition of true liberty." Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2989-91 (1864)).
Third, the amendment would eradicate the deprivation of the rights of disfavored
white Americans who opposed slavery. See id. Professor Buchanan states: "It would
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terminate the 'kidnapping, imprisoning, mobbing and murdering' of 'white citizens of the United States guilty of no offense.'" Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1865)).
The amendment's legislative history is supportive of a broad interpretation of
the amendment's scope and its equal protection underpinning. Congressman Morris of New York stated:
I now come to the question, what shall be done with these States
when subdued? I answer, amend the Constitution so as to forever
prohibit slavery in the Union, and then discriminate in pardoning the
rebels in such a manner as to restore to citizenship such as were not
voluntarily in hostility to the Federal Government....
In society
equality exists .... Each individual makes a sacrifice, and thereby obtains a guarantee of protection. Therefore each member upon entering society covenants to yield his particular to the general good, and
to so comport as to infract none of the rights of others, and also not to
incapacitate himself for the discharge of the duties growing out of the
social relations. There is mutuality of interest, equality of rights, and
a positive undertaking by each member to protect and defend the aggregate and also each constituent part. The enforcement of these duties and the redress of a breach of this covenant require the enactment and the enforcement of law. Therefore the founders of our
Government adopted and we indorse the cardinal truths:
"That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness...."
...
A State, then, sustains the same relation to the Union that an
individual does to society. They are constituents, are severally equal,
severally dependent, and actually subordinate to the whole ....

II aver no nation can violate any moral law without incurring a
penalty. No member of society, no matter how weak or humble, can
be oppressed without injury to the whole.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 2614 (1865) (statement of Rep. Morris of New
York). Congressman Farnsworth stated:
I thank God that the Republic has at last recognized the manhood of the negro. Gentleman may call us "miscegenists," and they
may talk of equal rights. I do not know of any man in the party to
which I belong who is fearful of coming into competition with the negro. I know there are many men of the party of my colleague who
spoke last evening, [Mr. Ross,] who do feel that the negro is their
natural competitor and rival, and they do fear, and fear with some
reason, too, that the negroes will outstrip them if we give them a fair
chance. I have heard gentlemen talk about their fears that negroes
might become Representatives upon this floor. Well, I am inclined to
think that the country would not suffer by such a change in some irstances. Oh! They are afraid of"negro equality" and "miscegenation."
You must not unchain the slave and allow him the fruits of his own
toil and permit him to fight for the Republic for fear of negro equality
and miscegenation. Can the head or heart of man conceive of anything
more mean and despicable?
Mr. Speaker, I am not afraid of "miscegenation." If my colleague
over the way is afraid of it, if he requires the restraining influences of
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Consistently, Professor tenBroek concluded:
The Amendment was seen by its drafters and sponsors as doing
the whole job-notjust cutting loose the fetters which bound the
physical person of the slave; but restoring to him his natural, inalienable and civil rights; or what was the same thing in other
words, guaranteeing to him the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. Slavery and liberty were contradictory
and mutually exclusive states. If slavery were abolished then liberty must exist. But liberty in society, civil liberty, consists of
natural liberty as restrained by human laws protecting all men in
their antecedent rights and being both general and equal.22
a penal statute to keep him and his party from running into miscegenation, I will willingly vote it to them. But we do not want it; we do
not practice miscegenation; we do not belong to that school; that is a
Democratic institution; that goes hand in hand with slavery. Why, sir,
some of the very best blood of the Democracy of Virginia may be
found in the contraband village at Arlington today; the blood of the
Masons, the Hunters, the Garnetts, the Carters, and the Haxalls; their
lineal though natural descendants are among the contrabands.
Mr. ROSS. I desire to ask the gentleman whether he thinks the
white man is equal to the negro.
Mr. FARNSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, that is a silly question which it
is useless to answer. I think some white men are better than some
other white men. I think some white men are better than some negroes, and that some negroes are better than some white men, especially those of the copperhead persuasion.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 2979-80 (1865) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth);
see id. at 1482, 1483 (statement of Sen. Sumner) (proposing, during congressional
debate, that the proposed Thirteenth Amendment's language be changed to include a phrase that "[aill persons are equal before the law," but concluding that the
use of the word "'slavery' is explicit, and describes precisely what it is proposed to
blast."). "I will not be intimidated by the fears of negro equality. The negro may
possess mental qualities entitling him to a position beyond our present belief. If so,
I shall put no obstacle in the way of his elevation. There is nothing in me that despises merit or envies its rewards." Id. at 1465 (statement of Sen. Henderson).
For other references to the Thirteenth Amendment's legislative history see
Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE LJ. 1916, 1936 (1987).
Senator Trumbull summarized the majority view held by Congress regarding the
broad, equal protection scope of the Thirteenth Amendment: "Congress is bound
to see that freedom is in fact secured to every person throughout the land; he must
be fully protected in all his rights of person and property; and any legislation or any
public sentiment which deprives any human being in the land of those great rights
of liberty will be in defiance of the Constitution." Id. Other congressmen "simply
invoked natural law and the Declaration of Independence as the source for the basic civil rights that they insisted the amendment now guaranteed." Id. at 1937. Professor Soifer stated: "The Thirteenth Amendment altered federalism. It established an affirmative role for Congress to protect fundamental rights throughout
the nation. The constitutional guarantee of universal civil freedom entailed federal
protection of individual fights." Id. at 1938.
n0 tenBroek, supra note 197, at 200. Given the political climate, the only clear
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Given the Thirteenth Amendment's legislative history, including its natural rights and equal protection philosophies, courts
should broadly interpret the amendment when exercising their judicial review authority. A broad interpretation leads to the conclusion
that both intentional racial discrimination and facially neutral policies having a disproportionate impact on African Americans and
other races can be violative of the Thirteenth Amendment.221 Unfortunately, both lower-level federal courts and the Supreme Court have
"dropped the ball" when interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE

One unresolved issue is the scope of the Supreme Court's
authority to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. Some commentators have concluded that the specific grant of congressional enforcement authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
means that Congress, and not the Court, should enforce the
amendment.' As support for this proposition, some observers have
asserted that Congress put Section 2 in the amendment out of fear
that the Supreme Court could not be trusted to protect former
slaves' rights, as was the case in the Dred Scot2 s decision. 4 Yet neither the legislative history of the amendment itself nor the debates
over the use of Section 2 to adopt the Civil Rights Act of 1866 conclusively show that Congress intended the Court to have no role in
22 5
the enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment.
exception from the coverage of the Thirteenth Amendment was the right to vote.
See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69
HARv. L. REv. 1, 11-40 (1955).
22
See text accompanying notes 387-425 infra The Thirteenth Amendment
outlaws both private and state-imposed discrimination. See generally Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
22
See KG. Jan Pillai, Phantom of the Strict Scrutiny, 31 NEw. ENG. L. REv. 397, 397
n.3 (1997).
223 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
224 See Pillai, supranote 222, at 397 n.3.
22
Although Section 2 was a part of the Thirteenth Amendment when
it was reported out of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, there were no statements by
its supporters that Section 2's grant of legislative enforcement authority to Congress
was for the purpose of excluding the Supreme Court's enforcement through judicial review. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1313 (1864). Similarly, despite
Senator Charles Sumner's proposed amendments to amend the Judiciary Committee's version of the amendment to insert the phrase "equal under the law," there
was no statement of a congressional intent to preclude or otherwise limit the Supreme Court's ability to enforce the amendment. See id. at 1479-83. Consistently,
during the debates surrounding the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, there
was no expression of a legislative intent that the Court should not or could not en-
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Given the constitutional separation of powers between the judicial and the legislative branches of government as reflected in Marbury v. Madison's26 establishment of the Court's supremacy in interpreting the Constitution and other laws,m the codification of Section
2 in the Thirteenth Amendment should not be interpreted as a
"negative implication" that the federal judiciary does not likewise
have the authority to enforce the amendment. 8 A more accurate
interpretation of Congress's Section 2 authority is that it is synonymous with Congress's enforcement authority under the "necessary
and proper" clause.'m With that conclusion, it becomes obvious that
force the Thirteenth Amendment, despite references that Congress had the expressed authority in Section 2 to enforce the amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull); id. at 822
(statement of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 623 (statement of Rep. Kerr); id. at 366
(statement of Sen. Fessenden).
226

5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137 (1803).

See id.at 177.
Regarding the implication of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment's express grant of authority to Congress to enforce that Amendment, one commentator
states:
It has been suggested that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
which grants to Congress the power to enforce the amendment, gives
rise to the negative implication that federal courts were not to have
such enforcement powers. But given the long and highly visible tradition of federal judicial enforcement of other constitutional provisions
directed against the states, I find it implausible that the framers of
1868 would have assumed that some special mention of federal judicial enforcement was required or that a positive grant to Congress was
sufficiently explicit to negative the tradition of judicial enforcement.
On the other hand, given the restrictive view of Congress's powers
under the commerce clause then current, the framers could easily
have thought that a special grant of power to Congress was needed in
order to assure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act and other
implementing legislation.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 66
n.283 (1985) (citations omitted).
M See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The "Necessary and Proper Clause"
gives
Congress the authority "[tlo make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper to
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Id. The legislative history establishes that the meaning and scope of
"appropriate legislation" as contained in Section 2's grant of authority to Congress
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment is the same as the meaning and scope of the
"necessary and proper" clause as defined in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope
of FederalPower: A JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267,
311 (1993) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866) (statement of
Rep. Williams) (asserting that ChiefJustice Marshall used "appropriate" to establish
the scope of the "necessary and proper" clause, and in part, referring to Representative Wilson's citation of McCulloch as the meaning of the scope of congressional
22

228
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Congress's authority to enact any "necessary and proper" laws to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment does not prohibit the Court's judicial enforcement of the amendment any more than Congress's
authority to enforce other amendments would preclude the Court
from similarly enforcing those same amendments. Consistently, the
Court's interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment establishes that
it has not totally delegated its judicial enforcement of the Thirteenth
Amendment to Congress's legislative enforcement.
Two themes are present in Supreme Court cases interpreting
the Thirteenth Amendment and civil rights laws enacted pursuant to
Congress's authority under Section 2 of the amendment. One is that
the Court, in exercise of its judicial review function, can establish the
scope of the amendment's coverage."' ° The other theme is that
Congress has legislative authority under Section 2 to enact laws outlawing and remedying acts of racial discrimination that are "badges
authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment).
During the debate over Congress's authority to enact the Civil Rights Act of
1866, Representative Wilson believed that Congress still had the authority to pass
the bill even if it went beyond the expressed authority contained in Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment:
Before our Constitution was formed, the great fundamental rights
which I have mentioned, belonged to every person who became a
member of our great national family. No one surrendered ajot or tittie of these rights by consenting to the formation of the Government.
The entire machinery of government as organized by the Constitution
was designed, among other things, to secure a more perfect enjoyment of these rights. A legislative department was created that laws
necessary and proper to this end might be enacted. A judicial department was erected to expound and administer the laws. An executive department was formed for the purpose of enforcing and seeing
to the execution of these laws. And these several departments of government possess the power to enact, administer, and enforce the laws
,necessary and proper' to secure these rights which existed interior to
the ordination of the Constitution.
tenBroek, supra note 197, at 193 n.46 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1118 (1866) (statement of Rep. Williams)).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has implied that Congress's authority under
Section 2 is the same as its authority under the "necessary and proper" clause. See
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968). The Court stated:
Whether or not the amendment itsef did any more than that-a question not involved in this case-it is at least clear that the Enabling
Clause of that Amendment empowered Congress to do much more.
For that clause clothed "Congress with power to pass all laws necessary
and properfor abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
States."
Id. (emphasis in original).
2-0 Therefore, the Court can entertain an aggrieved person's
direct claim under
the Thirteenth Amendment.

19981

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

and incidents" of slavery.
these themes.
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The following discussion elaborates on

A. The Civil Rights Cases-A BroadExercise of the Court'sJudicial
Review Function that Narrowly InterpretsBoth the Thirteenth
Amendment's Coverage and Congress's Section 2 Authority
In the Civil Rights Cases," several private persons were civilly
sued or criminally prosecuted under the Civil Rights Act of 18752
for their exclusion of African Americans from public hotels, public
theaters, and public railroad cars. 3" The Court held that the statute
was unconstitutional, in part,2" because the Thirteenth Amendment
did not give Congress the authority to enact such laws.2" Allegedly,
the amendment granted African Americans only the rights that were
denied slaves because of their status as slaves.2" Narrowly inter231
232

109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Section I of the Act provided:

That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land
or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only
to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable
alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous
condition of servitude.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9 (1883). Section 2 imposed certain civil and criminal
penalties for violations of the Act. See id.
233 See id. at
4-8.
24 Other portions of the Civil Rights Cases dealt with equal protection under
the
Fourteenth Amendment, and represented the Court's first opinion that state action
is required for a violation of the equal protection clause. See id. at 10-20.
"s See id. at 25.
236 See id. at 22. The Court stated:
The long existence of African slavery in this country gave us very distinct notions of what it was, and what were its necessary incidents.
Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint
of his movements except by the master's will, disability to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, to be a witness
against a white person, and such like burdens and incapacities were
the inseparable incidents of the institution. Severer punishments for
crimes were imposed on the slave than on free persons guilty of the
same offenses. Congress, as we have seen, by the civil rights bill of
1866, passed in view of the thirteenth amendment, before the fourteenth was adopted, undertook to wipe out these burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, constituting its substance
and visible form; and to secure to all citizens of every race and color,
and without regard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights
which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by
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preted, the Court concluded that those fundamental or natural
rights were the ones granted in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.3 Primarily, those rights involved the right to enter into contracts, to own property, and to sue and testify in court. 23 The Court
asserted that private citizens' racial exclusions of African Americans
from public inns, theaters, and other places of public accommodations were not within the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition because they were private acts of social discrimination that did not encompass slavery or involuntary servitude.2 The Court explained that
during slavery, free African Americans' "rights of life, liberty, and

white citizens.
Id.
In analyzing the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court relied on
Congress's intent in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as evidence of Congress's
intent in enacting the Thirteenth Amendment:
Congress did not assume, under the authority given by the Thirteenth
Amendment, to adjust what may be called the social rights of men and
races in the community; but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and the
enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential distinction
between freedom and slavery.
Id.
The Court, however, also established that the amendment was self-executing
without a statutory enactment under Congress's Section 2 authority. This means
that the Court can hold that certain acts of discrimination are violative of the Thirteenth Amendment despite the absence of a congressional enactment outlawing the
act. Therefore, in City of Memphis v. Greene, the Court stated: "Pursuant to the
authority created by § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has enacted legislation to abolish both the conditions of involuntary servitude and the 'badges and
incidents of slavery.'" 451 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1981). The exercise of that authority is
not inconsistent with the view that the amendment has self-executing force. As the
Court noted in Jones,
"By its own unaided force and effect," the Thirteenth Amendment
"abolished slavery, and established universal freedom." Whether or
not the amendment itselfdid any more than that-a question not involved in this case-it is at least clear that the Enabling Clause of that
Amendment empowered Congress to do much more.
Id. The Greene Court further noted that it would likewise leave the issue open
whether the amendment itself also outlawed the "badges and incidents" of slavery.
See Greene, 451 U.S. at 125-26. But see Cynthia L. Brennan, Comment, Mandatory
Community Sence as a High School Graduation Requirement: Inculcating Values or Un-

constitutional?, 11 T.M. CooLEY L. Rzv. 253, 268 n.131 (1994) (arguing that "[bly

'self-executing' the Court means that '[u]nder the Thirteenth Amendment, the legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery
and involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of
individuals.'").
237 See Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. at 22.
US
See id.
239 See id. at
24-25.
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property" were not violated simply because they did not enjoy all of
the rights to public accommodations that white men enjoyed. 2,0
Regarding the first theme discussed above, the Civil Rights
Cases's narrow interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment shows
that the Court did not delegate its judicial review function to Congress. As to the second theme, the Court limited Congress's ability
to proscribe private acts of racial discrimination by restricting Congress's authority under Section 2 of the amendment to the judicially
defined scope of the amendment.
In a thoughtful dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan asserted that
the amendment did more than outlaw racial deprivations inflicted
on slaves because of their slave status.24 ' Justice Harlan defined slavery as an institution based "wholly upon the inferiority" of African
Americans "because of their race." 242 As such, the amendment outlawed "all discrimination against [African Americans] because of
their race, in24 3 respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of
other races."
240
241

See id. at 25.
Justice Harlan stated:

The Thirteenth Amendment, it is conceded, did something more
than to prohibit slavery as an institution, resting upon distinctions of
race, and upheld by positive law. My brethren admit that it established and decreed universal civil freedom throughout the United
States. But did the freedom thus established involve nothing more
than exemption from actual slavery? Was nothing more intended
than to forbid one man from owning another as property?...
That there are burdens and disabilities which constitute badges
of slavery and servitude, and that the power to enforce by appropriate
legislation the Thirteenth Amendment may be exerted by legislation
of a direct and primary character, for the eradication, not simply of
the institution, but of its badges and incidents, are propositions which
ought to be deemed indisputable.
Id. at 34-35 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
The fact that Justice Harlan's statements were made in conjunction with an
analysis of Congress's authority under Section 2 of the amendment does not mean
that his conclusion that the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment is broad enough
to include "badges and incidents" of slavery should not be adopted by the Supreme
Court when evaluating a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment.
242 Id. at 36 (Harlan,J.,
dissenting).
243 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36. Whereas the majority
opinion put all discrimination against African Americans not based solely on their status as slaves in a
"social discrimination" category, Justice Harlan properly recognized that slavery was
based on the alleged racial inferiority of African Americans. See id. Justice Harlan
stated:
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that amendment, by appropriate legislation, may enact laws to protect [African
Americans] against the deprivation, because of their race, of any civil
rights granted to other freemen in the same State; and such legisla-
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tion may be of a direct and primary character, operating upon States,
their officers and agents, and, also, upon, at least, such individuals
and corporations as exercise public functions and wield power and
authority under the State.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Because only the African-American race was enslaved (and not even poor
whites), there is support forJustice Harlan's conclusion that the racial inferiority of
African Americans was the principal rationale supporting the foundations of slavery.
But it is clear that neitherJustice Harlan norJustice Bradley, who wrote the opinion
for the majority, thought that the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to outlaw
all forms of racial discrimination. Justice Harlan's conclusion that the amendment
granted to African Americans those "civil rights enjoyed by freemen" meant that if a
white man had a right to accommodations at a public inn or amusement park without discrimination if he could afford the admission fee, the amendment guaranteed
African Americans the same legal rights to such accommodation. See id. at 37-43.
Justice Harlan stated:
Congress has not, in these matters, entered the domain of State control and supervision. It does not, as I have said, assume to prescribe
the general conditions and limitations under which inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement shall be conducted or
managed. It simply declares in effect that since the nation has established universal freedom in this country, for all time, there shall be no
discrimination, based merely upon race or color, in respect of the accommodations and advantages of public conveyances, inns, and places
of public amusement.
Id. at 42-43.
Both Justice Harlan and Justice Bradley apparently believed that the amendment's protection extended only to "public rights" and not personal, social discrimination. As it relates to the Thirteenth Amendment, the primary difference was
over whether discrimination in public accommodations was social. The majority
held that it was social. See id. at 22-25. Justice Harlan thought that the accommodations at issue had enough public interest such that they were more than merely social. See id. at 59-60. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Because of their importance to the
public and the tradition that members of the public had access to them if they
could afford the admission fee, they were of a sufficient public character to be included as one of the civil rights or legal rights that the Thirteenth Amendment required to be offered on a nondiscriminatory basis. See id.
Justice Harlan's limiting of the Thirteenth Amendment's protection to those
civil rights that are held by members of the public is similar to the view that the Justice took in Pessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Pessy, the Justice likewise gave
importance to the fact that the railroad car, from which Plessy was excluded, was a
public accommodation. See id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that "a railroad is a public highway, and that the corporation which owns or operates it is in
the exercise of public functions, is not, at this day, to be disputed."). Justice Harlan
viewed the Louisiana statute that prevented African Americans and whites from riding in the same railroad car as denying the former the "personal freedom of citizens," which included the "'[p]ersonal liberty,' ... [of] removing one's person to
whatsoever places one's own inclination may direct." Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Harlan's analysis is based on an interpretation of both the
Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Amendments, the Justice separately acknowledged
that the Thirteenth Amendment "decreed universal civil freedom in this country."
Id. at 555 (Harlan,J., dissenting). Justice Harlan further stated that the Thirteenth
Amendment had a common purpose with the Fourteenth Amendment: "namely, to
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secure 'to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many generations have
been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy,'" and that "all
persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the
States... [and that] no discrimination shall be made against them by law because
of their color." Id. at 555, 556 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion discusses both the Thirteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, one can distinguish between those portions of the opinion where the
Justice is discussing the rights that the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to protect: "The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a
public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom
and the equality before the law established by the Constitution." Id. at 562 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
The central doctrine underpinning slavery, as enunciated into a constitutional norm in the Dred Scott case, was that slaves were inferior to whites and that
they were not a part of the group of people for whom the Constitution intended to
provide protection, but rather, that they were property with whom the majority race
could do as it saw fit. See Kinoy, supra note 218, at 391. Importantly, Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases asserted that the Thirteenth Amendment and
other Civil War amendments "repudiated" the racial inferiority theory and established that "the Negro race was indeed entitled to be part of 'the people' of the
United States. ... This was the heart of the newly created right of Negro freedom;
the promise that the Negro was to be an equal 'person' among the 'people' of the
United States." Kinoy, supra note 218, at 893. Professor Kinoy explains:
As a free and equal participant in the political community of the
United States the black man was entitled to all the privileges, rights
and immunities which hitherto only white 'people of the United
States' enjoyed. This was the essence of the 'charter of liberty' which
the Thirteenth Amendment proclaimed, the constitutional mandate
which Justice Bradley was to agree for the majority of the Court not
only abolished slavery, but affirmatively enacted 'universal freedom'
for the Negro race throughout the land.
Id. The meaning of universal freedom is that:
If white men, generally, enjoyed a right or privilege in any area of life,
black men could not be denied such a right or privilege because of
their race. Anything less was not the status of freedom and equality
enacted by the constitutional amendments to replace the ante-bellum
status of slavery and inferiority. Moreover, this right of the Negro to
be free from any discrimination by reason of race or color in the exercise of rights or privileges hitherto enjoyed by white men has been affirmatively created by the nation in the enactment of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 394.
Professor Kinoy makes the following statement about the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment as interpreted by Justices Bradley and Harlan in the Ciil Rights
CasesBoth Justices agreed that the Emancipation Amendment was not restricted to the narrow abolition of human slavery but affirmatively enacted a broad "charter of liberty" designed to bring about "universal
freedom." Accordingly, both Justices agreed that the amendment by
its own force abolished all "badges and incidents of slavery" along with
the institution itself, and that the Congress had direct and primary
power to implement this broad mandate.
Id. at 407 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The difference is that Bradley
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In one sense, the Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases is encouraging because it recognizes that, besides outlawing the masterservant relationship and involuntary servitude, the Thirteenth
Amendment gave African Americans "universal freedom" by at least
conferring on them the rights codified in the Civil Rights Act of
1866. 4 In two subsequent decisions, however, the Court limited the
scope of the amendment to the mere proscription of involuntary
servitude and the master-servant relationship.
In Hodges v. United States,25 a group of white Americans "armed
with deadly weapons" forced a group of African Americans from
their lumber mill jobs, thereby preventing them from performing
their employment contracts. 246 The white defendants were indicted
under a federal statute that made it a criminal offense for "two or
more persons [to] conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States."247 To establish Congress's authority to enact the statute under Section 2 of the amendment, the government asserted that the
defendants' conduct violated the workers' Thirteenth Amendment
rights to work and earn compensation.2
The Court, however, held that the statute was not a proper exercise of Section 2 authority.249 First, in a plain meaning textualist
manner, the Court stated that the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed
only "enforced compulsory service of one to another."2 0w Second, in
refused to recognize that racial discrimination based on the alleged inherent inferiority of African Americans was the foundation of slavery and the free northern
states' racial discrimination laws that existed during slavery, as noted by Justice
Taney in the Dred Scott case. See id. In other words, slavery and racial discrimination
in the North was justified on the grounds of the alleged inherent inferiority of the
African-American race. See id. at 407-14. Justice Harlan recognized the racial inferiority underpinning, and thought that the federal government had the authority to
pass laws that eradicated practices having a tendency to maintain the racial inferiority badge on African Americans. Id.
244 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. The problem with the
case is that the majority opinion did not adoptJustice Harlan's "black inferiority" theory.
24 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
246 See id. at 3.
247 Id. at 5.
248 See id. at 2-3.
249 See id. at 20.
250 Id. at 16-17. The Court stated:
The meaning of this is as clear as language can make it. The
things denounced are slavery and involuntary servitude, and Congress
is given power to enforce that denunciation. All understand by these
terms a condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another.
While the inciting cause of the Amendment was the emancipation of
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furtherance of its belief that Congress's Section 2 authority is limited
to the scope of the amendment, 251 the Court dismissed the government's argument that Congress could use its Section 2 powers to
criminalize defendants' conduct as one of the "badges and incidents" of slavery. 252
Twenty years later, in Corrigan v. Buckley, 5 the Court relied on
Hodges to hold that restrictive covenants preventing private property
owners from selling their property to African Americans did not violate either the Thirteenth Amendment or federal statutes enacted
under Congress's Section 2 authority. 2-" The Court again stated that,
other than prohibiting the master-servant relationship and involuntary servitude, the amendment "does not in other matters protect the
individual rights of persons of the negro race."255 Similarly, the Court
limited Congress's Section 2 authority to the same narrow, judicially
defined scope of the amendment.
the colored race, yet it is not an attempt to commit that race to the
care of the Nation. It is the denunciation of a condition, and not a
declaration in favor of a particular people.
Id.

251 See Hodges, 203 U.S. at 16.
The Court reasoned: "True the Thirteenth
Amendment grants certain specified and additional power to Congress, but any
Congressional legislation directed against individual action which was not warranted before the Thirteenth Amendment must find authority in it." Id.
22 See id. at 17-19. The government alleged that the "lack
of power to make or
perform contracts" was a badge of slavery, and "that when these defendants, by intimidation and force, compelled the colored men named in the indictment to desist
from performing their contract they to that extent reduced those parties to a condition of slavery." Id. at 17.
In addition to its belief that the plain language of the amendment outlawed
only "slavery and involuntary servitude," the Court believed that the Thirteenth
Amendment did not confer any benefit on the aggrieved African Americans that
was not also conferred on other Americans. See id. at 18-19. Because Chinese and
other Americans would have to seek protection from state law when suffering the
same injury as the aggrieved African Americans, the Court held that the latter's redress was through state law. See id. In other words, the Court believed that other
than being free from "slavery and involuntary servitude," African Americans "took
no more from the amendment than any other citizens of the United States." Id. at
18. Therefore, Congress did not have the authority to pass laws specifically for the
protection of African Americans against threats and intimidation during their employment. See id. at 18-19.
25 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
25
See id. at 330.
255 Id.
256 See id. at 331. The Court reasoned:
Assuming that this contention drew in question the "construction" of
these statutes, as distinguished from their "application," it is obvious,
upon their face, that while they provide, interalia, that all persons and
citizens shall have equal rights with white citizens to make contracts
and acquire property, they, like the Constitutional Amendment under
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Like the Civil Rights Cases, Hodges and Corrigan emphasized that
the Court itself through judicial review can define the scope of the
amendment. Those decisions also established that Congress's Section 2 authority is controlled by the scope of the amendment itself.
Forty-two years later in Jones v. Mayer,5 7 the Court greatly expanded
Congress's Section 2 authority; however, the outermost scope of
both that authority and the amendment itself is still judicially undefined.
B. Jones v. Mayer-A HeightenedDeference to Congressional
Authority andEnactments Under Section 2 of The Thirteenth
Amendment
In Jones, the Court left open the issue whether the Thirteenth
Amendment itself, unassisted by enabling legislation from Congress
under Section 2 of the amendment, did more than "'abolish[] slavery, and establish [] universal freedom.'" 2-" Explicitly, the Court did
not decide whether the amendment also abolished "badges and incidents" of slavery.5 9
260
First, the Court held that section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act
prohibited private racial discrimination in the sale and lease of real
whose sanction they were enacted, do not in any manner prohibit or
invalidate contracts entered into by private individuals in respect to
the control and disposition of their own property. There is no color
for the contention that they rendered the indenture void; nor was it
claimed in this Court that they had, in and of themselves, any such effect.
We therefore conclude that neither the constitutional nor
statutory questions relied on as grounds for the appeal to this Court
have any substantial quality or color of merit, or afford any jurisdictional basis for the appeal.
Id.

7

392 U.S. 409 (1968).
Id. at 439.

Unfortunately, the Court did not define "universal freedom";
therefore, it is not clear whether the Court would give the phrase the same narrow
interpretation as given in the Civil Rights Cases. See supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text.
The Court has not established the confines of the broad phrase "abolished
slavery, and established universal freedom." Jones, 392 U.S. 439 (1968). The only
certain thing is that a person cannot be placed in chains and dragged to a plantation and forced to endure involuntary servitude under a master-slave relationship.
Yet one does not know whether "universal freedom" means that African Americans
and other races have only the rights granted under the Civil Rights Act of 1866; or
whether, consistent withJustice Harlan's dissenting opinion in the Civil Rights Cases,
the phrase grants African Americans and other races all freedom enjoyed by white
Americans. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
25
SeeJones, 392 U.S. at 439.
no See id.
258
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property despite the absence of state action.2 ' Then, the Court established that the enactment of section 1982 was a proper exercise of
Congress's Section 2 authority: "Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate
that determination into effective legislation."2 2 Because the racist
conduct-a white man's refusal to sell a home to an African American-fell squarely within the language of section 1982, the Court
concluded that racial discrimination in the sale and lease of property
is both a "badge and incident" of slavery and a violation of section
1982.26-

Jones has several important implications. First, the Court did not
overrule either the Civil Rights Cases, Hodges, or Corriganas they relate
to the first theme-the Court's ability to interpret the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment itself. In other words, the Court's unfettered judicial review authority to define the scope of the amendment
itself remains intact afterJones. Accordingly, the Court implicitly has
the authority to entertain a direct cause of action under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Second, Jones overruled Hodges's narrow interpretation of the
limits of Congress's authority under Section 2 of the amendment.'
Unlike Hodges, which restricted Congress's authority to proscribe
only the master-servant relationship and involuntary servitude, Jones
established that Congress can outlaw a broader category of private
discriminatory acts against African Americans and, by implication,
against other minorities and white Americans. 265 The only express
261
262

23

See id. at 422-37.
Id. at 440.
See id. at 441. The Court stated:
For this Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have
encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery-its "burdens and
disabilities"-included restraints upon "those fundamental rights
which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same fight... to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens."

Id.
Jones provides support for the argument that the scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment does more than merely outlaw the master-slave relationship. It confers
at least those natural rights that are codified in section 1982, formerly section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
2M See id. at 443 n.78.
265 The exact scope of Congress's Section 2 authority
is not clear from Jones. It is
debatable whether Jones extends Congress's authority only to those acts of racial discrimination, such as discrimination in the sale and ownership of property that the
Court has clearly recognized as being "badges and incidents" of slavery, or whether
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limitation in Jones is that Section 2 legislation must be rationally re-

lated to ending "badges and incidents" of slavery.66
Third, in Jones, unlike in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court did not
specifically state that Congress can outlaw and remedy only those
present acts of racial discrimination that are linked historically to
past racial deprivation that only slaves endured. A portion of Jones,
however, can be narrowly interpreted to support that conclusion.
The Court stated: "For this Court recognized long ago that, whatever
else they may have encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery.., included restraints upon 'those fundamental rights ...to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens.'"2 6 7

On the other hand, other portions of Jones imply that

Congress can outlaw any act of racial discrimination even when there
is no direct historical connection with slavery, in the sense that only
slaves were denied the exercise of the right in question.2 66 For exam-

ple, the Court relied on statements such as the following from Senator Trumbull, a sponsor of both the Thirteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866:
I have no doubt that under this provision ...we may destroy all
these discriminations in civil rights against the black man; and if we
cannot, our constitutional amendment amounts to nothing. It
Jones's rationale extends to any act of racial discrimination that prevents African
Americans and other minorities from exercising their natural rights of "life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness." At least one passage from Jones can be used to support either proposition:
Surely Senator Trumbull was right. Surely Congress has the power
under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are
the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate
that determination into effective legislation. Nor can we say that the
determination Congress has made is an irrational one. For this Court
recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have encompassed,
the badges and incidents of slavery-its "burdens and disabilities"included restraints upon "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right.., to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens."
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free
exercise of those rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the
exclusion of Negroes from white communities became a substitute for
the Black Codes. And when racial discrimination herds men into
ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of
their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.
Jones, 392 U.S. at 440-43 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
26

See id.

Id. at 441 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)).
It should be noted, however, that pursuant to the "black inferiority" theory
being the foundational support of slavery, all racial discrimination against African
Americans is directly connected to slavery.
267

26
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was for that purpose that the second clause of that amendment
was adopted, which says that Congress shall have authority, by
appropriate legislation, to carry into effect the article prohibiting
slavery. Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation is to
be? The Congress of the United States; and it is for Congress to
adopt such appropriate legislation as it may think proper, so that
it be a means to accomplish the end.269
Consistently, Justice Stewart's majority opinion indicated that
"badges and incidents" of slavery, and therefore Congress's Section 2
authority, should be expansively interpreted:
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the
free exercise of those rights [property rights], were substitutes for
the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial
discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to
buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic
of slavery.
At its broadest interpretation, Justice Stewart's conclusion emphasizes that racial discriminators' tactics change from decade to
decade, but that when those strategies are designed to deny African
Americans and other minorities the same rights that white Americans enjoy in the exercise of their natural and fundamental rights,27 '
they are "relic[s] of slavery."272 This broad interpretation is consistent with Justice Harlan's conclusion in the Civil Rights Cases that the
"black inferiority" theory was the underpinning of slavery and that
any act of racial discrimination denying African Americans the free
exercise of any public right that white Americans enjoy is a "badge
and incident" of slavery.27 Although Jones stopped short of affirmaJones, 392 U.S. at 440 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 322
(1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull)) (emphasis added). The Court then concluded that "[s]urely Senator Trumbull was right. Surely Congress has the power
under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and
the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation." Id.
29

270

Id. at 441-43.

See id.
Id. at 443.
273
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 39-40 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It
should be noted that during pre-slavery colonial times, poor whites were treated as
badly as African Americans when both served as indentured servants. Yet when African Americans became targets for enslavement, the "black inferiority" theory was
employed as a means for justifying and maintaining the enslavement of African
271
2

Americans.

See Michael Les Benedict, Comment on Guyora Binder, "The Slavery of

Emancipation," 17 CAuoozoL. REv. 2103, 2111-12 (1996) (explaining that "there are
clear indications in the historical literature that slavery preceded the development
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tively adopting this position, footnote seventy-eight of the opinion
clearly shows that the Court has not ruled out that conclusion. At
best, the Court implicitly adopted the proposition when it stated:
"The Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress not only to outlaw
all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude but also to eradicate
4 the
free."2
half
and
slave
half
society
a
of
incidents
and
last vestiges
of the racist ideology that sustained and survived it.") (footnote omitted).
Therefore, it is only proper that the "black inferiority" theory be recognized
as the underpinning of slavery. Then one can freely recognize that the Thirteenth
Amendment, which was designed to equalize the status of African Americans and
white Americans, can be fully enforced only if all acts of racial discrimination
against African Americans (and other minorities implicitly) are deemed repugnant
to the Thirteenth Amendment's purpose. They are a direct violation of the
amendment such that, in addition to Congress being able to proscribe such acts
under its Section 2 authority, an aggrieved person has a direct claim under the
amendment for remedies flowing from such violations.
2
Jones, 392 U.S. at 443 n.78. Of course, those looking for a narrower interpretation could emphasize the fact that the Court made reference only to those previously denied rights that Congress specifically granted in the Civil Rights Act of
1866. See id. Yet given the fact that the Court in Jones did not have to make reference to Justice Bradley's and Justice Harlan's disagreement about the scope of Congress's Section 2 authority to decide the issue presented, and the Court's broad
conclusions that "[tihe Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress ... to eradicate the last vestiges and incidents of a society half slave and half free," one can argue that Congress has broad authority to outlaw all acts of racial discrimination that
treat African Americans, and other minorities, differently in the exercise of their
natural and fundamental rights. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 443 n.78; see also Andrew
Koppelman, supra note 210, at 498-99 (explaining that "Tribe thinks that this language, if read literally, grants to Congress a power to protect individual rights
'which is as open-ended as its power to regulate interstate commerce.'"). Koppelman might disagree with Tribe's analysis. See id. "But unlike the thirteenth
amendment, the commerce clause does not specify the evil which Congress is empowered to eliminate. If the thirteenth amendment authorizes Congress to eradicate the
badges of slavery--even those which, as in Jones, do not directly impose involuntary servitude-this can only be because they, too, are among the evils that the amendmentforbids." Id.
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
This is highlighted by the fact that Congress has used its Section 2 authority
to outlaw racially discriminatory acts that do not specifically fall within the confines
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which the Court in the Civil Rights Cases appears to
have cited as some indication of the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment's coverage. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22. In exercise of its Section 2 authority,
Congress has enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964), which outlaws conspiracies to
prevent the free exercise of African Americans' and other minorities' constitutional
rights. Similarly, Congress has enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1866) (amended 1991)
(outlawing discrimination in entering or refusing to enter into contracts on equal
terms); 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1867) (outlawing peonage); and 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1948)
(criminalizing peonage).
In quoting Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases--that the amendment's coverage was broad enough to encompass a corporation's private discrimination in the provision of public accommodations--the Jones Court arguably raised
questions about the continued validity of its decision in the Civil Right Cases. See
Jones, 392 U.S. at 443 n.78. The Court left open the possibility that the amendment
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Given that the "black inferiority" theory was the underpinning
of slavery and is- the supporting rationale of modem racial discrimination, Congress should have the authority under Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment to outlaw current racial discrimination
(even when it is not historically linked to types of discrimination
against slaves because of their slave status) as one of the incidents of
"a society half slave and half free. "2n Clearly, future litigation will determine whether Congress has such broad powers to further the
Thirteenth Amendment's purpose of equalizing the exercise of all
Americans' natural and fundamental rights, even when the Supreme
Court might not find those acts violative of the Thirteenth Amend-6
itself.2
ment while reviewing a direct claim under the amendment
In any event, neither Jones nor prior Thirteenth Amendment cases
placed limitations on either the Court's judicial authority to interitself, without Congress's enabling legislation, might outlaw both those racially discriminatory acts specifically listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and other discriminatory acts. Furthermore, the Court did not delineate the parameters of the
"rational" deference that Congress has when defining and proscribing "badges and
incidents" of slavery. SeeJones, 392 U.S. at 440-41. Future litigation will outline the
limits of Congress's authority when enacting laws eradicating "badges and incidents" of slavery. The Court should establish a workable test for measuring the
nexus between congressional enactments, targeted types of racial discrimination,
and the forms of racial deprivation that are the essence of slavery and its historical
"badges and incidents." If taken to the logical extent of its meaning, the "badges
and incidents" outlawed by the amendment sweep very broadly and touch all interaction among African Americans, other minorities, and white Americans. Justice
Stewart stated:
Negro citizens, North and South, who saw in the Thirteenth Amendment a promise of freedom-freedom to "go and come at pleasure"
and to "buy and sell when they please"-would be left with "a mere
paper guarantee" if Congress were powerless to assure that a dollar in
the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the
hands of a white man. At the very least, the freedom that Congress is
empowered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the
freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free
man means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made
a promise the Nation cannot keep.
Jones, 392 U.S. at 443 (footnotes omitted).
Justice Stewart's statements should be considered indicative of the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment, as a self-executing amendment, when analyzing specific
claims by African Americans and other minorities that certain racially motivated
conduct is violative of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Jones, 392 U.S. at 443 n.78.
2
For legal commentary discussing Congress's ability to enact laws outlawing
and remedying conduct that the Court would not find violative of the Thirteenth
Amendments and other amendments, see LAuRENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTTLTlONAL LAw 334-50 (2d ed. 1988) and Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 221, 246-54.
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pret independently the Thirteenth Amendment or its power to entertain direct claims under the amendment. Yet, some of the Court's
post-Jones decisions that address direct claims under the amendment
evidence a trend of judicial deference to congressional authority under Section 2 even in the absence of relevant legislative enactments.
This has led to a somewhat perfunctory legal evaluation of those
claims, and is tantamount to a delegation of the Court's judicial
re2 7
view function to Congress, as was the case in Palmerv. Thompson.
C. Palmer v. Thompson-An Unmerited Abdication ofJudicial
Review Responsibility to Congress
In Palmer, the Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment did
not prevent a city from closing all its swimming pools to avoid integration. 278 The Court's analysis of the amendment and the petition-

ers' claim is too unpersuasive and cursory. The Court's opinion
would be more convincing if the Justices had specifically decided
whether the Thirteenth Amendment itself prohibits "badges and incidents" of slavery. If the amendment outlaws "badges and incidents" of slavery, the Court could not legitimately complain that applying the amendment to the swimming pool closings would "stretch
its short simple words and do violence to its history."27 9 Implicit with
the outlawing of "badges and incidents" of slavery, the language of
the amendment would not solely control its scope.
At worst, the Court should have performed an historical analysis
comparing the petitioners' claim with the types of racial discrimination comprising the essence of slavery;28 ° if the nexus between the
discriminatory closing of the swimming pools was sufficiently close to
a prior act of discrimination endured by slaves, the Court could have
found a Thirteenth Amendment violation. At best, the Court should
have adopted Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases that racial discrimination denying African Americans the exercise of rights

27
278
29

280

403 U.S. 217 (1971).
See id. at 226-27.
Id. at 226.

Although there might not have been swimming pools during slavery, the state

maintained other segregated public facilities that slaves could not use because of

the color of their skin. Given that the "black inferiority" theory supported slavery
and present-day racism, a state's closing of swimming pools that would have been

kept open if federal laws had not required their integration is a "badge and incident" of slavery. The closing is an act for the purpose of maintaining the inferior
status of African Americans by sending a message that they are not good enough to
swim with white Americans.

A .A
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Americans enjoy is repugnant to the Thirand privileges that 2white
81

teenth Amendment.

The Court, however, was apparently more concerned with the
judicial implications of expanding the scope of those "badges and
incidents" of slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws. Instead of explaining how the application of the amendment to racially
motivated closings of swimming pools would "do violence to its history, "282 the Court lamented that such an application would give the
Court authority under the amendment "to declare new laws to govern the thousands of towns and cities of the country;" the Court
found that this was "a lawmaking power far beyond the imagination
of the amendment's authors.",8 ' Besides not citing any precedent or
legislative history defining the permissible scope of the "lawmaking
powers" that were in the "imagination of the amendment's authors,"
the Court's pronouncement regarding the creation of "new laws" was
an exaggerated interpretation of the petitioners' request.
Instead of asking the Court to make specific laws governing
"thousands of towns and cities," the petitioners simply asked the
Court whether the challenged racially motivated closing of public
swimming pools fell within those "badges and incidents" of slavery
that are outlawed by the amendment. 28 4 An affirmative answer to the

281

A more serious judicial review of the Thirteenth Amendment claim might not

have resulted in the continued operation of the swimming pools, but at least it
would have made Palmera better development in the Court's Thirteenth Amendmentjurisprudence. If the swimming pool closings had a disproportionate impact
on African Americans to the extent that they hid less available opportunities to
swim after the closings, then such disproportionate impact should have been held
violative of the Thirteenth Amendment. See TRIBE, supra note 276, at 1481
(discussing the possible disproportionate impact of the pool closings).
2 Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226.
283
Id. It is reasonable to believe that the reason why the Thirteenth Amendment
has not been interpreted as broadly as its legislative history would allow is that the
Court and lower federal courts know that, if taken to its logical conclusion, the
amendment could work a substantial change in America. Eventually, it would
equalize the treatment and condition of the different races that live in America. It
would strike down many laws that have an intentional or disproportionate impact
on African Americans, other minorities, and white Americans. It would make public entities and private persons think seriously about the impacts of their policies
and procedures. They would have to work hard to create policies that have the least
harmful impact on African Americans and all other races, including white Americans. In the abstract, few non-racist Americans would publicly disagree with the
fairness that would emanate from an expansive application of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
28 See id. at 226-27. An affirmative answer to the question would simply mean
that cities and towns would know that they cannot terminate public facilities for the
purpose of maintaining segregation to perpetuate a theory of "black inferiority."
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question would have established simply whether and under what circumstances a state, with racially discriminatory intent, can close public swimming pools. Any standards established in Palmer would have
been applicable to other sets of circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
State courts, lower-level federal courts, and the Supreme Court could
calibrate those standards if necessary through the resolution of future lawsuits 285 in the same manner that other legal principles and
decisions are determined. 8 6
In short, the Court, as the final arbiter of constitutional interpretation, cannot legitimately delegate its judicial review duties to
Congress by asserting that Congress has not used Section 2 to outlaw
discrimination in swimming pool closings, as attempted in Palmer.2 7
The Court, when called to do so, must establish the permissible parameters of "badges and incidents" of slavery when determining
whether the Thirteenth Amendment proscribes new forms of racial
discrimination. The Court's hesitancy to establish the degree to
which the Thirteenth Amendment itself proscribes "badges and incidents" of slavery is evidenced in other opinions.
D. Memphis v. Greene-A FailureTo Confront the Essence of
Slavery
In Memphis v. Greene,2 the Court again declined to decide
whether the amendment, as a self-executing enactment, does more
than simply remove African Americans from the master-slave relationship and involuntary servitude.2 In Greene, the respondents al285

See ChristopherJ. Peters, Adjudication as Representative, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 312,

391 (1977) (arguing that "[s] tatutes and constitutions are not self-interpreting; inevitably their language presents ambiguities, gaps that must be filled through the
same case-by-case process of reasoning by analogy and distinction that operates in
common law adjudication.").
298
See id.
20 See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 227. The Court stated:
Finally, although the Thirteenth Amendment is a skimpy collection of
words to allow this Court to legislate new laws to control the operation
of swimming pools throughout the length and breadth of this Nation,
the amendment does contain other words that we held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. could empower Congress to outlaw "badges of slavery." The last sentence of the amendment reads:
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
But Congress has passed no law under this power to regulate a city's
opening or closing of swimming pools or other recreational facilities.
Id.
451 U.S. 100 (1981).
28
2

See id. at 125-26.
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leged that the city's closing of the north end of a street passing
through a white neighborhood violated section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Thirteenth Amendment.29 The closing gave the
white neighborhood the benefit of a private street with less traffic,
while making it more inconvenient for predominantly AfricanAmerican motorists to travel directly to portions of the city.29 The
Court held that the traffic inconvenience and "the symbolic significance" that African Americans would be mostly affected by the closing was not a "badge and incident" of slavery because the
"inconvenience cannot be equated to an actual restraint on the liberty of black citizens that is in any sense comparable to the odious
practice the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to eradicate." M
Greene, in ambiguously referring to "odious practices" during
slavery, arguably is an adoption of the same historical nexus test that
the Court used in the Civil Rights Cases to define the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment's coverage. ' Given that the Court did not
specifically reject Justice Harlan's "black inferiority" definition of
"badges and incidents" of slavery,' however, litigants should strongly
press that theory until the Court has definitively resolved its merits.
As stated above, Greene left open the amendment's impact on
"badges and incidents" of slavery.29 That this issue is still open gives
the Court a continuing loophole tojustify its own inaction in not defining the precise parameters of those "badges and incidents" of
slavery that are directly outlawed by the amendment itself without
congressional enactments under Section 2 of the amendment.2

21

oSee id. at 102.
See id. at 110-11.

The Court found that African-American motorists were dis-

proportionately affected by the closing; however, the Court was of the opinion that
the increase in travel time that the street closing caused African-American motorists
was insubstantial. See id. at 111-12. The Court stated: "Thus although it is correct
that the motorists who will be inconvenienced by the closing are primarily black,
the extent of the inconvenience is not great." Id.
2
Id. at 128.
29 See id. at 126 n.40.
24 See Greene, 451 U.S. at 126 (explaining that "the Court neither agreed
nor
disagreed with the first Justice Harlan's statement in dissent in Hodges that 'by its
own force, that Amendment destroyed slavery and all its incidents and badges, and
established freedom.'").
25 See id.at 125-26. Implicit in Greene is the notion that the Court will entertain
both a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment and a disproportionate impact theory if the disparate impact on African Americans and other minorities is
significant enough to be a "badge and incident" of slavery. Therefore, the important unresolved issue might be the degree of impact that is necessary to establish
that a disproportionate impact is a "badge and incident" of slavery.
The Court, by refusing to identify the scope of impermissible "badges and in-

852

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:774

This position is untenable because the Court is just as capable as
Congress in reviewing the Thirteenth Amendment's legislative history and in defining "badges and incidents" of slavery.2 7 The Court
cidents" of slavery, and by asserting that Congress has the power to do so under Section 2 of the amendment, unreasonably delegates its judicial review function to
Congress. Since Marbuiy v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the supremacy
of the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution has been well established.
297 There is no legitimate reason for the Court's deference
to Congress's legislative powers under Section 2 of the amendment when presented with a specific claim
requesting an interpretation of the amendment. The argument, that the Court
should entertain direct claims under the Thirteenth Amendment and that the
amendment outlaws all acts of racial discrimination that place African Americans
and other minorities in an inferior status to white Americans, is not intended to
support a position that Congress's Section 2 authority should be coextensive with
the Court's judicial determination of the scope of the amendment. Rather, consistent with the Court's Fourteenth Amendmentjurisprudence under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court should hold that Congress can, under the
analogous Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, enact laws to proscribe racially
discriminatory acts that would not be violative of the Thirteenth Amendment as interpreted by the Court. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Regarding
Congress's authority under Section 5, the Court in Katzenbachstated:
"It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is
authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation.
Some legislation is contemplated to make the amendments fully effective." A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional
enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and
congressional responsibility for implementing the amendment. It
would confine the legislative power in this context to the insignificant
role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was
prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the
judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the "majestic generalities"
of § 1 of the amendment.
Katzenbach, 884 U.S. at 648-49 (footnote omitted). For an argument that the
Court's decision in Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), which
held that Congress's racially benign affirmative action remedies are subject to strict
scrutiny, is contrary to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment's grant of authority
to Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cedric Merlin Powell,
Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative
Inaction,51 U. Mimi. L. REv. 191, 194-96 (1997).
In any event, the mere fact that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment expressly gives Congress the authority to enact "appropriate legislation" to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment does not mean that the Court, under its judicial review
authority, does not likewise have the authority to interpret the amendment and decide whether certain racially discriminatory acts are violative of the amendment itself. In other words, there is nothing special about Section 2's grant of legislative
authority to Congress that would prevent the Court from exercising its judicial review authority to interpret the amendment. Congress's Section 2 authority is synonymous with Congress's authority under the "Necessary and Proper" Clause to enforce any amendment of the Constitution. See Donald P. Judges, Bayonets for the
Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and Disadvantaged Neighborhoods, 19 HASTINCs
CONsT. L.Q. 599, 714 (citingJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), City of
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should reestablish its authority as the final arbiter of the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment. To facilitate its constitutionally prescribed
role, the Court, and lower-level federal courts, should recognize and
entertain aggrieved persons' direct claims under the Thirteenth
Amendment.
VII. THE COURT SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE VALIDITY OF DIRECT
CLAIMS UNDER THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND ESTABLISH
WORKABLE TESTS FOR EVALUATING THOSE CLAIMS

If, as argued above, the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws racially
discriminatory acts that are "badges and incidents" of slavery, the
Court should explicitly establish that an aggrieved plaintiff can bring
a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment to vindicate her
rights and to collect damages for her injuries. A direct claim alleging
racial discrimination as a "badge and incident" of slavery would be
consistent with a direct claim to free an African American or other
person from slavery. No one would seriously argue that an enslaved
person could not bring a direct claim under the Thirteenth
Amendment to seek her freedom and damages stemming from her
enslavement. Likewise, no one should argue against a direct claim
under the Thirteenth Amendment for damages due to racial discrimination that is a "badge and incident" of slavery. Indeed, the
Court's opinions in Palmerand Greene implicitly recognize such a direct claim because both decisions involved allegations that discriminatory conduct was violative of the amendment."8 Importantly, a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment would be consistent
with the Court's precedent interpreting direct claims under other
amendments.
For example, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents is the leading
case on the creation of direct claims under constitutional amendRome v. United States, 466 U.S. 156 (1980), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966) respectively for the proposition that Congress's authority under Section 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section
2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is as broad as Congress's authority under the
"Necessary and Proper" Clause).
29
See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971); see also Greene, 451 U.S.
at 128.
403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court has extended Bivens-type liability to a prisoner's allegation that prison officials violated "his constitutional rights under the
Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference to his needs and medical condition resulting from a back operation and a history of psychiatric problems."
McCarthyv. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 142 (1992). In McCarthy, the Court recognized
two exceptions to a Bivens action: "(1) where Congress has provided an equally effective alternative remedy and declared it to be a substitute for recovery under the
Constitution, and (2) where, in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, spe-
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ments. In that case, federal narcotics agents searched the petitioner's home without a warrant and then arrested him for an alleged drug violation. 00 The petitioner subsequently filed a claim directly under the Fourth Amendment against the federal agents who
conducted the search, alleging the absence of probable cause for the
search."' The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
• • 302 dismissal
of the petitioner's complaint for failure to state a claim.
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed, holding that
the petitioner had stated a legally cognizable claim directly under
the Fourth Amendment.03
The factors that the Bivens Court found persuasive in support of
a direct claim under the Fourth Amendment are similarly supportive
of a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. First, "where
federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
cial factors counsel hesitation." Id. at 151 (citation omitted). Given that Congress
had not established a substitute remedy and that there were no specific circumstances regarding the efficient operation of the prison that would establish "special
circumstances" against a Bivens-type action, the Court concluded that the prison's
efficiency argument did not outweigh the prisoner's right to file a Bivens claim seeking vindication of his Eight Amendment rights. See id. at 152-55. But see Federal
Depository Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 417, 486 (1994) (disallowing a direct
Fourth Amendment claim against a federal agency because of "special factors counseling hesitation"). "If we were to recognize a direct action for damages against
federal agencies, we would be creating a potentially enormous financial burden for
the Federal Government." Id.
At least one commentator has alleged that Congress delegated the enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment and other Civil War amendments to itself because of the drafters' belief that the courts would not enforce the amendments. See
KG. Jan Phillai, supra note 222, at 400 (declaring that "[wihatever enforcement
role that the drafters of the amendments envisioned for the judiciary was no more
than secondary."). This commentator further asserted that the Civil Rights Caseswas
an attempt by the Court "to retain the judicial power to make independent judgments as to what constituted badges and incidents of slavery." Id. at 434. Yet, despite the correctness of this commentator's conclusion thatJones established that the
Civil Rights Cases had too narrowly limited Congress's authority under Section 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment, see id., the Court in Jones did not hold that it could not
independently determine the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, including
whether that Amendment outlaws "badges and incidents" of slavery as well as the
types of racial discrimination that are "badges and incidents" of slavery. As a matter
of fact, in Greene and Palmer, the Court arguably made a determination that the
plaintiffs' claims were not sufficient to establish a "badge and incident" of slavery.
These cases established the Court's authority to both interpret direct claims under
the Thirteenth Amendment and to decide which acts of discrimination fall within
the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition. See Greene, 451 U.S. at 124-28; see also
Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226-27.
WOSee Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
501
302
503

See id.
See id. at 390.
See id. at 390, 397.
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from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies
so as to grant the necessary relief,"' despite a particular law's silence
on whether money damages should be allowed as an enforcement
mechanism. °5 "Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.""5 0
Therefore, courts should entertain direct claims for remedies under
the Thirteenth Amendment, which is a "federally protected right[]"
and a constitutionally granted liberty interest against enslavement
and "badges and incidents" of slavery, in the same manner in
which they accept direct claims under the Fourth Amendment.
Second, like a direct claim under the Fourth Amendment, a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment does not violate
Bivens's limitations on direct constitutional claims. In other words,
there are "no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress." s As in Bivens, a direct claim under
the Thirteenth Amendment for either a private person's or a state's
racial discrimination does not necessarily involve "a question of
'federal fiscal policy."'3 °9 Similarly, there is "no explicit congressional
declaration that persons injured by [a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment] may not recover money damages ... but must instead
be remitted to another remedy." '0 There is no federal statute or
Id. at 392 (citations omitted).
See id. at 389. A direct claim is proper because "'where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.'" Id. at
396.
306
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395 (citations omitted).
307 Clearly, the Thirteenth Amendment is a federally protected right. The only
35

open issue is whether the amendment outlaws "badges and incidents" of slavery. See
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 126 n.40 (1981). One of the arguments in this
article is that the amendment should be interpreted to outlaw "badges and incidents" of slavery.
308 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
Id. (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947)).
To
the extent that there is a direct claim against a federal agency or federal agents and
employees, the "federal policy" argument might have relevancy. The presence or
absence of a federal employee or federal agency, however, simply means that Bivenstype claims should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and that direct constitutional claims against private persons and against states should be allowed when the
"federal policy" is not implicated.
310 Id. at 397. The Bivens Court stated:
The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can demonstrate an
injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents of his Fourth
Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts.
"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
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federal policy requiring a person who has suffered a violation of her
Thirteenth Amendment rights to seek a remedy under a statute that
Congress has enacted in furtherance of its Section 2 authority."'
In short, a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment does
not run afoul of any limitations that Bivens placed on direct claims
under constitutional amendments. Even if it did, one could make a
persuasive argument that Bivens should not even apply to a direct
claim under the Thirteenth Amendment because Bivens-type claims,
and implicitly their limitations, have been restricted mostly to lawsuits against federal agents who violate constitutional rights. 12 A direct claim pursuant to federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
that alleges a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment should not be
constricted by Bivens's policy considerations, especially because
Palmer and Greene implicitly entertained direct claims under the Thirteenth Amendment without imposing any of the parameters that the
Court found significant in Bivens-type cases.""
Besides recognition of direct claims under the Thirteenth
Amendment, courts must develop rational tests to evaluate those
claims. First, they should establish that the amendment outlaws
"badges and incidents" of slavery. 14 Then, they should apply a broad
interpretation of "badges and incidents." Some scholars have interpretedJones, Palmer,and Greene as establishing a rule that, in order to
be one of the "badges and incidents" of slavery, a racially discriminaindividual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives
an injury." Having concluded that petitioner's complaint states a
cause of action under the Fourth Amendment, we hold that petitioner
is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered
as a result of the agents' violation of the amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
3
Congress has not created an administrative scheme for the exclusive
means of
remedying all Thirteenth Amendment violations. Therefore, a direct Thirteenth
Amendment claim would generally be different from a claim by a federal employee
where the employee's employment relationship is "governed by comprehensive
procedural and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the
United States." Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983).
312

See id.

See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971);
see also Memphis v.
Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124-29 (1981).
314
Given Greene's conclusion that the Civil Rights Cases
established that the
amendment outlawed "'slavery and established universal freedom,'" and that the
issue is open as to whether the amendment does anything else, see Greene, 451 U.S.
at 125-26, courts should interpret and develop the scope of the "universal freedom"
that the amendment conferred. As the "black inferiority" theory was the foundational support for slavery, the definition and scope of "universal freedom" should at
a minimum mean that Americans, including African Americans and other minorities, cannot be racially discriminated against in the exercise of their rights to "life,
liberty, and happiness."
33
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tory act must have an historical nexus with the types of racial deprivation inflicted on African Americans because of their status as slaves."-,
If such an historical analysis is adopted as the constitutional norm,
there is a possibility that the Court will reaffirm its narrow interpretation in the Civil Rights Cases."6
In the abstract, an historical analysis is neither good nor bad;
however, the focus of the inquiry is crucial and often outcome determinative.3 " Given that the foundation of slavery rested on a theory of "black inferiority," the focus of an historical analysis should be
animated by Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in the Civil Rights
Cases."8 Instead of trying to locate similar acts of past discrimination
during slavery for comparison with present discrimination, the Court
should accept the "black inferiority" theory as the essence of both
slavery and subsequent acts of racial discrimination that seek to relegate African Americans and other minorities to inferior positions 1
Four principles are important to develop a standard for interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment. First, courts should be suspicious of any alleged act of discrimination that attempts to relegate
African Americans and other minorities to inferior positions in
which they are denied rights or privileges that white Americans freely
enjoy because of their race.'20 Such suspicion is necessary to protect

315

See Colbert supra note 210, at 108 (explaining that "[tihe all-white jury's ori-

gins are clearly traceable to the institutionalization of slavery and its denial of legal
justice to slaves."). Under the historical nexus test, one must be able to trace present racial discrimination back to a similar type of discrimination endured because
of one's slave status. See id.
316
See supra note 236 and accompanying text. Under the Civil Rights Cases's approach, a present discriminatory act will not be violative of the Thirteenth Amendment if it cannot be traced to a past discriminatory act because of slave status. See id.
1
Some courts that desire a narrow interpretation of the amendment might
adopt the Civil Rights Cases's holding that historically only those rights granted in
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were the ones denied African Americans because of
their slave status. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,22 (1883); see also infra
notes 382-384 and accompanying text. As such, new forms of racial discrimination
will not meet the "badges and incidents" test even if the Court holds that the
amendment itself outlaws "badges and incidents." On the other hand, a court that
accepts Justice Harlan's "black inferiority" standard for defining "badges and incidents" will be more willing to hold that newer forms of racial discrimination are
"badges and incidents" of slavery if they perpetuate notions of black inferiority. See
supra note 243 and accompanying text.
318 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 33 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
19 See id.
2
Suspicion is especially warranted for facially neutral policies that have disproportionate impacts on African Americans and other minorities. See infra notes 420422 and accompanying text.
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purpose of equalizing the status of all Amerithe amendment's
521
cans.

Second, the interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment
should be refocused to give prominence to the natural rights philosophy underlying the amendment's adoption. The Amendment
conferred on African Americans, and all other races, the natural
rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."' Therefore, an
analysis under the amendment should be based primarily on
whether a particular act of racism affects those natural rights. The
Court's analysis, as reflected in Jones, Palmer,and Greene, should be
refocused away from a narrow inquiry using the historical nexus test
to define "badges and incidents" of slavery. 23 It should not matter
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
The injection of a natural rights philosophy into a Thirteenth Amendment
analysis would not be inconsistent with the Court's prior selective use of natural
rights arguments to support its decisions. For example, in United States Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), the Court held that an Alabama statute that
limited the terms of U.S. Congressmen and Senators was unconstitutional. See id. at
837-38. In part, the Court relied on legislative history indicating that the people
have a sovereign right to elect whomever they want and that "to tell them whom
they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural rights." Id. at 794-95 (citing Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 541 n.76 (1969)).
The fact that the Court has held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause in
Article IV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution does not confer natural rights
on citizens, but that it only "prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of
other States in favor of its own," Hague v. Committee for Indust. Org., 307 U.S. 495,
511 (1938) (citations omitted), does not mean that the Thirteenth Amendment
does not guarantee to former slaves their natural rights. For cases where the Court
has acknowledged the importance of natural rights, see Lehman v. Lycoming County
Children'sServices Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 524 (1982) (natural right of parent); Men/on
v.ficarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 158 (1982) (noting that "Indian tribes had
'always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights.'"); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 266 (1967) (asserting
natural rights as a reason for the Framers not putting in the Constitution procedures on how to renounce U.S. citizenship); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 294
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (recognizing that natural right of travel was discussed repeatedly during the debate over the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment); and Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621, 627 (1950)
(discussing a natural right to property).
Because the free and equal exercise of natural rights is the controlling consideration under the Thirteenth Amendment, states and federal government
branches, including federal courts through the evaluation of direct claims under
the amendment, should have the authority to proscribe both state actions and private actions that have a disproportionate impact on citizens' natural rights and statecreated rights. Where both types of rights are involved, natural rights principles
mandate that all Americans have the free exercise of those rights to avoid a situation where some Americans would not have the free enjoyment of their natural
rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
3
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
321
3
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whether free African Americans during slavery could ride on public
trains and go to public theaters as discussed in the Civil Rights Cases,
could swim in the same swimming pools with white Americans as debated in Palmer,or could drive on city streets in white neighborhoods
as analyzed in Greene. The operative question should be whether alleged racist acts affect African Americans' "life, liberty, and pursuit of
happiness" in ways that white Americans' rights are not affected3.
In other words, the issue should be whether African Americans or
other minorities have been discriminated against in the exercise of
their natural rights in furtherance of the "black inferiority" theory.
Third, implicit in the natural rights philosophy is the notion
that all Americans should have equal protection of the law.'-' Consequently, the Thirteenth Amendment contains an equal protection
component 26 that is broader than the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause in at least two respects. First, the Thirteenth
Amendment outlaws both state and private discrimination against
African Americans and other races.32 ' Second, discriminatory intent
should not be a prerequisite to a Thirteenth Amendment violation. 8
Fourth, the Thirteenth Amendment should be elevated to an
equal status with other amendments, including the Fourteenth
Amendment. The passage of the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth
Amendments does not mean that the Thirteenth Amendment
should329not be interpreted as broadly as Congress anticipated its coverage.
In light of these four principles, strict scrutiny should be applied to violations of the Thirteenth Amendment by both states and
private persons. When a plaintiff alleges that a state entity has com-

24 It is possible that the Court would have reached the same
result in Palmerbecause neither whites nor African Americans were able to use the swimming pools
after their closing. To the extent that there were no substitute pools for African
Americans but there were for white Americans, however, then it is possible that the
closing of the pools had a disproportionate impact on African Americans. See supra
note 281 and accompanying text.
325 See supra note 216 and accompanying
text.
326 See supra notes 217-220 and accompanying
text.
SeeJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968).
27
328
See infra notes 387-404 and accompanying text. In Greene, the Court gave an

indication, without specifically deciding, that discriminatory intent is not a prerequisite to a Thirteenth Amendment violation: "[Ilt has long been settled that the
Thirteenth Amendment 'isnot a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude
shall not exist in any part of the United States.'" Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100,
120 (1981).
29 See text accompanying note 220 supra
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mitted either a public act of racial discrimination or passed a state
law that has the same effect, the Thirteenth Amendment's equal protection component should invalidate the law or act if it denies a right
or privilege to an individual in one racial group that is freely exercised by an individual in another racial group. The state must then
offer a compelling state interest to justify the discrimination and
make a clear and convincing"O showing that the compelling interest
cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. " The same standard
and analysis should be applicable to acts of private racial discrimination. A private defendant should be required to offer a legitimate
private
interest that cannot be achieved by a less restrictive alterna2
tive.3
To maximize the Thirteenth Amendment's utility in achieving
the free exercise of all Americans' natural rights to "life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness," including the opportunities to work, learn,
live, and otherwise share in the liberties and benefits in which white
Americans freely partake, 3 courts should recognize explicitly a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment-including a disproportionate impact theory as one possible claim-and apply strict
scrutiny to resolve claims under the amendment. In fact, Palmer and
Greene implicitly moot one of these issues by removing uncertainty
regarding one's ability to bring a direct claim under the Thirteenth
Amendment. The logic of this conclusion, however, has escaped
some lower-level federal courts.
A.

Lower-Level Federal Courts'Interpretationsof the Thirteenth
Amendment's Impact on "Badges and Incidents" of Slavery and on
Direct Claims under the amendment

Lower-level federal courts are split on whether the amendment
itself proscribes "badges and incidents" of slavery. Courts answering
negatively fall into several categories.
1. Courts Saying No Without Citing Legal Authority
In Sumpter v. Harper,3 4 the plaintiff, an African-American female,
alleged that her physician intentionally misdiagnosed breast cancer
and performed a mastectomy, although she only had high-blood

330
331

332
33

34

See text accompanying notes 405-422 infra.
See text accompanying notes 405-422 infra
See text accompanying notes 405-422 infra
See supra note 216.
683 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1982).
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pressure.! 5 The plaintiff also asserted that the physician maintained
segregated waiting rooms and otherwise discriminated against African Americans.!
Without citing any legal authority, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff
"7
had not stated a claim directly under the Thirteenth Amendment.
The court cavalierly stated: "[H]er contention seems to be that defendant's conduct saddles her with a 'badge or incident of slavery.'
True or not, defendant's behavior violates Federal law if, but only if, it
breaches some statute enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the amendment."338
Similarly, in Wong v. Striplings" the plaintiff alleged that the
hospital wrongfully terminated his staff privileges.0 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff
could not allege a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment as a
predicate to a section 1985 claim.-"' Without citing any legal authority or legislative history that the Thirteenth Amendment did not outlaw "badges and incidents" of slavery, the court merely stated that no
court had presently held that the amendment alone proscribes
"badges and incidents" of slavery. 4 Although Wong did not involve a
direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment, the tenor of the
court's decision implies that a direct claim would have been dismissed.-"3
In NAACP v. Hunt,'" the petitioner alleged that a state's flying
of the confederate flag over its capital building was a "badge and in35 See id. at 107.

See id.
See id. at 108.
338 Id. (emphasis added). The court referenced no authority to support its conclusion.
39 881 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1989).
34
See id. at 203.
33

37

41

342
34
44

See id.

See id. at 202.
See id.
891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990). The court stated:
The NAACP's sole argument in support of its claim that the state has
violated the Thirteenth Amendment is that the confederate flag, because of its inspirational power in the confederate army during the
Civil War and its adoption by the Ku Klux Klan, is a "badge and vestige of slavery." Standing alone, the Thirteenth Amendment does not
forbid the badges and incidents of slavery. Congress has not utilized
its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement authority to pass legislation
forbidding the flying of the confederate flag as a badge or incident of
slavery. Because the flying of the confederate flag is not forbidden by
federal statute, summary judgment was properly granted.
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cident" of slavery directly violating the Thirteenth Amendment.3 4 5 In
affirming the trial court's dismissal of the claim, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the amendment
alone did not outlaw "badges and incidents" of slavery.
The court
did not cite any legal authority to support its conclusion. 7
Sumpter, Wong, and Hunt are not persuasive decisions. The
courts in those cases failed to recognize that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants
original federal jurisdiction over claims arising from a violation of
constitutional provisions.'
Similarly, those courts did not acknowledge that Palmer and Greene implicitly support direct claims under
the Thirteenth Amendment.m9 Therefore, by not citing either legal
precedent or legislative history to support their conclusions against
direct claims, ' " those opinions are indicative of the lack of seriousness that some courts exhibit to aggrieved persons seeking relief directly under the Thirteenth Amendment.
2.

Courts that Misapply Supreme Court Cases
Yates v. Hagerstown Lodge No. 212'"' is representative of cases in
which courts misapply Supreme Court decisions. The plaintiff, an
African-American male, filed a claim alleging a conspiracy under section 1985 when a local Moose lodge denied his request for membership and otherwise discriminated against him when he attended a
lodge function."' The plaintiff asserted a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment
as a predicate for the claim. The court dismissed the
• 35 3
claim, relying on Palmerfor the proposition that courts do not have

35

346
347
48

Id. at 1564 (citation omitted).
See id. at 1559.

See id.
See id.

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1948).

M9 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27
(1971); see also Memphis v.
Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124-29 (1981).

The tenor of Greene, however, in comparing the street closing to the type of
"odious practice" during slavery, implies that the amendment outlaws more than
the master-slave relationship and involuntary servitude. See Greene, 451 U.S. at 128.
$5
878 F. Supp. 788 (D. Md. 1995).
352
See id. at 791-94.
s5s See id. at 803. The court stated:
The Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the authority, inter alia, to pass laws proscribing actions by states and private individuals which constitute "badges and incidents of slavery." Therefore, although "the amendment does contain... words that... could
empower Congress to outlaw badges of slavery," a Court does not
have "authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to declare new
laws...." Because reaching that result would "severely stretch" the
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"authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to declare new laws. "SM
The court found significant Palmer's concerns about "'severely
stretch[ing]'" the words of the Thirteenth Amendment and
"'do[ing] violence to its history.'"35 ' In relying on Palmer to state a
blanket rule against direct claims under the Thirteenth Amendment,
the Yates court interpreted Palmer's conclusions too broadly. Palmer
did not hold that one could never bring a claim directly under the
amendment.!" Furthermore, as argued above, Palmer is not a wellreasoned opinion, and courts should not interpret it as preventing
them from using theirjudicial review authority to determine whether
a racially discriminatory act is a "badge and incident" of slavery. 3 7
words of the Thirteenth Amendment and "do violence to its history,"
this Court can not let stand as a separate and independent cause of
action Yates' Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim with the Thirteenth
Amendment as its basis.
Id. at 803-04.
su Id. at 803 (citing Palmer,403 U.S. at 226-27).
355

Id.

See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226-27.
See text accompanying supra notes 278-287. More importantly, the Court on
numerous occasions has left open a decision on whether the amendment also outlaws "badges and incidents" of slavery such that a direct claim could be brought under the amendment. If the amendment does outlaw "badges and incidents," then
of necessity the Court, as a part of itsjudicial review function, must interpret the full
scope of the amendment, including determining on a case-by-case basis whether
complained of present-day acts of discrimination fall within the scope of impermissible "badges and incidents" of slavery.
For example, in Greene the Court was specifically requested to hold that
Palmer established that a claim alleging that an act of racial discrimination was a
"badge and incident" of slavery could not be brought directly under the Thirteenth
Amendment. See Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124-25. The Court stated:
In this case respondents challenge the conferring of a benefit upon
white citizens by a measure that places a burden on black citizens as
an unconstitutional "badge of slavery." Relying on Justice Black's
opinion for the Court in Palmerv. Thompson, the city argues that in the
absence of a violation of specific enabling legislation enacted pursuant to § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, any judicial characterization
of an isolated street closing as a badge of slavery would constitute the
usurpation of "a law-making power far beyond the imagination of the
amendment's authors."
Id. at 124. The Greene Court, however, emphasized thatJones had left open the issue
whether the amendment itself outlawed an act of racial discrimination that is one of
the "badges and incidents" of slavery, and the Court stated that it would also leave
the issue open. See id. at 124-25.
Furthermore, the Greene Court gave strong indications that a direct claim
could be brought under the amendment despite Congress's authority to identify
and outlaw "badges and incidents" of slavery under Section 2 of the amendment.
"The exercise of that authority is not inconsistent with the view that the amendment
has self-executing force." Id. at 125.
Finally, given that Palmeris a 1971 decision, that Greene is a 1981 decision, and
35
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Courts Holding that a Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Would be Redundant if Courts Allow a Thirteenth
Amendment Claim

In Alma Society, Inc., v. Mellon,5 8 the court rejected the plaintiffs'
claim that the Thirteenth Amendment invalidated a New York statute that sealed adoption records to protect natural parents' identities."" The plaintiffs based their claims on a comparison of the statute's effects to slavery-era practices that prevented slave children
from communicating with and visiting their parents.'
The court
held that the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed only involuntary servitude; therefore, the plaintiffs did not state a valid claim under the
amendment.-"1 In part, the court believed that the Thirteenth
Amendment claim would have made the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment superfluous. " 2 If such an argument is taken to its logical conclusion, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would
also be a limitation on Congress's authority to identify "badges and
incidents" of slavery under Section 2 of the amendment.
Using the Fourteenth Amendment to limit Congress's authority,
however, would militate against the Court's decision in Jones, which
gave substantial deference to Congress's Section 2 powers. 3 Because
the Court has never used the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit Congress's authority under Section 2," lower-level
courts should not use the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
that Yates is a 1995 decision, Yates's reliance on Palmerdespite Greene being a more
recent statement of the Court's relevant position is not well grounded.
601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979).
359 See id. at
1236-39.
3o See id. at
1237.
3 See id. at 1236-39. In addition to citing Supreme Court cases showing that the
Court has never held that the amendment alone outlawed the "badges and incidents" of slavery, see id. at 1237, the Court held that such a conclusion would have
made the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment superfluous. See id. at 1238. A
rejoinder to this argument, however, is that it is not improper to have several constitutional amendments and statutes that outlaw the same conduct. For example, a
state's present day enslavement of only African Americans would be a violation of
both the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude and of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
As a matter of fact, Alma Society's rationale would make superfluous Section 2
of the Thirteenth Amendment. For why would Congress have enacted the Fourteenth Amendment if Congress had power under Section 2 to outlaw "badges and
incidents" of slavery?
36

See id. at 1238.

SeeJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
None of the Supreme Court cases discussed in this article have indicated that
the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment is in any way limited by the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments.
36
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to limit the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment that is the source of
Congress's Section 2 authority. The same conclusion adheres even
when a plaintiff has brought both a Thirteenth Amendment claim
and a Fourteenth Amendment claim in the same lawsuit involving a
single incident of racial discrimination36Instead of being a legitimate redundancy argument, the rush to
dismiss racial discrimination claims directly under the Thirteenth
Amendment is due to courts' unwillingness to develop jurisprudence
in this area, apparently because much development has already ocSeeJohnson v. Harron, No. 91-CV-1460, 1995 WL 319943 (N.D.N.Y. May 23,
1995). In Johnson, the plaintiff, an African-American male, and his wife, a white
woman, were detained at a custom check point between Canada and New York, and
the various police officers and custom officers allegedly verbally abused the AfricanAmerican male with racial slurs and conducted various searches including a strip
search after erroneously finding that his license had been suspended and that he
had a criminal record. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging various causes of action
including, but not limited to, a claim based on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The court stated:
In the present case, it is impossible to determine from the face of
plaintiff's complaint what the basis for his Thirteenth Amendment
claim is. Nor do plaintiff's papers submitted in opposition to the present motions shed any light on the nature of this claim. Drawing all
reasonable inferences from the allegations contained in the complaint, however, the court concludes that the only plausible basis for
this claim is plaintiff's contention that defendants treated him differently because of his race/color. Viewed in these terms, plaintiffs
claim is a classic example of an equal protection challenge. Since
plaintiff asserts such a claim as part of his first cause of action, the
court finds his Thirteenth Amendment claim to be redundant. Accordingly, the court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs first cause of action to the extent that it
alleges a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Id. at *7; accord Robinson v. Town of Colonie, 878 F. Supp. 387, 396 (N.D.N.Y.
1995) (court apparently assuming that a claim could be directly brought under the
Thirteenth Amendment, but dismissing it for redundancy because, even though it
was brought first in the same § 1983 count of the complaint along with the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for the § 1983 claim, the court reasoned that it alleged only unequal protection of African-American females whom a police officer
ordered to leave a store, a claim also cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment).
There is no merit, however, to this type of redundancy argument. A plaintiff
should be able to state a claim under both the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth
Amendments in the same complaint. Nor is there any reason why the Fourteenth
Amendment claim is not the one that is redundant if any amendment is deemed to
be redundant. To the extent that the redundancy argument is partially based on
whether the Thirteenth Amendment claim or the Fourteenth Amendment claim is
alleged first or second in the complaint, one could say that the Fourteenth
Amendment, appearing after the Thirteenth Amendment in the Constitution,
would be redundant if courts were to interpret the Thirteenth Amendment as
broadly as it should be.
365
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curred under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. Some courts find support in dictum from Jones that "in the
realm of equal protection, the Thirteenth Amendment offers no
protection not already provided under the Fourteenth Amendment."" There are two reasons why this dictum is not persuasive.
First, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, which is applicable only
when state action is involved, the Thirteenth Amendment regulates
both private action and state action.67
Second, whereas one must prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth
Amendment should prohibit facially neutral policies that have a disproportionate impact on African Americans and other minorities
even when they cannot establish discriminatory intent!" Therefore,
a direct claim of racial discrimination under the Thirteenth
Amendment would reach more racial conduct than the Fourteenth
Amendment and would supplement available legal causes of actions
against ever-present racial discrimination. 3 6
Robinson, 878 F. Supp. at 396. Despite the Jones' dictum, the Jones Court still
left open the issue whether the Thirteenth Amendment also outlaws the "badges
and incidents" of slavery, thereby allowing a direct claim under the Thirteenth
Amendment. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 440.
67
Given that there were state actors in both Robinson (a police officer) and Johnson (police officers and United States customs officers), and claims based on intentional discrimination and not on disproportionate impacts, the courts' dismissal of
the plaintiffs' claims might have been harmless, because the allowable damages appear to be the same under the Thirteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment when state action is present. See generally Robinson, 878 F. Supp. at
387;Johnson, 1995 WL 319943.
Where the theory is one of disproportionate impact, and not discriminatory
intent, the Thirteenth Amendment claim would not be redundant because a valid
Fourteenth Amendment claim requires purposeful discrimination.
5" See text accompanying notes 384-422 infra.
39
A direct claim of racial discrimination under the Thirteenth Amendment
would provide great assistance to the Fourteenth Amendment and civil rights laws
in maintaining the free exercise of natural rights for African Americans and other
minorities.
Although the Thirteenth Amendment had already formally conferred the
same natural rights on former slaves as had existed in white men prior to the passage of the United States Constitution, there were lingering doubts as to the ability
of both the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to bring about
a real conferment of those natural rights. See Powell, supra note 297, at 207. The
author explained:
The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is equally compelling in its rejection of colorblindness. As Professor Fair writes,
"Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment because of lingering
doubts about the adequacy of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
1866 Civil Rights Act to secure former slaves their full civil rights."
"Congressman [Thadeus] Stevens, introducing the [Flourteenth
36
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Courts that Appear Fearful of the Implication of a
Direct Claim Under the Thirteenth Amendment

In Evans v. Verdon,1 0 a white man allegedly spewing racial slurs
purportedly used a golf club to beat an African-American child."'
Despite an acknowledgment that the Thirteenth Amendment encompasses "badges and incidents" of slavery,-72 the court dismissed
[A]mendment in the House, characterized its basic purpose as the
,amelioration of the condition of the freedmen.'" The Fourteenth
Amendment was not intended to be a clarion call to individual rights,
it sought to bring an oppressed group into the national citizenry.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Guyora Binder, The Slavety of Emancipation, 17 CARDozo L..
REv. 2063, 2066 (1996) (noting that "the Fourteenth Amendment, whatever else it
was supposed to do, was clearly aimed to anchor the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the
Constitution; and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in turn was passed to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment.').
Some of the uncertainty stemmed from President AndrewJackson's veto of a
civil rights bill allegedly because of his belief that Congress did not have the authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to enact the bill. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative Histoy of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753,
785-86 (1985).
There is, moreover, substantial evidence that Congress adopted the
fourteenth amendment in part to provide a constitutional basis for
the Freedmen's Bureau Act. When President Johnson vetoed the
1866 Freedmen's Bureau bill, he questioned whether the Constitution
permitted the measure and challenged in particular the authority of
Congress to spend funds, at least outside the District of Columbia, to
aid any needy class."
Id. Apparently because of the uncertainty that opponents cast on the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment, in an era devoid of relevant judicial precedent, Congress
believed that the Fourteenth Amendment was needed to resolve lingering doubts
about its authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. See tenBroek,
supra note 197, at 200-02. Simply put, Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment as a clarifying pronouncement that would serve as another weapon to combat
southern states' persistent efforts to deny African Americans' natural rights. See id.
Some courts, however, have incorrectly limited the scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment on the grounds that an expansive interpretation of the amendment
would render the Fourteenth Amendment null. See supra notes 358-369 and accompanying text. The short answer to such reasoning is that more than one statute
or constitutional amendment can outlaw the same conduct without any of them bein redundant.
,7No. CV 90-0212, 1992 WL 486299 (E.D.N.Y Oct. 23, 1992).
371 Seeid. at *1.
372 See id. at *3 (noting that "[tihe amendment
relates to slavery and has been
read to touch the badges and incidents of slavery."). Other courts have indicated
that all racial discrimination that "treat[s] black persons different from white persons, and thereby segregat[es] them, may violate the Thirteenth Amendment."
Baker v. McDonald's Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1474, 1480 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1987). The
court in Baker, however, held that one could not bring a direct claim under the
Thirteenth Amendment for employment discrimination. See id.; accord Lowden v.
William M. Mercer, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 212, 221 (D. Mass. 1995) (explaining that
"[tihe Thirteenth Amendment is implicated primarily when a private individual
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segregates or humiliates a black person from freely exercising rights guaranteed to
all citizens."). The court held that plaintiff had not stated a proper claim under section 1985(3) of the Civil Rights Act with the Thirteenth Amendment as a predicate
because she alleged age and gender discrimination, whereas the Thirteenth
Amendment only proscribes racial discrimination. See id.
Some lower-level federal courts have held that one cannot bring a direct claim
under the Thirteenth Amendment challenging employment. See, e.g., Sanders v.
A.J. Canfield Co., 635 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (employment discrimination
case); Atta v. Sun Co., 596 F. Supp. 103 (D.C. Pa. 1984) (same); Walton v. Utility
Prods., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1145 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (same). On the other hand, some
courts hold that a direct claim is allowable under the Thirteenth Amendment, but
hold that it is only applicable to allegations of involuntary servitude and forced subjection to the master-slave relationship. See, e.g., Mensah v. Mercy Catholic Med.
Ctr., No. 97-3757, 1988 WL 36351 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 11, 1988) (employment discrimination case); Family Division Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (same); Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 453 F. Supp. 735 (D.C. Pa.
1978) (same). In non-employment contexts, courts have also held that one does
not have a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. In Provisional Government of Republic of New Afrika v. American BroadcastingCompanies, Inc., 609 F. Supp.
104, 109 (D.D.C. 1985), the court stated: "Although the Supreme Court has never
decided whether the Thirteenth Amendment provides a direct cause of action to
eradicate the vestiges of slavery, the better view is that the Thirteenth Amendment,
standing alone, does not give such rights." Id. In Atta v. Sun Co., 596 F. Supp. 103
(E.D. Pa. 1984), the court held that an African-American female could not establish
a direct claim under the amendment, but that she could plead a claim under §
1981. See id. at 104-05 (relying on Jones and Palmer for support that there is no Supreme Court decision on the issue).
At least one court has imposed Rule 11 sanctions against a plaintiff who filed
a claim directly under the Thirteenth Amendment. See generally Sanders v. A.J. Canfield, 635 F. Supp. 85, 87 (N.D. Ill. 1986). "Count IV purports to state a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. There is no direct private cause of action under
the Thirteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs, instead, must resort to statutory remedies
created by Congress under the power granted to it by that amendment." Id.
On the other hand, some courts have either implicitly stated or assumed that
one can bring a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment See Crenshaw v.
City of Defuniak Springs, 891 F. Supp. 1548, 1556 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (assuming, for
purposes of its decision, that plaintiff could state a claim directly under the
amendment, but noting that: "[w]hile neither the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Courts of Appeal have decided the extent to which a direct cause of
action exists under the Thirteenth Amendment, district courts have uniformly held
that the amendment does not reach forms of discrimination other than slavery or
involuntary servitude."); Scott v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs, Inc., 645 F.
Supp. 1465, 1473 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that an African-American physician who
was denied staff privileges because a hospital administrator did not submit his application to a credential committee did not plead any facts to allege a violation of
the amendment, which the court implied grants a private claim for slavery and the
"badges and incidents" of slavery) (citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,
226-27 (1971)); Di Maggio v. O'Brien, 497 F. Supp. 870, 873 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(implying that a claim might exist under the Thirteenth Amendment but noting
that the plaintiff had made no allegation that he was subjected to either involuntary
servitude or to "badges and incidents" of slavery);Jordan v. Lewis Grocer Co., 467 F.
Supp. 113, 116 (N.D. Miss. 1979) (asserting that the amendment is self-executing
without legislation from Congress, but apparently limiting direct claims to those
involving involuntary servitude: "[Tihe cases involving claims based upon the
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the child's Thirteenth Amendment claim on the grounds that "not
every wrong motivated by racial prejudice relates to slavery or the
badges and incidents of slavery.
The problem with that conclusion is that the court should have given a more thorough explanation of why the plaintiff's alleged racially motivated beating was not a
"badge and incident" of slavery. Even if courts accept the notion
that not every act of racial discrimination is violative of the Thirteenth Amendment, courts should still adopt workable tests to apply
on a case-by-case basis to outline the scope of the amendment's protection. For example, had the court in Evans adopted the historical
nexus test that some scholars believe flows from Jones, Palmer, and
7 4 a strong argument could have been made
Greene,"
that the white
male's alleged racist beating of the African-American child violated
the Thirteenth Amendment. Clearly, some white people beat African Americans both during and after slavery. Frequently, such beatings led to death by lynching and other cruel means. Some racist
people have used beatings to intimidate and control African Americans from slavery to the present time. As such, a sufficient nexus exists between the whipping of slaves and present-day racially motivated
beatings of African Americans. If being free from slavery means anything, it certainly should mean that an alleged racist person cannot
beat an African-American child like a dog. 75
amendment itself, as opposed to statutes enacted under its enabling clause, have
required some showing of compulsion, enforced labor without option or the like.");
Holton v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 419 F. Supp. 334, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(implying that a direct cause of action existed for involuntary servitude but alleging
that plaintiff had not alleged the claim sufficiently). In Arnold v. Board of Education
of Escambia County, 880 F.2d 305, 315 (11th Cir. 1989), the court held that the Thirteenth Amendment "prohibits conduct which constitutes a badge or incident of
slavery." Id. The court, however, held that a minor who alleged that his
"performance of menial tasks for the school officials violated the thirteenth
amendment" had not stated a claim because there was no allegation that he was
forced to work against his will. See id. The court further asserted that the Court had
not decided whether one can bring a claim directly under the amendment; but that
"badges and incidents" are interpreted narrowly when the Court interprets the contours of the amendment itself, as opposed to interpreting the same phrase while
evaluating the constitutionality of a statute that Congress has enacted under Section
2 of the amendment. See id. (citing Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981); Terry
Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1986)).
33 Evans v. Verdon, No. CV 90-0212, 1992 WL 486299, at *1, *3 (E.D.N.Y Oct.
23, 1992) (citing Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 7 (1944)).
374 See generally Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging
the Challenge: The Thirteenth
Amendment as a ProhibitionAgainst the Racial Use of Peremptoy Challenges, 76 CORNELL
L. REv. 1 (1990).
375 In describing the nature of the beating
in Evans, the court stated:
Plaintiffs allege that David Evans was traveling homeward by bicycle after having played basketball at a nearby park when he and his friends
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Lower-Lever Courts that Broadly Define the Scope of
the Thirteenth Amendment

Judge Wisdom's concurring opinion in Williams v. City of New Or-

leans?76 is one of the most forceful lower court opinions holding that

the Thirteenth Amendment's scope includes "badges and incidents"
of slavery and that all acts of racial discrimination are impermissible
"badges and incidents" of slavery if they are historically linked to
slavery or involuntary servitude." 7 ' By stating that there must be an
historical link between current acts of racial discrimination and slavery and by performing such an analysis to show historical patterns of
racial discrimination against African-American police officers in New
Orleans, Judge Wisdom stopped short of concluding that the
amendment would also proscribe forms of racial discrimination that
did not have a direct historical connection with slavery. 78 Nevertheless, certain portions of the opinion support that conclusion.
First, Judge Wisdom cited Justice Douglas's concurring opinion
in Jones that "persisting racial prejudices are themselves relics of slavery.", 7 Similarly, the judge emphasized Justice Douglas's opinion in
Bell v. Marylands that "'the Black Codes were a substitute for slavery,
that segregation was a substitute for the Black Codes', and that
'discrimination in the sit-in cases [therefore] is a relic of slavery.' 3 8
Thus, one interpretation of Judge Wisdom's opinion is that the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws all present-day racial discrimination that
decided to stop at a deli. As David Evans exited the deli, he was attacked by the defendant who yelled racial slurs, chased him and beat
him with a golf club.
Evans, 1992 WL 486299, at *1 n.1.
376 729 F.2d 1554, 1570-84 (5th Cir. 1984) (Wisdom,
J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
377 Judge Wisdom persuasively argued that the Thirteenth
Amendment outlaws
both the physical bonds of slavery and the "badges and incidents" of slavery:
"[Clurrent forms of racial discrimination are badges of slavery that may be proscribed under the thirteenth amendment if they are historically linked with slavery
or involuntary servitude." Id. at 1579 (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citingJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968)).
78 See id. at 1579-80. Because all racial discrimination against African
Americans
is based on a historical belief in their inherent inferiority, which was the foundational theory supporting their enslavement, all forms of racial discrimination
against African Americans meet the historical nexus test and therefore the Thirteenth Amendment should outlaw such acts of discrimination.
379 Id. at 1579 n.27 (Wisdom, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)
(citingJones, 392 U.S. at 448-49).
3a0 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
Sa Wi/iams, 729 F.2d at 1579 n.27 (Wisdom,J., concurring in part
and dissenting
in part) (quoting Beg/ 378 U.S. at 247-48).
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is designed to relegate African Americans and other minorities to racially inferior positions.'
In sum, most lower-level federal courts that have addressed the
issue have dismissed direct claims under the Thirteenth Amendment
by misinterpreting Supreme Court cases or by acting without persuasive authority to support their conclusions. On the other hand,
Greene provides strong evidence that the Court will entertain a racial
discrimination claim brought directly under the Thirteenth
Amendment.:' Consistently, Palmer, although giving too much deference to Congress's authority under Section 2 of the amendment,
confirms that the Court can determine whether an act of discrimination is a "badge and incident" of slavery. It is time for all courts to
acknowledge a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment and
to recognize that a disproportionate impact theory is a proper direct
claim.
VIII. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT'S AND CONGRESS'S POWER TO
ERADICATE "BADGES AND INCIDENTS" OF SLAVERY THAT HAVE A
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON AFRICAN AMERICANS AND OTHER
MINORITIES

Consistent with the broad natural rights underpinning of the
Thirteenth Amendment, the Court and lower-level federal courts
should recognize a disproportionate impact theory as one possible
direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. Currently, the
Court has not specifically decided this issue."" In Greene, however,
M Judge Wisdom relied on several commentators who support such a
conclusion. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, Federalism and Civil Rights, 77 PRoc. MASS. HIST. Soc'y
15 (1966); see also Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82
HARv.L. REv. 1294, 1308-09 (1969).
38
See Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124-28 (1981).
See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 890 n.17
(1982) (holding that Congress, in enacting § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
had an intent to proscribe only intentional discrimination, but leaving open the issue whether "the Thirteenth Amendment itself reaches practices with a disproportionate effect as well as those motivated by discriminatory purpose"). Similarly, the
Court has not acknowledged that Congress's powers under Section 2 of the
amendment are broad enough to proscribe facially neutral policies having a disproportionate impact on African Americans.
Despite a primary focus of this article being that courts have the authority to
create a disproportionate impact theory under the Thirteenth Amendment, a review of Congress's authority to do the same is instructive. First, limitations on Congress's authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment would not prevent
Congress from passing a statute allowing remedies under a disproportionate impact
theory. In Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970), the Court outlined the parameters of Congress's power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, and
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presumably the scope of the amendment itself:
As broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited. Specifically, there are at least three limitations upon Congress'
power to enforce the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments. First,
Congress may not by legislation repeal other provisions of the Constitution. Second, the power granted to Congress was not intended to
strip the States of their power to govern themselves or to convert our
national government of enumerated powers into a central government of unrestrained authority over every inch of the whole Nation.
Third, Congress may only "enforce" the provisions of the amendments and may do so only by "appropriate legislation." Congress has
no power under the enforcement sections to undercut the amendment's guarantees of personal equality and freedom from discrimination, or to undermine those protections of the Bill of Rights which we
have held the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the States.
Id. (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966)).
If Congress can pass laws that limit a state's ability, despite traditional Federalism concerns, to govern itself when the interference is for the purpose of eradicating a "badge or incident" of slavery, then Congress should certainly have the
authority to proscribe or provide a remedy for facially neutral laws, policies, and
procedures that have a disproportionate impact on African Americans and other
minorities. The Court in Mitchell noted several statutes that Congress had properly
enacted under its Section 2 powers to limit state authority in matters involving racial
groups. See id. at 129 (citing Katzunbach, 384 U.S. at 651, where the Court upheld a
statute that outlawed NewYork's requirement of literacy in English as a prerequisite
to voting as the requirement was applied to Puerto Ricans with certain educational
qualifications and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), where the
Court upheld the literacy test ban of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
In Mitchell the Court also asserted: "On the other hand, where Congress legislates in a domain not exclusively reserved by the Constitution to the States, its enforcement power need not be tied so closely to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race." Mitchell 400 U.S. at 130. This is supportive of an
argument that, under Section 2, Congress has the power to enact all laws that are
necessary and proper to carry out its mandate to eradicate "badges and incidents" of
slavery.
As a matter of fact, some legal scholars have implied that Congress has
broader authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment than it does under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See TRIBE, supra note 276, at 330-50.
In Mitchel1 the Court asserted that Congress's power to enact laws that are
.necessary and proper" to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment (and other Civil War
Amendments) is governed by the same standards that the Court in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), established to delineate the parameters of the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution. See Mitchel
1 , 400 U.S. at
127-28, 142-43. The Court stated: "'Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional.'" Id. at 143 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 421).
Therefore, there is no legitimate reason why Congress should not have the
authority to impose penalties and remedies when persons enforce facially neutral
policies and practices that have disproportionate impacts on African Americans and
other minorities. At least one lower-level federal court has acknowledged that Congress's Section 2 authority is broad enough to outlaw and to provide remedies for
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the Court gave indications that it might recognize a disproportionate
impact theory."5 After holding that the city did not have an intent to
discriminate when it closed a street that was used primarily by African Americans, the Court described the harmful impact of the
closing as a mere inconvenience in having to use another street to go
to the same neighborhood.
Given that alleged trivial impact, 8 the
acts having racially discriminatory impacts on protected races. See Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 964 (D. Md. 1977) (stating that "[u]ndeniably,
Congress could have provided for the establishment of a § 1981 claim upon proof
of discriminatory impact or effect alone.").
If Congress can create a disproportionate impact theory under its Section 2
authority, then courts, as a part of their judicial review function while interpreting
direct claims under the Thirteenth Amendment, should properly recognize the
amendment's natural rights and equal protection foundations by acknowledging
that a disproportionate impact theory necessarily flows from those principles.
Again, the Court's decision in Greene is relevant. In analyzing whether discriminatory intent is a required element under § 1982 and the Thirteenth Amendment,
and comparing those provisions with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated: "[I]t has long been settled that the Thirteenth Amendment 'is not a
mere prohibitionof State laws establishingand upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration
that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.'" Greene,
451 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added). Although the Court left the issue open, its
statement is a strong indication that, despite a lack of discriminatory intent, one
cannot enslave or subject another to involuntary servitude through the use of facially neutral policies and practices having the practical effect of enslaving or subjecting that person to involuntary servitude.
The logical extension of the Court's pronouncement in Greene is that, to the
extent that racial discrimination that is a "badge and incident" of slavery is also outlawed by the Thirteenth Amendment, one could not enforce facially neutral policies and procedures that subject African Americans and other minorities to conditions having a disproportionate impact on them in the exercise of their natural
rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The obviousness of a disproportionate impact theory manifests itself when one recognizes that the Thirteenth
Amendment has an equal protection component that proscribes any treatment of
African Americans and other minorities that relegates them to a condition of racial
inferiority by denying to them rights and privileges that white Americans are allowed to freely exercise. To equalize the treatment of African Americans and other
minorities, a disproportionate impact theory would be consistent with the natural
rights and equal protection philosophies underlying the Thirteenth Amendment.
M
See Greene, 451 U.S. at 124-29.
386

See id. at 126-28.

3V See id. at 110-11, 128-29.
388 Given the Court's conclusion that the city did not have an intent to discriminate, a proper analysis of the disproportionate impact of the street closing should
have involved a balancing of the benefit to the city and the detriment to the AfricanAmerican motorists, and a determination of whether there were any less restrict alternatives. One such alternative might have been to restrict the time period during
which the African Americans could use the street. Such time restrictions might
have included allowing them to use the street during certain hours in the morning
and during the afternoon when most of them go to and from work. This could
have been a reasonable alternative that would have left both the citizens who resided in the neighborhood where the street was closed and the aggrieved African
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Court reasoned that the Thirteenth Amendment argument "must
therefore rest, not on the actual consequences of the closing, but
rather on the symbolic significance that most of the drivers who will
be inconvenienced by the action are black."" The Court concluded
that, even when that symbolic argument is considered, "[t]o regard
an inevitable consequence of that kind as a form of stigma so severe
as to violate the Thirteenth Amendment would trivialize the great
purpose of that charter of freedom."""
At worst, the only conclusion from Greene is that the AfricanAmerican petitioners did not make a sufficiently strong showing of
the type of disproportionate harm warranting liability under the
Thirteenth Amendment. At best, that the Court discussed the disproportionate impact of the closing, after having already found that
the city did not have discriminatory intent, means that a disproportionate impact theory is a viable theory under the Thirteenth
Amendment."' Importantly, the Court stated:
Americans feeling that their interests had been protected.
The crucial point here is that, despite the Court's beliefs that the street closing's impact on African Americans was insignificant as it relates to the symbolic feeling that they were being harmed because of their race, neither African Americans
nor any other race should be subjected to any level of inconvenience if there are
less restrictive alternatives that would minimize the inconvenience. Therefore,
those who make decisions should explore all alternatives and choose policies that
have the less disproportionate impacts on affected people. On the other hand, if
the city had discriminatory intent, any level of inconvenience would be too much to
bear.
M Id. at 128.
390 Id. In Southern Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. St. ClairCounty,
743 F.2d 1207
(7th Cir. 1984), the court relied on Greene's stigmatization argument to hold that
African-American property owners did not state a sufficient impact on their property value to establish a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment when they alleged
that the county's failure to demolish or refurbish its adjacent property ran down the
African Americans' property values. The court stated:
Because the plaintiffs' Section 1981 contract, Section 1982 property,
and fourteenth amendment protections were not violated by the
County's alleged conduct, any disparate impact on blacks from the
County's conduct could not be fairly characterized as a "badge or incident of slavery." Any incidental consequences flowing from the
County's conduct fall far short of the type of stigmatization the thirteenth amendment was designed to eliminate.
Id. at 1213. The Southern Neighborhood decision implies that a disproportionate impact on African Americans might, under certain circumstances, violate the Thirteenth Amendment. The correctness of the conclusion, however-that the alleged
depreciation in the value of African Americans' homes was not sufficient enough to
be a "badge and incident" of slavery-depends on whether there was in fact a depreciation in the value of their homes, and whether there were less harmful alternatives that would not result in a reduction in the value of their properties.
39 In Palmer, the Court did not specifically address whether a disproportionate
effect alone could establish a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Palmer v.
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To decide the narrow constitutional question presented by
this record we need not speculate about the sort of impact on a racial
group that might be prohibited by the amendment itself We merely

hold that the impact of the closing of West Drive on nonresidents
of Hein Park is a routine burden of citizenship; it does not reflect
a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment 3
Implicitly, the Court left open the possibility that some level of disproportionate impact might violate the Thirteenth Amendment itself.-'
Furthermore, the Court gave a strong indication that one can
bring a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment despite Congress's authority to enforce the amendment under Section 2, especially when one considers that the Court rejected respondent's claim
that Palmer limited the Court's ability to classify the street closing as a
"badge and incident" of slavery.5 9 As such, lower-level federal courts
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971). The Court did not discuss whether an intent
requirement is necessary. See id. In the portion of the opinion addressing the
plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, however, the plaintiffs
alleged that the City ofJackson had intentionally closed its swimming pools to avoid
having to operate them on a desegregated basis. See id. at 224-26. Discussing the
Thirteenth Amendment issue, the Court might have simply assumed, without discussion or decision, that the plaintiffs were also alleging intentional racial discrimination. Justice White's dissent indicates that racially discriminatory motives led to
the closing of the swimming pools, thereby supporting an argument that the plaintiffs alleged discriminatory intent as a part of their claims under the amendment.
See id. at 235 (White,J., dissenting).
39

393
394

Greene, 451 U.S. at 128-29.
See id.
See id. at 124-125. The Court stated:

In this case respondents challenge the conferring of a benefit upon
white citizens by a measure that places a burden on black citizens as
an unconstitutional "badge of slavery." Relying on Justice Black's
opinion for the Court in Palmerv. Thompson, the city argues that in the
absence of a violation of specific enabling legislation enacted pursuant to § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, any judicial characterization
of an isolated street closing as a badge of slavery would constitute the
usurpation of "a law-making power far beyond the imagination of the
amendment's authors."
Pursuant to the authority created by § 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Congress has enacted legislation to abolish both the
conditions of involuntary servitude and the "badges and incidents of
slavery." The exercise of that authority is not inconsistent with the
view that the amendment has self-executing force. As the Court noted
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.:
"'By its own unaided force and effect,' the Thirteenth
Amendment 'abolished slavery' and 'established universal
freedom.' Whether or not the amendment itself did any more
than that-a question not involved in this case-it is at least
clear that the Enabling Clause of that Amendment empowered
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that have interpreted Greene and Palmer, as either rejecting direct
claims under the amendment or as requiring discriminatory intent
as an element of such claims, have misinterpreted Greene and
395
Palmer.
Congress to do much more."
Greene, 451 U.S. at 124-25.
395 This misinterpretation has primarily occurred in vote
dilution cases. In Ashe
v. The Board of Elections of the City of New York, No. 88-CV-1566, 1988 WL 95427
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1988), the plaintiffs, who complained about New York's conducting of the 1988 presidential election, alleged in part that a New York statute that
based appointments to the NewYork City Board of Election on affiliation to the two
major parties was a violation of their Thirteenth Amendment rights on its face because it "result[s] in black and Hispanic citizens having less opportunity to participate in the political process." Id. at *1. The court held that the plaintiffs had not
stated a claim because they had not shown that the statute was passed with discriminatory intent:
Finally, a claim under the thirteenth amendment must show how the
statute complained of is used as a badge of servitude, a claim which
involves racial animus.... Here, plaintiffs have failed to show that

the act can never be applied constitutionally or that it was passed with
discriminatory intent.
Id. at *3.
In Reed v. Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 892 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), the court likewise
concluded that discriminatory intent is an element of a Thirteenth Amendment
claim. See id. (explaining that "[elven if the Thirteenth Amendment's scope were
so extended, such a claim would require a showing of racial animus.") (citing
Greene, 451 U.S. at 126-28 and Ashe, 1988 WL 95427, at *3). The Reed court relied
on Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1981), where the court considered a
claim under the Thirteenth Amendment against a vote dilution challenge to an atlarge voting system. See id. at 913. Courts that have relied on Finlay have interpreted it too broadly, because the Finlay court did not conclusively hold that the
Thirteenth Amendment would not outlaw a racially discriminatory voting system.
At most, Finlay can be interpreted as holding that if the Thirteenth Amendment is
applicable to a voting rights case, it provides no greater protection than that provided by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments:
The plaintiffs also press on appeal their claims that the at-large election system violates their first and thirteenth amendment rights. We
hold that to the extent either of these amendments protects the voting rights here
asserted-a question we do not decide--theirprotections do not in any event
extend beyond those more directly, and perhapsonly, provided by the fourteenth
andfifteenth amendments.
While Congress may arguably have some discretion in determining
what kind of protective legislation to enact pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment, it appears that the amendment's independent scope is
limited to the eradication of the incidents or badges of slavery and
does not reach other acts of discrimination. In the realm of voting,
we think the thirteenth amendment offers no protections not already
provided under the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments.
Id. at 927 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-25 (1883)) (emphasis
added). Finlay is flawed to the extent that it states that "it appears that the amendment's independent scope is limited to the eradication of the incidents or badges of
slavery and does not reach other acts of discrimination." Id. The Finlay court relied
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A disproportionate impact theory as a basis for a direct claim
under the Thirteenth Amendment would be, to some extent, consistent with the disproportionate impact theory that some courts have
applied to claims under civil rights laws such as sections 19819 " and
on the Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases to support this conclusion. See id.
Yet the Court itself has raised questions about the continued validity of its decision
in the Civil Right Cases. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 n.78
(1968). Rather than accepting its earlier decision in the Civil Rights Cases that the
Thirteenth Amendment, and Congress's enforcement powers under Section 2 of
the amendment, were limited to those "badges and incidents" of slavery that are
specifically referred to in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Jones Court stated that
Congress has authority to identify "badges and incidents" of slavery and can make
laws to proscribe them. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 440-41. Therefore, Congress could determine that voting rights discrimination is a "badge and incident" of slavery and
could enact laws pursuant to its authority under Section 2 of the amendment.
Furthermore, because the amendment should be self-executing, individuals
should be able to bring a claim directly under the Thirteenth Amendment to challenge voting rights discrimination. The fact that the Fifteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments might also provide protection against voting discrimination should
not prevent the application of the Thirteenth Amendment in an appropriate case.
Legislative history, however, provides persuasive support that the Thirteenth
Amendment does not outlaw voting discrimination. The legislative history of the
Thirteenth Amendment shows that the amendment did not intend to give African
Americans the right to vote. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HLtv. L REv. 1 (1955). Hence, the Ashe,
Reed, and Finlaydecisions should have been based on that ground alone, and not by
broadly stating that the Thirteenth Amendment does not reach other acts of discrimination. This is particularly true because those cases do not outline the types of
racial discrimination encompassed within the impermissible "badges and incidents"
of slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws.
Therefore, Finlayand its progeny are not controlling precedent for purposes
of the Thirteenth Amendment's application to voting rights cases. Even if the
amendment itself does not outlaw voting discrimination, in light of the Court's decision in Jones, Congress might have the authority to use its legislative powers under
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to outlaw voting discrimination.
396
For opinions holding that no intent is required for a § 1981 claim, see Davis
v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440
U.S. 625 (1979), Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 838 n.22
(1977), and Dawson v. Pastrick, 441 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Ind. 1977). For cases asserting that intent is required for a § 1981 claim, see Metrocarev. Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority, 679 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1982), Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey
Department of Civil Service, 667 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1981), Crawford v. Western Electric
Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1309 (5th Cir. 1980), and Mescallv. Burrus, 603 F.2d 1266, 1271

(7th Cir. 1979).
For an argument that the language of § 1981 is broad enough to negate an
intent requirement and that the real reason that courts will not accept a disproportionate impact theory is that "[s]uch a standard might 'invalidate a whole range of
tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white,'" see
Bronze Shields, 667 F.2d at 1098 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Judge Higginbotham concluded that there is no reason to protect
laws having a disproportionate impact from being violative of § 1981 if there was no
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198239' of the Civil Rights Act of 1968398 and under the Fair Housing
Act.""

In essence, a disproportionate impact theory directly under

rational basis for them. See id.
Regardless of whether the language and legislative history of §§ 1981 and
1982 support a disproportionate impact theory, courts should recognize that the
resolution of that issue involves the ascertainment of congressional intent through
statutory construction. A conclusion one way or the other is not dispositive on
whether the Thirteenth Amendment supports a disproportionate impact theory because the latter issue involves a proper interpretation and recognition of the natural
rights and equal protection philosophies that animate the Thirteenth Amendment's purpose of giving protected persons the full and free exercise of their natural rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
97 Some courts have held that a plaintiff need not show
discriminatory intent to
establish a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. In Phiffer v. Proud ParrotMotor Hotel, Inc.,
648 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980), the defendant refused to rent office space to an African-American businessman allegedly because he did not leave a deposit. Subsequently, the defendant rented the property to a white person despite telling the
plaintiff that no offices were available when the plaintiff again inquired about office
space. The court found that the defendant had violated § 1982, and that the plaintiff did not have to prove that the defendant had an intent to discriminate:
Racial motivation is not an element of the § 1982 prima facie case;
only a racial impact need be shown. Defendants erroneously argue
that we must follow an equal protection analysis and require that
plaintiffs prove racial animosity.... [Section] 1982, however, represents an exercise of the power of Congress to eliminate the "badges
and incidents" of slavery under the thirteenth amendment, and not
strictly an attempt to effectuate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. We cannot, therefore, analogize to equal
protection cases.
Id. at 551-52 (citations omitted).
398 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982 (1866).
39
A disproportionate impact theory under the Thirteenth Amendment is consistent with the theory used in evaluating an alleged violation of the Fair Housing
Act. Discriminatory intent is not required; one can establish a prima facie case by
showing that a policy or practice has a discriminatory impact on African Americans
or other minorities. SeeUnited States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th
Cir. 1974). The court stated:
The burden of proof in Title VIII cases is governed by the concept of
the "prima facie case." To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the plaintiff need prove no more than that the conduct
of the defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a discriminatory effect. The plaintiff
need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial
discrimination in housing was racially motivated. Effect, and not motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily conceal their
motivations, but more importantly, because... whatever our law was
once, ... we now firmly recognize that the arbitraryquality of thoughtlessness
can be as disastrousand unfair to private rights and the public interest as the
perversity of a willful scheme.
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case by demonstrating racially discriminatory effect, the burden shifts to the governmental defendant to demonstrate that its conduct was necessary to
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the Thirteenth Amendment would be in conformity with the natural
rights and equal protection philosophies that define the outer limits
of the amendment. 4° Consistently, the theory would be another
means of ensuring that African Americans, other minorities, and
white Americans would have the broadest protection of their natural
rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The theory
would deny protection to those who institute policies and practices
that disproportionately harm persons protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment. To withstand a disproportionate impact claim, a defendant must show that there are no less restrictive alternatives to
the challenged policies or practices. 40'
The standards for evaluating a disproportionate impact claim
under the Thirteenth Amendment, however, should not be based on
the standards that federal courts have created under Title VII.4 The
Court should adopt new standards to avoid some of the confusion
promote a compelling governmental interest.
Id. at 1184-85. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Accord Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974). In Williams, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant subdivision owner's facially neutral policy of
selling subdivision lots only to builders (who would then sell to individual purchasers like the plaintiff) violated §§ 1981 and 1982, and the Fair Housing Act. See id. at
822. The court held that the plaintiff could use statistics on the number of African
Americans who eventually were able to purchase homes to establish a prima facie
case that shifts the burden to the defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason or business necessity for the policy. See id.at 826. The facially neutral practice had a discriminatory impact because Williams had sold lots only to white builders who maintained a practice of selling homes only to whites. See id.Furthermore,
the defendant, who previously had a policy of allowing only whites in the subdivision, had not sufficiently communicated his alleged new policy of subdivision integration to white builders, and African-American builders were frustrated in their
efforts to be approved as builders. See id.at 826-27. The court refused the defendant's offer of a "business necessity" because there were less discriminatory alternatives to having only a facially neutral policy that had a disproportionate impact on
African Americans, such as the defendant selling directly to African Americans and
instructing approved builders to sell to African Americans. See id.at 827.
400See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
401 See text accompanying note 405 infra, When this article refers
to disproportionate impact theory, the reference means that an aggrieved plaintiff should be
able to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination under the Thirteenth
Amendment by showing that a challenged law, policy, or procedure affects one racial group in a manner in which another racial group-typically white Americans-is not affected. For example, in Greene, the city's closing of a public street in a white
neighborhood had a disproportionate impact on African Americans to the extent
that they could not use the street after the closing. See generally Memphis v. Greene,
451 U.S. 100 (1981). After a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burdens of production and persuasion shift to the defendants to satisfy the elements of
the strict scrutiny test. See text accompanying notes 404 - 416 infra
40
Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(K)(1)(A)-(B) (1964)
(amended 1991).
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surrounding the plaintiffs and defendant's respective burdens of
production and persuasion in Title VII cases., 50
403 Uncertainty

exists over how courts will interpret some of the elements comprising plaintiff's and defendant's burdens in a Title VII case. As to the first element, the plaintiffs prima facie case, it appears that a plaintiff alleging that a facially neutral practice has a disproportionate impact on members of minority
groups or women must offer statistics or other evidence to show that the practice in
fact has a disproportionate impact. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977);
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); see also Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination-ItShouldn't Be So Easy, 58
FORDHAm L. REv. 939, 958 (1990). There is confusion surrounding the proof that a
defendant must offer to rebut a prima facie case. In Dothard,the Court held that
"[o] nce it is thus shown that the employment standards are discriminatory in effect,
the employer must meet 'the burden of showing that any given requirement
[has] ...a manifest relationship to the employment in question.'" Dothard, 433
U.S. at 329. Yet the Court asserted that "'[t]he touchstone is business necessity;' a
discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficientjob performance to survive a Tide VII challenge." Id. at 332 n.14. Subsequent
to Dothard,lower-level federal courts have split over the level of proof necessary to
meet a defendant's burden to comply with Dothardand other Supreme Court cases.
Some courts require that the challenged employment practice have "job-relatedness
or necessity"; some require that it be an "absolute necessity"; and some require that
it be a "reasonable necessity." See Rosemary Alito, DisparateImpact Discrimination
Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 RuTrGERs L. REv. 1011, 1029-30 (1993).
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Supreme Court
added more confusion to the disproportionate impact case. First, contrary to earlier decisions, the Court in Wards Cove held that when the defendant offers a permissible justification for the discriminatory effects of its facially neutral practices,
the defendant bears only the burden of production, and the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. See id. at 659. The court further weakened the defendant's burden by concluding that, to satisfy ajustification for its discriminatory business practice, a defendant must show only that "a challenged practice serves, in a significant
way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer." Id. For a discussion of how
Wards Cove diminished the defendant's burden, including the possibility that the
"'significant[] further[ing] [of] the 'legitimate employment goals' of the employer' . . . may be an oblique signal that the business justification defense is limited
to job performance criteria, or it may be meant to open the door to a broad range
of additional considerations," see Watson, supra,at 962.
Wards Cove also changed the nature of the plaintiffs proof to rebut the defendant's business justification for having a discriminatory practice. Prior to Wards
Cove, a plaintiff could still win her case if she established by a preponderance of the
evidence that, despite defendant's business justification, "other selection devices
without a similar discriminatory effect would also 'serve the employer's legitimate
interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship."" Dothard,433 U.S. at 329. The
Court in Wards Cove gave the defendant a cost defense because, in resolving plaintiff's claim that there are less discriminatory alternatives, a court could consider "the
cost or other burdens" in determining whether the alternatives are equally as efficient. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661. The Court even urged the judiciary to proceed with caution in evaluating proposed alternatives to a defendant's discriminatory practices: "Courts are generally less competent than employers to restructure
business practices;... consequently, the judiciary should proceed with care before
mandating that an employer must adopt a plaintiffs alternative selection or hiring
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The same proof standards that govern alleged violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment should apply. In other words, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a state law that discriminates against or in
favor of a particular race will survive an equal protection challenge
only if the law is "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest."" To be "narrowly tailored," the state must show that the compelling interest cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. 405 The
Court's decision in City of Richmond v. Croson, 6 is instructive. There,
practice in response to a Tide VII suit." Id.
Fortunately, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), to overrule Wards Cove. In passing the 1991 Act,
Congress had the intent of restoring the state of the law prior to Wards Cove. See Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in DisparateImpact DiscriminationCases, 30
GA. L. REv. 387, 392-93 (1996). Because the Court's decisions prior to Wards Cove
are not entirely clear-at least as far as the defendant's burden of persuasion in establishing a business justification for discriminatory practices-there is confusion
about how courts will interpret the substantive components of the 1991 Act. See generally Alito, supra For example, the 1991 Act mandates that, after a plaintiff has established a prima facie case by showing that the defendant's employment practice
has a disparate impact, the burden of persuasion is on the defendant to show "that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(I); id. § 2000e2(k) (1) (A) (II).
Some commentators have criticized the 1991 Act on the grounds that the
Court's decisions prior to Wards Cove did not require a defendant to show both job
relatedness and business necessity, and that plaintiffs have not previously been allowed to prevail by simply showing that there are less discriminatory alternatives
without having first shown that a defendant's existing practice has a disproportionate impact. See Alito, supra note 403, at 1023-40. Some also argue that a defendant
should be able to meet her burden of persuasion by showing that the practice is job
related and that it "significantly advanc[es] a legitimate business purpose" rather
than showing that the challenged employment practice is a business necessity. See
id. at 1033-36. In contrast, other commentators have argued that the 1991 Act
should be interpreted as requiring a defendant to show both job relatedness and a
business necessity for the challenged employment practice. See Grover, supra, at
396.
Furthermore, commentators disagree over whether costs should be taken into
consideration when deciding whether a defendant must adopt a proffered less discriminatory alternative. See id. at 398 n.40 (citing International Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210-11 (1991) (alleging that disparate impact
cases should be treated like disparate treatment cases where costs are normally
taken into consideration only if the expense would "threaten the survival of the
e ployer's business")).
Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2490 (1995).
405 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978)
(explaining that "[uinquestionably we have held that a government practice or
statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' or which contains 'suspect classifications' is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a
compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.").
406 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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the Court held that Richmond's Minority Business Utilization Plan,
which mandated that prime contractors on city construction projects
give thirty percent of their subcontracts to minority businessesj violated the Fourteenth Amendment.048 Applying the above-stated strict
scrutiny standard, the Court held that Richmond had not shown a
compelling remedial interest to support the minority set-aside because it had neither established its own discrimination against minority contractors nor proved white prime contractors' discrimination against minorities.4 9
Similarly, Richmond did not establish that its thirty percent setaside was narrowly tailored to its asserted compelling interest. First,
emphasizing Richmond's asserted interest in remedying past discrimination against African-American contractors, the Court held
that the set-aside was not narrowly tailored but overinclusive, because
it also gave a preference to "Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons," where there was no evidence of discrimination against them.1 0 Similarly, the Court held that Richmond had
not shown that its asserted interest-rectifying the disparity in the
number of minority contracts-could not have been achieved with
less restrictive alternatives not based on racial classifications. 1'
Adopting Croson's strict scrutiny standard in the Thirteenth
Amendment context would require that, in response to a plaintiffs
direct claim of intentional racial discrimination or a plaintiffs prima
facie disproportionate impact discrimination claim, a defendant
(either a state, private person, or private entity) show that: (1) the
challenged practice serves a compelling state or legitimate private interest, (2) the challenged practice is narrowly tailored to the
achievement of the asserted interest, and (3) there are no less restrictive alternatives to achieve the asserted interest. For state defendants, the same standards for determining whether the asserted interest is a compelling interest in the Fourteenth Amendment context
would be applied to a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. For private defendants, in furtherance of the fullest exercise
of their natural rights liberty interest, 412 any asserted interest that is
not illegal would meet the legitimate private interest test.
See id. at 477.
See id. at 511.
409 See id. at
505.
407
408

410

Id. at 506.

411 See id. at

507-10.
In conformity with one's fundamental natural rights to pursue life and liberty
to the fullest extent of the law, any private activity that is not illegal should be
412
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To satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement, both state and private defendants should be required to show that the challenged
practice is closely related to the asserted interest because it either
achieves or substantially achieves the interest.4 13 Even when the first
two requirements have been met, the challenged practice would still
violate the Thirteenth Amendment if the asserted interest could be
achieved by less discriminatory alternatives.1 4 Importantly, cost
should not be considered in evaluating the merits of a proffered less
discriminatory alternative.4 15 The burden of production and persuasion on all three issues is on the defendant whose conduct is challenged as being violative of the Thirteenth Amendment.1 "
deemed a legitimate private interest for Thirteenth Amendment analysis. This
standard not only promotes the principles of the Declaration of Independence, but
also gives meaning to the natural rights and Lockean philosophies that underlie the
Thirteenth Amendment. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. In other
words, one should have the fullest right to pursue any lawful activity that she wishes.
Yet the Thirteenth Amendment places certain limitations on that right. One may
not enslave a person, nor subject a person to involuntary servitude. Similarly, one
should not be allowed to exercise a fundamental liberty interest in pursuit of her
happiness to the extent that her actions have a discriminatory or disproportionate
impact on another. For example, a private employer, either African American or
white American, should not be allowed to exercise a liberty interest to operate a
business by employing only employees of his or her own race. Nor should the employer be allowed to institute facially neutral policies and procedures that have a
disproportionate impact on potential employees who are not of his or her own race
unless he or she establishes that there are no less restrictive alternatives available.
To do otherwise would mean that the disproportionately-impacted employees would
have been denied an equal pursuit of liberty in employment on the same terms as
the favored race of employees. That would be contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment's intent that neither state action nor private action may deny an individual the
equal
pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness on the basis of race.
413
In some circumstances, a practice might be narrowly tailored if it advances
or
substantially advances the achievement of the asserted interest.
414
See supra note 405 and accompanying text. Included in less discriminatory
alternatives are available rules, policies, and procedures that would achieve the asserted interest with less disproportionate impacts on minorities.
415 SeeJudith Welch Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring
Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct
of 1973, 69 CO
.tLLL. REV. 401, 447 (1984) (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973) (explaining that "the Court has found cost justifications
unpersuasive when the classification gives members of a quasi-suspect class no opportunity to benefit from a particular program, or denies access to a quasifundamental right.")); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (citing Frontiero,411 U.S. at
688-91 (noting that "the interest in avoiding the bureaucratic effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who truly have suffered the effects of prior discrimination cannotjustify a rigid line drawn on the basis of a suspect classification.")).
416 It would be appropriate to place the burden of production
and persuasion on
the defendant after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case by showing that
defendant's policies and practices have a disproportionate impact. See supra note
399 and accompanying text.
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Besides applying the strict scrutiny standard, Croson is also important because it recognizes that facially neutral policies can be
used to deny opportunities to certain groups. 7 Justice O'Connor
emphasized that such policies often can be changed to allow more
races to partake of relevant benefits without a loss of business effectiveness.
justice O'Connor concluded that "[b]usiness as usual
exclusion of
should not mean business pursuant to the unthinking
41 9
rewards."
its
from
society
our
of
members
certain
A direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment, including
one alleging a disproportionate impact theory, would achieve several
purposes. First, it would give the Thirteenth Amendment a similar
constitutional status as the Fourteenth Amendment because both
amendments would be active means of redressing racial discrimination. Second, it would increase the potential responsibility of state
government. Whereas an aggrieved person must show intentional
discrimination to establish a violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment, even when facially neutral policies have disproportionate impacts on minorities or other racial groups,4 2 a disproportionate impact theory against a state under the Thirteenth Amendment
would not require discriminatory intent.421
Third, an aggrieved person would have a cause of action against
private persons and private entities whose facially neutral policies
417
418
419

See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10.
See id. at 510.
Id. In entirety,Justice O'Connor stated:

Even in the absence of evidence of discrimination, the city has
at its disposal a whole array of race-neutral devices to increase the accessibility of city contracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of
all races. Simplification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding
requirements, and training and financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races would open the public contracting market to all
those who have suffered the effects of past societal discrimination or
neglect. Many of the formal barriers to new entrants may be the
product of bureaucratic inertia more than actual necessity, and may
have a disproportionate effect on the opportunities open to new minority firms. Their elimination or modification would have little detrimental effect on the city's interests and would serve to increase the
opportunities available to minority business without classifying individuals on the basis of race. The city may also act to prohibit discrimination in the provision of credit or bonding by local suppliers
and banks. Business as usual should not mean business pursuant to
the unthinking exclusion of certain members of our society from its
rewards.
Id. at 509-10
420 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976).
421 SeeMemphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124-28 (1981).
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cause disproportionate impacts."' Finally, by not considering cost in
determining whether there are less discriminatory alternatives, a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment would be consistent
with a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because cost is not
normally considered in deciding whether a state's actions are narrowly tailored to achieve the state's interests.
A. Possible Uses for a DisproportionateImpact Theory Under the
Thirteenth Amendment to EradicateInjurious Health CarePolicies
1. Racial Application of Physician-Assisted Suicide
Part I of this Article concluded by asserting that states should
not criminalize physician-assisted suicide simply out of fear that physicians and hospitals will coerce African Americans and other disfavored groups into having physician-assisted suicide against their will.
As one safeguard against medical providers' abuses, it is recommended that physicians, hospitals, and other medical providers report certain statistics to a designated agency. At a minimum, those
statistics should include the race and color of patients who have received physician-assisted suicide from each physician and from each
other medical provider. For each physician and other medical provider, the statistics should also include, by race and color, the total
number of patients who have died by means other than physicianassisted suicide.4 2 These two sets of statistics will assist in identifying
whether physician-assisted suicide is being applied in a manner that
has an improper, disproportionate impact on members of racial minority groups or members of any racial group, including white
Americans. If this is the case, then a disproportionate impact claim
under the Thirteenth Amendment is one means of challenging the
constitutionality of a state statute allowing physician-assisted suicide.
The theory could also be used against individual physicians or other
medical providers whose assistance in physician-assisted suicide has
Courts that entertain intentional discrimination claims and disproportionate
impact claims under the Thirteenth Amendment should award appropriate equitable and legal remedies to make aggrieved plaintiffs whole, including injunctive relief and compensatory damages. See text accompanying notes 304-307 supra
423 As stated elsewhere in this article, other statistics such as insurance, age,
and
sex should also be obtained for the purpose of ascertaining whether physicianassisted suicide has a disproportionate impact involving status other than race and
color. Because the primary focus of this article is on the application of the Thirteenth Amendment, which primarily involves racial discrimination, no position is
taken here on the best method of preventing and remedying other types of discrimination.
42
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been shown to have an improper, disproportionate impact on racial
groups.
In establishing a disproportionate impact claim, one might look
at the death statistics of each physician or other medical providers.
A comparison might be made by evaluating the percentage of each
race's death by physician-assisted suicide when compared to the total
number of each race's deaths. If such comparison shows a disproportionate number of physician-assisted suicides in a racial group, a
disproportionate impact claim under the Thirteenth Amendment
might be viable.
A statistical difference alone, however, might not show that the
disparity is improper. For example, polls have shown that white
Americans are more in favor of legalizing physician-assisted suicide
than African Americans.2 4 This is some evidence that, in practice,
more white Americans would request and ultimately receive physician-assisted suicide. Therefore, if statistics show that more African
Americans and other minorities receive physician-assisted suicides
than white Americans, an investigation into the reasons for that disparity would be reasonable. Yet regardless of the disparity in favor of
or against a particular racial group, one might raise the argument
that the persons who received physician-assisted suicide freely requested it without any coercion or undue influence from their physicians or other medical providers. In other words, the allegation
would be that any percentage racial disparity is legitimate and not
the type of disproportionate impact that should be a violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
For those who still pursue disproportionate impact claims in
light of such allegations, the only way to rebut those contentions
would be to engage in a case-by-case evaluation of each patient's informed consent disclosure to determine whether there has been improper coercion and undue influence. This might raise privacy issues whereby some patients' estates would attempt to prevent
disclosure of videotapes and other medical record information. On
occasion, however, privacy interests in medical records have given
way to other legitimate concerns. The ascertainment of improper,
disproportionate racial impacts in the application of physicianassisted suicide might outweigh patients' privacy interests. One
mitigating factor might be that only videotapes and medical records
of the disproportionately impacted group would be required in or-

424

See supra notes 95 and 96 and accompanying text.
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der to ascertain whether improper influence and coercion has occurred during informed consent disclosures.
Despite the proof problems discussed above, those who believe
that physician-assisted suicide has been administered in an improper
manner should be given the opportunity to present their cases before courts by alleging direct claims under the Thirteenth Amendment. In the process of litigating such claims, attorneys might develop new means of proving improper disproportionate impacts on
certain racial groups. Similarly, attorneys might utilize existing
means or develop new methods of proving intentional racial discrimination in the application of physician-assisted suicide because
intentional discrimination claims should also be cognizable under
the Thirteenth Amendment.
For physician-assisted suicide purposes, in addition to the direct
application of the disproportionate impact theory to physicianassisted suicide statistics, the theory might also be used to help wipe
out remaining racism in the health care industry, such that one
would no longer be fearful of the possibility that physicians and hospitals might engage in racist medical treatment. Some uses of the
theory might include, but not be limited to, lawsuits that (1) promote the integration of housing patterns, which normally leads to an
increase in access to health care, (2) prevent the relocation of medical facilities from inner-city areas to suburban areas, (3) increase access to nursing homes, (4) decrease medical treatment practices that
have disproportionate impacts on racial minorities, and (5) increase
the number of minority physicians.
2.

Racial Discrimination in Housing Patterns

Some of the problems that African Americans experience in obtaining access to medical care stem from their living in segregated
urban areas that are predominantly populated by African Americans.42 5 At least two factors have prevented housing integration. One
is that private sellers, real estate agents, and federal housing agencies
have historically promoted racial discrimination in the housing market by using tactics that excluded African Americans and other minorities from purchasing property in white neighborhoods.

425

426

See Randall, supra note 135, at 146.
See MARIANNE FOLEY & GLEN R. JOHNSON, HEALTH

CARE OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN

INNER CmES, HEALTH CARE IssuEs, in BLACK AMERICA, PoLICIEs, PROBLEMS, AND
PROSPECTS 213 (Woodrow Jones, Jr. & Mitchell F. Rice eds., 1987); ALPHONSO
PINKNEY, BLACKAMERICANS 26-31 (3d ed. 1987).
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The other is that many white Americans moved to the suburbs
in response to an increased African-American population in urban
areas. Not surprisingly, white physicians and hospitals followed the
white population by relocating to suburban areas. Therefore, many
African Americans who live in urban inner-city areas must now rely
on a limited number of public hospitals and a smaller number of
physicians. 428 Consequently, the level of medical services that innercity public hospitals and other facilities offer might not equal that of
suburban medical facilities given the latter's superior financial resources.

429

Because racial discrimination in the real estate industry is a
"badge and incident" of slavery," ° Congress enacted the Fair Housing
Act (FHA) pursuant to its Section 2 authority under the Thirteenth
Amendment. 43 The FHA, however, has not been successful in ending either racial discrimination in the real estate industry or the lack
of access to health care caused by this discrimination. The courts'
narrow interpretations of the FHA are partially responsible for the
law's ineffectiveness. For example, in the first portion of its decision
in Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. The Cincinnati Enquirer,
Inc. (HOME), 3 2 the court held that section 3604(c) of the FHA did
not prohibit the use of a "single publication" 43 of
an advertisement
3
which uses a small number of all-white models.
42

See FOLEY &JOHNSON, supra note 426, at 213.

428

See generally Sidney Watson, Health Care in the Inner City: Asking the Right Ques-

tions, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1647 (1993).
4
See id.
430 SeeJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443
(1968).
431 See42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1968).
4S2 943 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1991).
4ss Id. at 648. The plaintiff had alleged:
[O]ver a twenty-year period defendant accepted for publication real
estate advertisements which, in almost every instance, pictured only
white human models. Less than one percent of the advertisements
depicting human models pictured a black model. This percentage
contrasts with a population comprised of 34% black persons in the
City of Cincinnati, 19% in Hamilton County and 12% in the metropolitan statistical area.
Id. at 645.
The plaintiffs' lawsuit alleged that the fact that one newspaper had for twenty
years published many advertisements that depicted only white models "raiseld] a
factual issue of whether such advertisement is discriminatory." Id. Because plaintiffs neither identified the advertisers who paid the newspaper for the publishing of
the advertisements nor alleged that those advertisers had discriminatory intent, the
court relied on regulations from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and dismissed the lawsuit because the regulations did not require the
use of multiracial models in advertisements. See id. at 644-48.
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In the second portion of its opinion, the court held that a violation of section 3604(c) occurs only when a racial message stems from
a particular advertisementm and that the Department of Housing
and Urban Development's (HUD) regulation did not proscribe a
newspaper's multiple advertisement layout of unrelated advertisers
even when each advertisement contains only white models. 5 5 Despite acknowledging that layouts containing unrelated advertisements depicting only white models might be a "powerful engine for
housing segregation,"" the court held that unrelated advertisements
could not be aggregated to establish a violation of section 3604(c).' 7
The court concluded that only a racial preference depicted in an individual advertisement or a series of advertisements from the same
advertiser violates section 3604(c) ."
The court asserted that the adoption of an aggregate advertise4 9
ment theory would "raise important first amendment concerns.
First, the theory allegedly would not promote the FHA's dual purpose of "eradicat[ing] housing discrimination and []promot[ing] integrated housing" given that the theory allegedly had only a tenuous
effect on those policies. Second, the court believed that the aggregate theory was "too extensive" to serve the state interest of eradicating housing discrimination and promoting integration of the housing market."0 Third, the alleged heavy burden that a newspaper
would incur through monitoring both individual advertisements and
the aggregate effect of multiple advertisements outweighed the
"incidental benefit" from the theory."
In its totality, the court's decision in HOME emphasizes the importance of both a direct cause of action under the Thirteenth
Amendment and a disproportionate impact theory as one possible
direct claim. Significantly, the court in HOME denied the plaintiffs'
claim by employing a narrow statutory construction of both section
3604(c) and HUD's regulations, despite implicitly recognizing that a
44

See id. at 650.

435 See id. at 650-51.

436 Id. at 651.
47

See id. at 653.

438 See Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. The Cincinnati Enquirer (HOME),

943 F.2d 644, 653 (6th Cir. 1994). For a critique of HOME, see generally Reginald
Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits of the FairHousing Act: The Intersection of Dominant White Images, The Violence of Neighborhood Purity, and the Master Narrativeof Black
Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARYL. REv. 69 (1995).
HOME, 943 F.2d at 652-53.
440

See id. at 653.

44'

See id.
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layout of unrelated advertisements with only white models "may have

been a powerful engine for housing segregation."" 2 If the court's interpretation of the FHA, HUD's regulations, and the advertisements'
potential discriminatory effect is correct, Congress has not enacted a
statute and HUD has not promulgated regulations that sufficiently
alleviate racial discrimination in the housing industry.4 Therefore,
a direct cause of action under the Thirteenth Amendment would
provide another means of both eradicating housing discrimination
and remedying injuries flowing from persistent racial segregation in

the real estate market."

Despite the HOME plaintiffs' attempt to

raise a Thirteenth Amendment claim, the trial court dismissed the
claim on the grounds that one cannot bring a direct claim under the
Thirteenth Amendment."5 The court, however, did not give any persuasive reason for its conclusion. 4 *
Because racial discrimination in the real estate industry is a
"badge and incident" of slavery, a direct claim under the Thirteenth
Amendment should have trumped any asserted First Amendment
speech arguments in HOME.4" This is especially true because a
newspaper's printing of real estate advertisements is commercial
speech, which should give way to the Thirteenth Amendment's policy of eradicating racial discrimination in the real estate industry."
The eradication of racial discrimination in the real estate industry
would increase access to health care because proximity to medical
442
44S

Id. at 651.
There is no indication in the statute that Congress intended it to be the ex-

clusive means of remedying housing discrimination.
44 The Fair Housing Act does not state that an individual cannot also
bring a
claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1968).
445 See Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. The Cincinnati Enquirer (HOME),
731 F. Supp. 801, 805 n.4 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
446 See id.
447 See HOME 943 F.2d
at 651.
448 This would be consistent with the same manner in which the Thirteenth
Amendment and civil rights statutes enacted under Section 2 of the amendment
trumped parents' First Amendment arguments against interference with their freedom of association rights to send children to private schools excluding African
Americans, and with the fact that private conduct amounting to "blockbustering"
did not receive First Amendment protection. See infra note 480 and accompanying
text. Consistently, First Amendment arguments should not be sufficient to justify
racial discrimination in the real estate industry. To the extent that an aggrieved
plaintiff can show that a newspaper's printing of different real estate advertisements
in the aggregate has a disproportionate impact on African Americans' and other
minorities' purchase of real estate in white neighborhoods, the newspaper should
be required to show that its policy of publishing advertisements is a legitimate interest that cannot be achieved by means that have less harmful impacts on African
Americans and other minorities.
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providers normally determines the frequency of one's use of medical
services.449 As such, a refusal to engage in a constructive use of the
Thirteenth Amendment to end discrimination in real estate advertisements and in other real estate practices will ultimately mean that
African Americans, and other minorities, will have less access to
health care.4
The Thirteenth Amendment can also be used to prevent the relocation of hospitals and other medical facilities from inner-city areas
that are predominately populated by minority groups. For example,
aggrieved plaintiffs should be allowed to bring direct claims under
the Thirteenth Amendment challenging the relocation of hospitals
and other medical facilities from inner-city to suburban areas if such

moves would have •••a disproportionate
impact on African Americans
451
and other minonues.
A direct claim under the Thirteenth
Amendment would impose a more stringent requirement on those
seeking a relocation than some courts have imposed under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42
For example, in NAACP v. Medical Center,4 5' the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant's plans to relocate a portion of its medical facility
to a suburban area was violative of Title VI because it caused several
disproportionate effects on African Americans and other minorities
by reducing their access to medical treatment.4 " The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit accepted the district court's
conclusion that Title VI creates a disproportionate impact right of
action and that plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case by merely
showing that the challenged relocation had a disproportionate im449 For a discussion of African Americans' access to health care,
see generally

Randall, supranote 135.
40 See id.
451 Similarly, state governments and the federal government
can deny hospitals
and other medical facilities the certificates that they need to move from inner-city
areas, predominantly populated by African Americans and other minorities, to suburban areas.
452 A strict scrutiny standard should be used to resolve a direct
claim under the
Thirteenth Amendment. See text accompanying supra notes 404-416.
453 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
454 See id. at 1326. In additional to alleging a reduction to medical treatment
access, the plaintiffs alleged that the travel distance to the suburban facility would reduce the "number of minority and elderly visitors to inpatients at the Southwest facility"; that "minority pediatric inpatients, would be adversely affected by a decrease
in the number of visitors caused by the location of services at Southwest"; that the
portion of defendant's facility that remained in the inner-center area would be
maintained in an inferior condition; and that the relocation would cause a "racial
indentifiability" whereby the inner-city area would be predominately minority and
the suburban facility would be predominately white. See id. at 1327.

SETON HALL LA WREV1EW

892

[Vol. 28:774

pact on minority plaintiffs. 55 The district court and the Third Circuit assumed a disproportionate impact on minorities and then considered the defendant's burden of proof when responding to a
prima facie case.4 The district court would have imposed a burden
on the defendant to produce evidence that the relocation "'in theory
and practice' serve[d] 'a legitimate bona fide interest of
[defendant] ... and.., show that no alternative course of action

could be adopted that would
enable that interest to be served with
45 7
less discriminatory impact.'"

In contrast, the Third Circuit apparently would have adopted a
rational relationship test, thereby allowing the defendant to prevail if
it showed that the relocation was "rationally related" to the defendant's purpose of improving its educational programs and its quality
of care and facilities.4 - The Third Circuit even indicated that, on the
showing of a rational relation, a defendant does not have to produce
evidence that there are no alternatives with less disproportionate effects.459 Instead, the Third Circuit held that the ultimate burden of
persuasion was on the plaintiff to show that "a feasible, yet less onerous alternative exists.'
Although the Third Circuit's rational relation test is very deferential to defendants, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in Bryan v. Koch' is much less exacting on defendants. Besides adoption of its own version of the rational relation
standard, 2 the Second Circuit would not even address the presence
or absence of alternatives with less disproportionate impacts after a
defendant has met its rational relation showing.4
The plaintiffs' and defendants' burdens of production and persuasion under Title VI are important because Title VI is one of a
small number of federal laws that affect most hospitals and health
care facilities due to their acceptance of federal funds through
455 See id. at 1328-31. Subsequently, the Supreme Court has established that
Title

VI itself requires plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent, but that the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare implementing regulations provide for a disproportionate impact theory. See generally Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); see
alsoWatson, supra note 403, at 952-55.
4Se
NAACP, 657 F.2d at 1332-33.
457

Id. at 1336.
48 See id. at 1336 (citingJefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 550 (1972)).
459 See id.
460 Id. at 1335.
461 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
462
463

See id. at 616-18.
See id. at 618.
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Medicaid and Medicare.'" As shown in NAACP v. Medical Center and
Bryan v. Koch, however, courts have been much too deferential to defendants' justifications for using facially neutral policies that have
disproportionate effects on African Americans and other minorities.
Under the Thirteenth Amendment, a defendant's burden would be
much more rigorous than either a rational relation test or merely the
burden of producing some evidence of a legitimate business interest
or goal that the challenged practice serves.465 After a plaintiff has
shown a prima facie case of disproportionate harmful impact in a
claim brought directly under the Thirteenth Amendment, the burden should shift to the defendant to show that its challenged policies
are narrowly tailored to a legitimate interest and that no less harmful
alternatives would substantially serve the interest.i
3.

Nursing Home Discrimination and Other Medical
Treatment Discrimination

Another area where the facially neutral policies of health care
institutions have a disproportionate impact on African Americans is
in the provision of nursing home services. Given that Medicaid provides a substantial portion of nursing home funding, one would expect that African Americans would be well represented in nursing
homes because a significant number of elderly African Americans receive Medicaid.i 7 One commentator, however, has asserted that
"[n]ursing homes are the most segregated publicly licensed health
care facilities in America."4" Despite the percentage of African
Americans on Medicaid, the percentage of African-American patients
in nursing homes is relatively low." 9 The manner in which nursing
4
465

SeeWatson, supra note 428, at 1666-68.
A defendant should have the burden of showing that its challenged practices

are narrowly tailored to a legitimate private interest and that there are no less restrictive alternatives that would serve that interest.
46 "Substantially serving" the legitimate interest is proper
because some cost effectiveness or profitability, or other economic efficiencies, might have to be sacrificed to alleviate the disproportionate impact of some facially neutral practices. For
example, an employer who has a policy of paying white employees ten dollars per
hour and African Americans five dollars per hour for the same work, experience,
and skills has a policy that causes a disproportionate impact on African Americans.
Obviously, such a policy is unlawful, and the employer would be required to pay the
same wages to all similarly-situated employees. A wage adjustment of an additional
five dollars per hour for the African-American employees would result in an acceptable reduction in the employer's profits.
467 See Watson, supra note 428,
at 1667.
468 Id.
469 See Randall, supra note 135, at 155-56. In 1993, African Americans comprised
29% of those on Medicaid, but accounted for only 10% of the patients in interme-
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homes certify a limited number of beds for Medicaid patients has a
disproportionate impact on African-American patients, many of
whom are poorer than white Americans and therefore cannot afford
to pay for noncertified nursing home beds. 7 Poverty, however, is
not the only reason for the disparity. Even when African Americans
have the financial resources to pay for nursing home care, many of
them are denied access to nursing homes.47'
African Americans are also denied access to hospitals and other
health care facilities due to facially neutral practices that have a disproportionate impact. Scholars believe that hospital policies such as
admitting only patients of physicians with staff privileges and of not
having staff physicians who admit Medicaid patients have a dispro472
portionate impact on African Americans.
They also believe that
requiring substantial deposits as a precondition to hospital admissions has a similar impact.4 " Furthermore, the disparity in medical
treatment that physicians give to African-American patients when
compared to the treatment of white Americans also shows the disproportionate impact of hospitals' and physicians' policies and procedures.474
Facially neutral policies might also be responsible for the small
number of African Americans and other minorities who become
physicians. 475

Despite being roughly twelve percent of the popula-

diate care nursing homes and 9% percent of those in skilled nursing homes. See id.
at 156.
470 See id. at 156-58.
471 See Watson, supra note 428, at
1667-68.
472
See Randall, supra note 135, at 149; Watson, supra note 428, at 1667
(explaining that "[w ] hile most hospitals participate in the Medicaid program, many
explicitly cap the number of Medicaid patients they will treat."). "Others use a variety of mechanisms to exclude Medicaid patients.... Each may foreclose access to
health care in inner cities." Id.
473 See Randall, supra note 135, at 149; Watson,
supranote 428, at 1666.
474 See Randall, supra note 135, at 160-62 (discussing studies showing
that African
Americans receive less coronary angiography; bypass surgery; aggressive kidney
treatment, including hemodialysis; internal medical treatment; and caesarean sections than white Americans even when they have financial resources to pay for those
treatments); see also text accompanying notes 177-196 supra
475 The connection between the present day shortage of African-American
physicians and slavery is much stronger than the connection with nursing homes. Neither slaves nor free African Americans could realistically expect to attend medical
schools during slavery. Before Howard University College of Medicine was established in 1868, and Meharry Medical College in 1876, there was no place for free
African Americans to attend medical school. See MAX SEHAM, BLAcKS AND AMERICAN
MEDICAL CARE 43-46 (1973). Those were the only two medical schools open to African Americans in the South before 1948. See id. Although between 1938 and 1939,
22 of the 27 medical schools in the United States had admitted a few African
Americans, and the number of students steadily increased, it was not until 1971 that
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tion, African Americans comprise approximately three percent of
physicians in America. 47 An increase in the number of AfricanAmerican physicians will probably increase African Americans' access
to health care because African-American physicians are the ones who
primarily work in inner-city areas where African Americans predominately reside.4 7 An increase in the number of African-American physicians might mean that more of them will have the opportunity to
participate in hospitals' and other health care institutions' decisionmaking processes; this might lead to the adoption of policies
and procedures that have less discriminatory impact on African
Americans and other minorities.4 7 Therefore, to the extent that
medical schools' facially neutral policies and procedures, including
admission tests, are having a disproportionate impact on minorities,
aggrieved persons should be able to challenge those policies through
a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment.4 79
All of the above-described areas of the health care system, which
evidence racially disproportionate impacts by either intentional discrimination or by facially neutral policies, are ripe for appropriate
challenges through a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. This is not to say that plaintiffs will succeed in winning all of
their lawsuits; however, they should at least be given the opportunity
to present valid claims. This is particularly important because disproportionate impact claims under the Thirteenth Amendment
generally would not abridge defendants' rights under other constitutional provisions.'
all medical schools in the South admitted African-American students. See id. Despite opening admission to African Americans, most of those schools did not have
any African-American students. See id.
476 See Randall, supra note 135, at 158.
47 See id. at 158.
478 See id. at 159-60.
479 Commentators have noted both the modest increase in the percentage of African-American and Hispanic medical students, and that approximately 40% of African-American students attend only 14 medical schools. See Lelia B. Helms & Charles M. Helms et al., Litigation in Medical Education: Retrospect and Prospect, 11 J.
CONTEMP. HALTH L. & POL'Y 317, 336 (1995) (noting that "[als medical schools
continue to contend with demands for access, more litigation may reinforce demands for the diversification of the medical profession.").
480 See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that the federal
anti-discrimination policy underlying § 1981, which was enacted under Congress's
Section 2 authority, outweighed the defendant's First Amendment association rights
to send white students to private schools that excluded African Americans); Brown
v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting a
Christian school's contention that freedom of religion supported its exclusion of
African Americans to avoid interracial marriage, and avoiding a direct conflict between the Thirteenth Amendment and the First Amendment by finding that the
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CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Glucksberg allows states the opportunity
to study and debate the propriety of physician-assisted suicide. If
appropriate investigation shows that medication will not alleviate
terminally ill patients' pain in a substantial number of cases, then
physician-assisted suicide should be legalized.
States, however,
should enact and vigorously enforce laws, rules, and procedures that
prevent physicians' and others' racism to ensure that the practical
application of physician-assisted suicide does not have a disproportionate impact on African Americans and other minorities. In addition to such state law protection, aggrieved persons should be given
the opportunity to bring direct claims under the Thirteenth
Amendment in order to obtain remedies for injuries caused by physician-assisted suicide and by other policies that either intentionally
discriminate or have disproportionate impacts on them.

school's racist policy was not "religion"); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212
n.9 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1968's prohibition on racist
housing advertisements outweighed the defendant's contention that the advertisement was protected by the First Amendment, on the grounds that the racist advertisement was commercial speech that must give way to the federal antidiscrimination policy); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115,
121 (5th Cir. 1973) (asserting that "blockbustering" activities were conduct and not
protected First Amendment speech and "'conclud [ing] that the statute is one regulating conduct, and that any inhibiting effect it may have upon speech is justified by
the Government's interest in protecting its citizens from discriminatory housing
practices and is not violative of the First Amendment.'").
Some defendants might assert that direct claims under the Thirteenth
Amendment, and under federal civil rights laws, impermissibly infringe on their
fundamental property rights and even constitute an unconstitutional taking of their
property. Counter arguments to such theories might emphasize that historically,
discriminators' property rights have either completely given way to or been substantially regulated by federal policy against racial discrimination. First, the Thirteenth
Amendment itself totally alienated slave masters from their slave property without
providing just compensation as reimbursement for the loss. Second, numerous
federal civil rights laws now place restrictions on the free use of private property.
For example, one cannot construct a public amusement park on his or her private
property and then deny admission to African Americans or other races. One cannot build a manufacturing plant on his private land and then hire only white employees. One cannot build a hospital, an apartment complex, or a private school to
serve only white patrons. In the public accommodation arena, § 1981 prevents individuals from refusing to enter into contracts with African Americans on the same
basis as other races, and in the employment context, Title VII prohibits racially discriminatory conduct.
Therefore, consistent with the acceptable ramifications flowing from other
civil rights laws, any restriction on the use of private property stemming from a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment would not generally constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of property.

